Persist the position of the cocoa window #2

samdeane · 2020-04-08T16:46:20Z

I tend to move the window to another screen, and it's a pain that it doesn't restore to the same place.

This patch fixes that.

Initially I tried just using [NSWindow frameAutosaveName], but it has a few issues:

when launched from the Terminal, some funny business appears to go on, which means that it always restores the window to the same screen that the Terminal window was on; this is not the behaviour I expected
because the window can resize multiple times during boot of the guest OS, there's a danger of the originally persisted frame getting wiped out.

So what I did instead was just persist the origin of the window (in the user defaults), whenever the user explicitly moves the window. I then attempt to restore this origin whenever the window is resized by the emulator.

I'm persisting the origin (which is the bottom-left), so the initial frame during boot up doesn't appear to be right, but by the time booting is finished and the window is back to the size it was previously, the origin is correct and everything is hunky dory.

I did this on top of your screamer branch, so I figured I'd make a PR here. I might also try to submit a patch, but I wasn't quite sure whether the cocoa.m from here has a bunch of other changes in it.

Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>

The window will often resize a few times during booting of the guest OS, so we don't really want to store the frame. Instead we just remember the origin and restore that; by the time boot has finished, if the window is back to its previous size, the frame will also be back to what it was.

'crypto_opts' forgot to free in qcow2_close(), this patch fix the bellow leak stack: Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0edd81f970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970) #1 0x7f0edc6d149d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d) #2 0x55d7eaede63d in qobject_input_start_struct /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qapi/qobject-input-visitor.c:295 #3 0x55d7eaed78b8 in visit_start_struct /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qapi/qapi-visit-core.c:49 #4 0x55d7eaf5140b in visit_type_QCryptoBlockOpenOptions qapi/qapi-visit-crypto.c:290 qemu#5 0x55d7eae43af3 in block_crypto_open_opts_init /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/crypto.c:163 qemu#6 0x55d7eacd2924 in qcow2_update_options_prepare /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1148 qemu#7 0x55d7eacd33f7 in qcow2_update_options /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1232 qemu#8 0x55d7eacd9680 in qcow2_do_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1512 qemu#9 0x55d7eacdc55e in qcow2_open_entry /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1792 qemu#10 0x55d7eacdc8fe in qcow2_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1819 qemu#11 0x55d7eac3742d in bdrv_open_driver /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:1317 qemu#12 0x55d7eac3e990 in bdrv_open_common /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:1575 qemu#13 0x55d7eac4442c in bdrv_open_inherit /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:3126 qemu#14 0x55d7eac45c3f in bdrv_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:3219 qemu#15 0x55d7ead8e8a4 in blk_new_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/block-backend.c:397 qemu#16 0x55d7eacde74c in qcow2_co_create /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:3534 qemu#17 0x55d7eacdfa6d in qcow2_co_create_opts /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:3668 qemu#18 0x55d7eac1c678 in bdrv_create_co_entry /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:485 qemu#19 0x55d7eb0024d2 in coroutine_trampoline /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/util/coroutine-ucontext.c:115 Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200227012950.12256-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>

'type/id' forgot to free in qmp_object_add, this patch fix that. The leak stack: Direct leak of 84 byte(s) in 6 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe2a5ebf768 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef768) #1 0x7fe2a5044445 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x52445) #2 0x7fe2a505dd92 in g_strdup (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6bd92) #3 0x56344954e692 in qmp_object_add /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/qom-qmp-cmds.c:258 #4 0x563449960f5a in do_qmp_dispatch /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:132 qemu#5 0x563449960f5a in qmp_dispatch /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:175 qemu#6 0x563449498a30 in monitor_qmp_dispatch /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:145 qemu#7 0x56344949a64f in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:234 qemu#8 0x563449a92a3a in aio_bh_call /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/util/async.c:136 Direct leak of 54 byte(s) in 6 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe2a5ebf768 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef768) #1 0x7fe2a5044445 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x52445) #2 0x7fe2a505dd92 in g_strdup (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6bd92) #3 0x56344954e6c4 in qmp_object_add /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/qom-qmp-cmds.c:267 #4 0x563449960f5a in do_qmp_dispatch /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:132 qemu#5 0x563449960f5a in qmp_dispatch /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:175 qemu#6 0x563449498a30 in monitor_qmp_dispatch /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:145 qemu#7 0x56344949a64f in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:234 qemu#8 0x563449a92a3a in aio_bh_call /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/util/async.c:136 Fixes: 5f07c4d Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Message-Id: <20200310064640.5059-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Acked-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>

Previously, the signal handler would be byte swapped if the target and host CPU used different endianness. This would cause a SIGSEGV when attempting to translate the opcode pointed to by the swapped address. Thread 1 "qemu-ppc64" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000600a9257 in ldl_he_p (ptr=0x4c2c061000000000) at qemu/include/qemu/bswap.h:351 351 __builtin_memcpy(&r, ptr, sizeof(r)); #0 0x00000000600a9257 in ldl_he_p (ptr=0x4c2c061000000000) at qemu/include/qemu/bswap.h:351 #1 0x00000000600a92fe in ldl_be_p (ptr=0x4c2c061000000000) at qemu/include/qemu/bswap.h:449 #2 0x00000000600c0790 in translator_ldl_swap at qemu/include/exec/translator.h:201 #3 0x000000006011c1ab in ppc_tr_translate_insn at qemu/target/ppc/translate.c:7856 #4 0x000000006005ae70 in translator_loop at qemu/accel/tcg/translator.c:102 The signal handler will be byte swapped as a result of the __get_user() call in sigaction() if it is necessary, no additional swap is required. Signed-off-by: Vincent Fazio <vfazio@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20200319133244.8818-1-vfazio@xes-inc.com> Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

There is a use-after-free possible: bdrv_unref_child() leaves bs->backing freed but not NULL. bdrv_attach_child may produce nested polling loop due to drain, than access of freed pointer is possible. I've produced the following crash on 30 iotest with modified code. It does not reproduce on master, but still seems possible: #0 __strcmp_avx2 () at /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 bdrv_backing_overridden (bs=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:6350 #2 bdrv_refresh_filename (bs=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:6404 #3 bdrv_backing_attach (c=0x55c9d48e5520) at block.c:1063 #4 bdrv_replace_child_noperm (child=child@entry=0x55c9d48e5520, new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:2290 qemu#5 bdrv_replace_child (child=child@entry=0x55c9d48e5520, new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:2320 qemu#6 bdrv_root_attach_child (child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing", child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>, ctx=<optimized out>, perm=<optimized out>, shared_perm=21, opaque=0x55c9d3c5a3d0, errp=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:2424 qemu#7 bdrv_attach_child (parent_bs=parent_bs@entry=0x55c9d3c5a3d0, child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing", child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:5876 qemu#8 in bdrv_set_backing_hd (bs=bs@entry=0x55c9d3c5a3d0, backing_hd=backing_hd@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:2576 qemu#9 stream_prepare (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at block/stream.c:150 qemu#10 job_prepare (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:761 qemu#11 job_txn_apply (txn=<optimized out>, fn=<optimized out>) at job.c:145 qemu#12 job_do_finalize (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:778 qemu#13 job_completed_txn_success (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:832 qemu#14 job_completed (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:845 qemu#15 job_completed (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:836 qemu#16 job_exit (opaque=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:864 qemu#17 aio_bh_call (bh=0x55c9d471a160) at util/async.c:117 qemu#18 aio_bh_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55c9d3c46720) at util/async.c:117 qemu#19 aio_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55c9d3c46720, blocking=blocking@entry=true) at util/aio-posix.c:728 qemu#20 bdrv_parent_drained_begin_single (poll=true, c=0x55c9d3d558f0) at block/io.c:121 qemu#21 bdrv_parent_drained_begin_single (c=c@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0, poll=poll@entry=true) at block/io.c:114 qemu#22 bdrv_replace_child_noperm (child=child@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0, new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300) at block.c:2258 qemu#23 bdrv_replace_child (child=child@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0, new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300) at block.c:2320 qemu#24 bdrv_root_attach_child (child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300, child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing", child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>, ctx=<optimized out>, perm=<optimized out>, shared_perm=21, opaque=0x55c9d3cc2060, errp=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:2424 qemu#25 bdrv_attach_child (parent_bs=parent_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300, child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing", child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:5876 qemu#26 bdrv_set_backing_hd (bs=bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, backing_hd=backing_hd@entry=0x55c9d3d27300, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:2576 qemu#27 stream_prepare (job=0x55c9d495ead0) at block/stream.c:150 ... Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com> Message-Id: <20200316060631.30052-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>

We neglect to free port->bh on the error paths. Fix that. Reproducer: {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'virtio_serial_pci0', 'driver': 'virtio-serial-pci', 'bus': 'pci.0', 'addr': '0x5'}, 'id': 'yVkZcGgV'} {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'port1', 'driver': 'virtserialport', 'name': 'port1', 'chardev': 'channel1', 'bus': 'virtio_serial_pci0.0', 'nr': 1}, 'id': '3dXdUgJA'} {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'port2', 'driver': 'virtserialport', 'name': 'port2', 'chardev': 'channel2', 'bus': 'virtio_serial_pci0.0', 'nr': 1}, 'id': 'qLzcCkob'} {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'port2', 'driver': 'virtserialport', 'name': 'port2', 'chardev': 'channel2', 'bus': 'virtio_serial_pci0.0', 'nr': 2}, 'id': 'qLzcCkob'} The leak stack: Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f04a8008ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8) #1 0x7f04a73cf1d5 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x531d5) #2 0x56273eaee484 in aio_bh_new /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/async.c:125 #3 0x56273eafe9a8 in qemu_bh_new /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/main-loop.c:532 #4 0x56273d52e62e in virtser_port_device_realize /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c:946 qemu#5 0x56273dcc5040 in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891 qemu#6 0x56273e5ebbce in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:2238 qemu#7 0x56273e5e5a9c in object_property_set /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:1324 qemu#8 0x56273e5ef5f8 in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26 qemu#9 0x56273e5e5e6a in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:1390 qemu#10 0x56273daa40de in qdev_device_add /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:680 qemu#11 0x56273daa53e9 in qmp_device_add /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:805 Fixes: 199646d Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit@kernel.org> Message-Id: <20200309021738.30072-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

virtio_vqs forgot to free on the error path in realize(). Fix that. The asan stack: Direct leak of 14336 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f58b93fd970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970) #1 0x7f58b858249d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d) #2 0x5562cc627f49 in virtio_add_queue /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2413 #3 0x5562cc4b524a in virtio_blk_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/block/virtio-blk.c:1202 #4 0x5562cc613050 in virtio_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3615 qemu#5 0x5562ccb7a568 in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891 qemu#6 0x5562cd39cd45 in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:2238 Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200328005705.29898-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

The tulip networking card emulation has an OOB issue in 'tulip_copy_tx_buffers' when the guest provide malformed descriptor. This test will trigger a ASAN heap overflow crash. To trigger this issue we can construct the data as following: 1. construct a 'tulip_descriptor'. Its control is set to '0x7ff | 0x7ff << 11', this will make the 'tulip_copy_tx_buffers's 'len1' and 'len2' to 0x7ff(2047). So 'len1+len2' will overflow 'TULIPState's 'tx_frame' field. This descriptor's 'buf_addr1' and 'buf_addr2' should set to a guest address. 2. write this descriptor to tulip device's CSR4 register. This will set the 'TULIPState's 'current_tx_desc' field. 3. write 'CSR6_ST' to tulip device's CSR6 register. This will trigger 'tulip_xmit_list_update' and finally calls 'tulip_copy_tx_buffers'. Following shows the backtrack of crash: ==31781==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x628000007cd0 at pc 0x7fe03c5a077a bp 0x7fff05b46770 sp 0x7fff05b45f18 WRITE of size 2047 at 0x628000007cd0 thread T0 #0 0x7fe03c5a0779 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79779) #1 0x5575fb6daa6a in flatview_read_continue /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3194 #2 0x5575fb6daccb in flatview_read /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3227 #3 0x5575fb6dae66 in address_space_read_full /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3240 #4 0x5575fb6db0cb in address_space_rw /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3268 qemu#5 0x5575fbdfd460 in dma_memory_rw_relaxed /home/test/qemu/include/sysemu/dma.h:87 qemu#6 0x5575fbdfd4b5 in dma_memory_rw /home/test/qemu/include/sysemu/dma.h:110 qemu#7 0x5575fbdfd866 in pci_dma_rw /home/test/qemu/include/hw/pci/pci.h:787 qemu#8 0x5575fbdfd8a3 in pci_dma_read /home/test/qemu/include/hw/pci/pci.h:794 qemu#9 0x5575fbe02761 in tulip_copy_tx_buffers hw/net/tulip.c:585 qemu#10 0x5575fbe0366b in tulip_xmit_list_update hw/net/tulip.c:678 qemu#11 0x5575fbe04073 in tulip_write hw/net/tulip.c:783 Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>

Since commit 8c6b035 ("util/async: make bh_aio_poll() O(1)"), migration-test reveals a leak: QTEST_QEMU_BINARY=x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 tests/qtest/migration-test -p /x86_64/migration/postcopy/recovery tests/qtest/libqtest.c:140: kill_qemu() tried to terminate QEMU process but encountered exit status 1 (expected 0) ================================================================= ==2082571==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f25971dfc58 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0x10dc58) #1 0x7f2596d08358 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x57358) #2 0x560970d006f8 in qemu_bh_new /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/main-loop.c:532 #3 0x5609704afa02 in migrate_fd_connect /home/elmarco/src/qemu/migration/migration.c:3407 #4 0x5609704b6b6f in migration_channel_connect /home/elmarco/src/qemu/migration/channel.c:92 qemu#5 0x5609704b2bfb in socket_outgoing_migration /home/elmarco/src/qemu/migration/socket.c:108 qemu#6 0x560970b9bd6c in qio_task_complete /home/elmarco/src/qemu/io/task.c:196 qemu#7 0x560970b9aa97 in qio_task_thread_result /home/elmarco/src/qemu/io/task.c:111 qemu#8 0x7f2596cfee3a (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4de3a) Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200325184723.2029630-2-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Direct leak of 4120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fa114931887 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.6+0xb0887) #1 0x7fa1144ad8f0 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x588f0) #2 0x561e3c9c8897 in qmp_object_add /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qom/qom-qmp-cmds.c:291 #3 0x561e3cf48736 in qmp_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:155 #4 0x561e3c8efb36 in monitor_qmp_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:145 qemu#5 0x561e3c8f09ed in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher /home/elmarco/src/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:234 qemu#6 0x561e3d08c993 in aio_bh_call /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/async.c:136 qemu#7 0x561e3d08d0a5 in aio_bh_poll /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/async.c:164 qemu#8 0x561e3d0a535a in aio_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/aio-posix.c:380 qemu#9 0x561e3d08e3ca in aio_ctx_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/async.c:298 qemu#10 0x7fa1144a776e in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5276e) Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200325184723.2029630-3-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

There is an overflow, the source 'datain.data[2]' is 100 bytes, but the 'ss' is 252 bytes.This may cause a security issue because we can access a lot of unrelated memory data. The len for sbp copy data should take the minimum of mx_sb_len and sb_len_wr, not the maximum. If we use iscsi device for VM backend storage, ASAN show stack: READ of size 252 at 0xfffd149dcfc4 thread T0 #0 0xaaad433d0d34 in __asan_memcpy (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2cb0d34) #1 0xaaad45f9d6d0 in iscsi_aio_ioctl_cb /qemu/block/iscsi.c:996:9 #2 0xfffd1af0e2dc (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xe2dc) #3 0xfffd1af0d174 (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xd174) #4 0xfffd1af19fac (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0x19fac) qemu#5 0xaaad45f9acc8 in iscsi_process_read /qemu/block/iscsi.c:403:5 qemu#6 0xaaad4623733c in aio_dispatch_handler /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:467:9 qemu#7 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch_handlers /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:510:20 qemu#8 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:520 qemu#9 0xaaad46215944 in aio_ctx_dispatch /qemu/util/async.c:298:5 qemu#10 0xfffd1bed12f4 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x512f4) qemu#11 0xaaad46227de0 in glib_pollfds_poll /qemu/util/main-loop.c:219:9 qemu#12 0xaaad46227de0 in os_host_main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:242 qemu#13 0xaaad46227de0 in main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:518 qemu#14 0xaaad43d9d60c in qemu_main_loop /qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1662:9 qemu#15 0xaaad4607a5b0 in main /qemu/softmmu/main.c:49:5 qemu#16 0xfffd1a460b9c in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20b9c) qemu#17 0xaaad43320740 in _start (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2c00740) 0xfffd149dcfc4 is located 0 bytes to the right of 100-byte region [0xfffd149dcf60,0xfffd149dcfc4) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaad433d1e70 in __interceptor_malloc (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2cb1e70) #1 0xfffd1af0e254 (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xe254) #2 0xfffd1af0d174 (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xd174) #3 0xfffd1af19fac (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0x19fac) #4 0xaaad45f9acc8 in iscsi_process_read /qemu/block/iscsi.c:403:5 qemu#5 0xaaad4623733c in aio_dispatch_handler /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:467:9 qemu#6 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch_handlers /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:510:20 qemu#7 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:520 qemu#8 0xaaad46215944 in aio_ctx_dispatch /qemu/util/async.c:298:5 qemu#9 0xfffd1bed12f4 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x512f4) qemu#10 0xaaad46227de0 in glib_pollfds_poll /qemu/util/main-loop.c:219:9 qemu#11 0xaaad46227de0 in os_host_main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:242 qemu#12 0xaaad46227de0 in main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:518 qemu#13 0xaaad43d9d60c in qemu_main_loop /qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1662:9 qemu#14 0xaaad4607a5b0 in main /qemu/softmmu/main.c:49:5 qemu#15 0xfffd1a460b9c in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20b9c) qemu#16 0xaaad43320740 in _start (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2c00740) Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Qun <kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Message-id: 20200418062602.10776-1-kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

virtio_net_device_realize() rejects invalid duplex and speed values. The error handling is broken: $ ../qemu/bld-sani/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 -S -display none -monitor stdio QEMU 4.2.93 monitor - type 'help' for more information (qemu) device_add virtio-net,duplex=x Error: 'duplex' must be 'half' or 'full' (qemu) c ================================================================= ==15654==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x62e000014590 at pc 0x560b75c8dc13 bp 0x7fffdf1a6950 sp 0x7fffdf1a6940 READ of size 8 at 0x62e000014590 thread T0 #0 0x560b75c8dc12 in object_dynamic_cast_assert /work/armbru/qemu/qom/object.c:826 #1 0x560b74c38ac0 in virtio_vmstate_change /work/armbru/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3210 #2 0x560b74d9765e in vm_state_notify /work/armbru/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1271 #3 0x560b7494ba72 in vm_prepare_start /work/armbru/qemu/cpus.c:2156 #4 0x560b7494bacd in vm_start /work/armbru/qemu/cpus.c:2162 qemu#5 0x560b75a7d890 in qmp_cont /work/armbru/qemu/monitor/qmp-cmds.c:160 qemu#6 0x560b75a8d70a in hmp_cont /work/armbru/qemu/monitor/hmp-cmds.c:1043 qemu#7 0x560b75a799f2 in handle_hmp_command /work/armbru/qemu/monitor/hmp.c:1082 [...] 0x62e000014590 is located 33168 bytes inside of 42288-byte region [0x62e00000c400,0x62e000016930) freed by thread T1 here: #0 0x7feadd39491f in __interceptor_free (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0x10d91f) #1 0x7feadcebcd7c in g_free (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x55d7c) #2 0x560b75c8fd40 in object_unref /work/armbru/qemu/qom/object.c:1128 #3 0x560b7498a625 in memory_region_unref /work/armbru/qemu/memory.c:1762 #4 0x560b74999fa4 in do_address_space_destroy /work/armbru/qemu/memory.c:2788 qemu#5 0x560b762362fc in call_rcu_thread /work/armbru/qemu/util/rcu.c:283 qemu#6 0x560b761c8884 in qemu_thread_start /work/armbru/qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519 qemu#7 0x7fead9be34bf in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x84bf) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7feadd394d18 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0x10dd18) #1 0x7feadcebcc88 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x55c88) #2 0x560b75c8cf8a in object_new /work/armbru/qemu/qom/object.c:699 #3 0x560b75010ad9 in qdev_device_add /work/armbru/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:654 #4 0x560b750120c2 in qmp_device_add /work/armbru/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:805 qemu#5 0x560b75012c1b in hmp_device_add /work/armbru/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:905 [...] ==15654==ABORTING Cause: virtio_net_device_realize() neglects to bail out after setting the error. Fix that. Fixes: 9473939 Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200422130719.28225-9-armbru@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

With virtio-vga, pci bar are reordered. Bar #2 is used for compatibility with stdvga. By default, bar #2 is used by virtio modern io bar. This bar is the last one introduce in the virtio pci bar layout and it's crushed by the virtio-vga reordering. So virtio-vga and modern-pio-notify are incompatible because virtio-vga failed to initialize with this option. This fix sets the modern io bar to the bar qemu#5 to avoid conflict. Signed-off-by: Anthoine Bourgeois <anthoine.bourgeois@gmail.com> Message-Id: <20200422215455.10244-1-anthoine.bourgeois@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>

when s->inflight is freed, vhost_dev_free_inflight may try to access s->inflight->addr, it will retrigger the following issue. ==7309==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x604001020d18 at pc 0x555555ce948a bp 0x7fffffffb170 sp 0x7fffffffb160 READ of size 8 at 0x604001020d18 thread T0 #0 0x555555ce9489 in vhost_dev_free_inflight /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/vhost.c:1473 #1 0x555555cd86eb in virtio_reset /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/virtio.c:1214 #2 0x5555560d3eff in virtio_pci_reset hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1859 #3 0x555555f2ac53 in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:893 #4 0x5555561d572c in property_set_bool qom/object.c:1925 qemu#5 0x5555561de8de in object_property_set_qobject qom/qom-qobject.c:27 qemu#6 0x5555561d99f4 in object_property_set_bool qom/object.c:1188 qemu#7 0x555555e50ae7 in qdev_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/qdev-monitor.c:626 qemu#8 0x555555e51213 in qmp_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/qdev-monitor.c:806 qemu#9 0x555555e8ff40 in hmp_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hmp.c:1951 qemu#10 0x555555be889a in handle_hmp_command /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:3404 qemu#11 0x555555beac8b in monitor_command_cb /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:4296 qemu#12 0x555556433eb7 in readline_handle_byte util/readline.c:393 qemu#13 0x555555be89ec in monitor_read /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:4279 qemu#14 0x5555563285cc in tcp_chr_read chardev/char-socket.c:470 qemu#15 0x7ffff670b968 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a968) qemu#16 0x55555640727c in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:215 qemu#17 0x55555640727c in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:238 qemu#18 0x55555640727c in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:497 qemu#19 0x555555b2d0bf in main_loop /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/vl.c:2013 qemu#20 0x555555b2d0bf in main /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/vl.c:4776 qemu#21 0x7fffdd2eb444 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x22444) qemu#22 0x555555b3767a (/root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x5e367a) 0x604001020d18 is located 8 bytes inside of 40-byte region [0x604001020d10,0x604001020d38) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ffff6f00508 in __interceptor_free (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xde508) #1 0x7ffff671107d in g_free (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5007d) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ffff6f00a88 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xdea88) #1 0x7ffff6710fc5 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4ffc5) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/vhost.c:1473 in vhost_dev_free_inflight Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c08801fc150: fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c08801fc160: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa 0x0c08801fc170: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa 0x0c08801fc180: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 0x0c08801fc190: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa =>0x0c08801fc1a0: fa fa fd[fd]fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c08801fc1b0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c08801fc1c0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c08801fc1d0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c08801fc1e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c08801fc1f0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==7309==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Li Feng <fengli@smartx.com> Message-Id: <20200417101707.14467-1-fengli@smartx.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Raphael Norwitz <raphael.norwitz@nutanix.com>

…gration 'rdma->host' is malloced in qemu_rdma_data_init, but forgot to free on the error path in rdma_start_incoming_migration(), this patch fix that. The leak stack: Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb7add18ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8) #1 0x7fb7ad0df1d5 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x531d5) #2 0x7fb7ad0f8b32 in g_strdup (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6cb32) #3 0x55a0464a0f6f in qemu_rdma_data_init /mnt/sdb/qemu/migration/rdma.c:2647 #4 0x55a0464b0e76 in rdma_start_incoming_migration /mnt/sdb/qemu/migration/rdma.c:4020 qemu#5 0x55a0463f898a in qemu_start_incoming_migration /mnt/sdb/qemu/migration/migration.c:365 qemu#6 0x55a0458c75d3 in qemu_init /mnt/sdb/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:4438 qemu#7 0x55a046a3d811 in main /mnt/sdb/qemu/softmmu/main.c:48 qemu#8 0x7fb7a8417872 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x23872) qemu#9 0x55a04536b26d in _start (/mnt/sdb/qemu/build/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x286926d) Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Message-Id: <20200420102727.17339-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>

When error happen in multifd_new_send_channel_async, 'sioc' will not be used to create the multifd_send_thread. Let's free it to avoid a memleak. And also do error_free after migrate_set_error() to avoid another leak in the same place. The leak stack: Direct leak of 2880 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f20b5118ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8) #1 0x7f20b44df1d5 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x531d5) #2 0x564133bce18b in object_new_with_type /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:683 #3 0x564133eea950 in qio_channel_socket_new /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:56 #4 0x5641339cfe4f in socket_send_channel_create /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/socket.c:37 qemu#5 0x564133a10328 in multifd_save_setup /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/multifd.c:772 qemu#6 0x5641339cebed in migrate_fd_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/migration.c:3530 qemu#7 0x5641339d15e4 in migration_channel_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/channel.c:92 qemu#8 0x5641339cf5b7 in socket_outgoing_migration /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/socket.c:108 Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f20b5118cf0 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefcf0) #1 0x7f20b44df22d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5322d) #2 0x56413406fc17 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:61 #3 0x564134070464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109 #4 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_addr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:379 qemu#5 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_saddr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:458 qemu#6 0x5641340870ab in socket_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:1105 qemu#7 0x564133eeaabf in qio_channel_socket_connect_sync /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:145 qemu#8 0x564133eeabf5 in qio_channel_socket_connect_worker /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:168 Indirect leak of 360 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f20b5118ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8) #1 0x7f20af901817 in __GI___vasprintf_chk (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x10d817) #2 0x7f20b451fa6c in g_vasprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x93a6c) #3 0x7f20b44f8cd0 in g_strdup_vprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6ccd0) #4 0x7f20b44f8d8c in g_strdup_printf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6cd8c) qemu#5 0x56413406fc86 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:65 qemu#6 0x564134070464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109 qemu#7 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_addr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:379 qemu#8 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_saddr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:458 qemu#9 0x5641340870ab in socket_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:1105 qemu#10 0x564133eeaabf in qio_channel_socket_connect_sync /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:145 qemu#11 0x564133eeabf5 in qio_channel_socket_connect_worker /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:168 Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Message-Id: <20200506095416.26099-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>

…leaks When error happen in multifd_send_thread, it use error_copy to set migrate error in multifd_send_terminate_threads(). We should call error_free after it. Similarly, fix another two places in multifd_recv_thread/multifd_save_cleanup. The leak stack: Direct leak of 48 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f781af07cf0 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefcf0) #1 0x7f781a2ce22d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5322d) #2 0x55ee1d075c17 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:61 #3 0x55ee1d076464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109 #4 0x55ee1cef066e in qio_channel_socket_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:569 qemu#5 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:207 qemu#6 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:171 qemu#7 0x55ee1cee8248 in qio_channel_write_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:257 qemu#8 0x55ee1ca12c9a in multifd_send_thread /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/multifd.c:657 qemu#9 0x55ee1d0607fc in qemu_thread_start /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519 qemu#10 0x7f78159ae2dd in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x82dd) qemu#11 0x7f78156df4b2 in __GI___clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xfc4b2) Indirect leak of 52 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f781af07f28 in __interceptor_realloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xeff28) #1 0x7f78156f07d9 in __GI___vasprintf_chk (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x10d7d9) #2 0x7f781a30ea6c in g_vasprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x93a6c) #3 0x7f781a2e7cd0 in g_strdup_vprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6ccd0) #4 0x7f781a2e7d8c in g_strdup_printf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6cd8c) qemu#5 0x55ee1d075c86 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:65 qemu#6 0x55ee1d076464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109 qemu#7 0x55ee1cef066e in qio_channel_socket_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:569 qemu#8 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:207 qemu#9 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:171 qemu#10 0x55ee1cee8248 in qio_channel_write_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:257 qemu#11 0x55ee1ca12c9a in multifd_send_thread /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/multifd.c:657 qemu#12 0x55ee1d0607fc in qemu_thread_start /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519 qemu#13 0x7f78159ae2dd in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x82dd) qemu#14 0x7f78156df4b2 in __GI___clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xfc4b2) Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Message-Id: <20200506095416.26099-3-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>

Similarly to commit 158b659 with the APB PnP registers, guests can crash QEMU when writting to the AHB PnP registers: $ echo 'writeb 0xfffff042 69' | qemu-system-sparc -M leon3_generic -S -bios /etc/magic -qtest stdio [I 1571938309.932255] OPENED [R +0.063474] writeb 0xfffff042 69 Segmentation fault (core dumped) (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000000000 in () #1 0x0000562999110df4 in memory_region_write_with_attrs_accessor (mr=mr@entry=0x56299aa28ea0, addr=66, value=value@entry=0x7fff6abe13b8, size=size@entry=1, shift=<optimized out>, mask=mask@entry=255, attrs=...) at memory.c:503 #2 0x000056299911095e in access_with_adjusted_size (addr=addr@entry=66, value=value@entry=0x7fff6abe13b8, size=size@entry=1, access_size_min=<optimized out>, access_size_max=<optimized out>, access_fn=access_fn@entry= 0x562999110d70 <memory_region_write_with_attrs_accessor>, mr=0x56299aa28ea0, attrs=...) at memory.c:539 #3 0x0000562999114fba in memory_region_dispatch_write (mr=mr@entry=0x56299aa28ea0, addr=66, data=<optimized out>, op=<optimized out>, attrs=attrs@entry=...) at memory.c:1482 #4 0x00005629990c0860 in flatview_write_continue (fv=fv@entry=0x56299aa7d8a0, addr=addr@entry=4294963266, attrs=..., ptr=ptr@entry=0x7fff6abe1540, len=len@entry=1, addr1=<optimized out>, l=<optimized out>, mr=0x56299aa28ea0) at include/qemu/host-utils.h:164 qemu#5 0x00005629990c0a76 in flatview_write (fv=0x56299aa7d8a0, addr=4294963266, attrs=..., buf=0x7fff6abe1540, len=1) at exec.c:3165 qemu#6 0x00005629990c4c1b in address_space_write (as=<optimized out>, addr=<optimized out>, attrs=..., attrs@entry=..., buf=buf@entry=0x7fff6abe1540, len=len@entry=1) at exec.c:3256 qemu#7 0x000056299910f807 in qtest_process_command (chr=chr@entry=0x5629995ee920 <qtest_chr>, words=words@entry=0x56299acfcfa0) at qtest.c:437 Instead of crashing, log the access as unimplemented. Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> Reviewed-by: KONRAD Frederic <frederic.konrad@adacore.com> Message-Id: <20200331105048.27989-3-f4bug@amsat.org>

For ex, when resetting the xlnx-zcu102 machine: (lldb) bt * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0x50) * frame #0: 0x10020a740 gd_vc_send_chars(vc=0x000000000) at gtk.c:1759:41 [opt] frame #1: 0x100636264 qemu_chr_fe_accept_input(be=<unavailable>) at char-fe.c:159:9 [opt] frame #2: 0x1000608e0 cadence_uart_reset_hold [inlined] uart_rx_reset(s=0x10810a960) at cadence_uart.c:158:5 [opt] frame #3: 0x1000608d4 cadence_uart_reset_hold(obj=0x10810a960) at cadence_uart.c:530:5 [opt] frame #4: 0x100580ab4 resettable_phase_hold(obj=0x10810a960, opaque=0x000000000, type=<unavailable>) at resettable.c:0 [opt] frame qemu#5: 0x10057d1b0 bus_reset_child_foreach(obj=<unavailable>, cb=(resettable_phase_hold at resettable.c:162), opaque=0x000000000, type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at bus.c:97:13 [opt] frame qemu#6: 0x1005809f8 resettable_phase_hold [inlined] resettable_child_foreach(rc=0x000060000332d2c0, obj=0x0000600002c1c180, cb=<unavailable>, opaque=0x000000000, type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at resettable.c:96:9 [opt] frame qemu#7: 0x1005809d8 resettable_phase_hold(obj=0x0000600002c1c180, opaque=0x000000000, type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at resettable.c:173:5 [opt] frame qemu#8: 0x1005803a0 resettable_assert_reset(obj=0x0000600002c1c180, type=<unavailable>) at resettable.c:60:5 [opt] frame qemu#9: 0x10058027c resettable_reset(obj=0x0000600002c1c180, type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at resettable.c:45:5 [opt] While the chardev is created early, the VirtualConsole is associated after, during qemu_init_displays(). Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20230220072251.3385878-1-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>

blk_get_geometry() eventually calls bdrv_nb_sectors(), which is a co_wrapper_mixed_bdrv_rdlock. This means that when it is called from coroutine context, it already assume to have the graph locked. However, virtio_blk_sect_range_ok() in block/export/virtio-blk-handler.c (used by vhost-user-blk and VDUSE exports) runs in a coroutine, but doesn't take the graph lock - blk_*() functions are generally expected to do that internally. This causes an assertion failure when accessing an export for the first time if it runs in an iothread. This is an example of the crash: $ ./storage-daemon/qemu-storage-daemon --object iothread,id=th0 --blockdev file,filename=/home/kwolf/images/hd.img,node-name=disk --export vhost-user-blk,addr.type=unix,addr.path=/tmp/vhost.sock,node-name=disk,id=exp0,iothread=th0 qemu-storage-daemon: ../block/graph-lock.c:268: void assert_bdrv_graph_readable(void): Assertion `qemu_in_main_thread() || reader_count()' failed. (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff6eafe5c in __pthread_kill_implementation () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff6e5fa76 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007ffff6e497fc in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #3 0x00007ffff6e4971b in __assert_fail_base.cold () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #4 0x00007ffff6e58656 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6 qemu#5 0x00005555556337a3 in assert_bdrv_graph_readable () at ../block/graph-lock.c:268 qemu#6 0x00005555555fd5a2 in bdrv_co_nb_sectors (bs=0x5555564c5ef0) at ../block.c:5847 qemu#7 0x00005555555ee949 in bdrv_nb_sectors (bs=0x5555564c5ef0) at block/block-gen.c:256 qemu#8 0x00005555555fd6b9 in bdrv_get_geometry (bs=0x5555564c5ef0, nb_sectors_ptr=0x7fffef7fedd0) at ../block.c:5884 qemu#9 0x000055555562ad6d in blk_get_geometry (blk=0x5555564cb200, nb_sectors_ptr=0x7fffef7fedd0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1624 qemu#10 0x00005555555ddb74 in virtio_blk_sect_range_ok (blk=0x5555564cb200, block_size=512, sector=0, size=512) at ../block/export/virtio-blk-handler.c:44 qemu#11 0x00005555555dd80d in virtio_blk_process_req (handler=0x5555564cbb98, in_iov=0x7fffe8003830, out_iov=0x7fffe8003860, in_num=1, out_num=0) at ../block/export/virtio-blk-handler.c:189 qemu#12 0x00005555555dd546 in vu_blk_virtio_process_req (opaque=0x7fffe8003800) at ../block/export/vhost-user-blk-server.c:66 qemu#13 0x00005555557bf4a1 in coroutine_trampoline (i0=-402635264, i1=32767) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177 qemu#14 0x00007ffff6e75c20 in ?? () from /lib64/libc.so.6 qemu#15 0x00007fffefffa870 in ?? () qemu#16 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () Fix this by creating a new blk_co_get_geometry() that takes the lock, and changing blk_get_geometry() to be a co_wrapper_mixed around it. To make the resulting code cleaner, virtio-blk-handler.c can directly call the coroutine version now (though that wouldn't be necessary for fixing the bug, taking the lock in blk_co_get_geometry() is what fixes it). Fixes: 8ab8140 Reported-by: Lukáš Doktor <ldoktor@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20230327113959.60071-1-kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>

…gionPortioList Currently when portio_list MemoryRegions are freed using portio_list_destroy() the RCU thread segfaults generating a backtrace similar to that below: #0 0x5555599a34b6 in phys_section_destroy ../softmmu/physmem.c:996 #1 0x5555599a37a3 in phys_sections_free ../softmmu/physmem.c:1011 #2 0x5555599b24aa in address_space_dispatch_free ../softmmu/physmem.c:2430 #3 0x55555996a283 in flatview_destroy ../softmmu/memory.c:292 #4 0x55555a2cb9fb in call_rcu_thread ../util/rcu.c:284 qemu#5 0x55555a29b71d in qemu_thread_start ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:541 qemu#6 0x7ffff4a0cea6 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:477 qemu#7 0x7ffff492ca2e in __clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xfca2e) The problem here is that portio_list_destroy() unparents the portio_list MemoryRegions causing them to be freed immediately, however the flatview still has a reference to the MemoryRegion and so generates a segfault when the RCU thread updates the flatview. Solve the lifetime issue by making MemoryRegionPortioList a child of the portio_list owner, and attach the portio_list MemoryRegions to the MemoryRegionPortioList instead of to the portio_list owner. This ensures that the MemoryRegionPortioList lifecycle is tied to that of its portio_list MemoryRegions, and allows a finalize() method to be added that can be called by the (delayed) RCU thread to free the MemoryRegions when the flatview is next updated. Since MemoryRegionPortioList is a QOM object with this change the MemoryRegionPortList is now visible in the output of "info qom-tree". As an example the output of "info qom-tree" before and after this commit is shown below: Before: /device[4] (i8257) /dma-chan[0] (memory-region) /dma-cont[0] (memory-region) /dma-page[0] (memory-region) /dma-page[1] (memory-region) /device[5] (i8257) /dma-chan[0] (memory-region) /dma-cont[0] (memory-region) /dma-page[0] (memory-region) /dma-page[1] (memory-region) After: /device[4] (i8257) /dma-chan[0] (memory-region) /dma-cont[0] (memory-region) /portiolist[0] (memory-region-portio-list) /dma-page[0] (memory-region) /portiolist[1] (memory-region-portio-list) /dma-page[0] (memory-region) /device[5] (i8257) /dma-chan[0] (memory-region) /dma-cont[0] (memory-region) /portiolist[0] (memory-region-portio-list) /dma-page[0] (memory-region) /portiolist[1] (memory-region-portio-list) /dma-page[0] (memory-region) Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>

This reverts commit b320e21, which accidentally broke TCG, because it made the TCG -cpu max report the presence of MTE to the guest even if the board hadn't enabled MTE by wiring up the tag RAM. This meant that if the guest then tried to use MTE QEMU would segfault accessing the non-existent tag RAM: ==346473==ERROR: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address (pc 0x55f328952a4a bp 0x00000213a400 sp 0x7f7871859b80 T346476) ==346473==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==346473==Hint: this fault was caused by a dereference of a high value address (see register values below). Disassemble the provided pc to learn which register was used. #0 0x55f328952a4a in address_space_to_flatview /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/include/exec/memory.h:1108:12 #1 0x55f328952a4a in address_space_translate /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/include/exec/memory.h:2797:31 #2 0x55f328952a4a in allocation_tag_mem /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/arm-clang/../../target/arm/tcg/mte_helper.c:176:10 #3 0x55f32895366c in helper_stgm /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/arm-clang/../../target/arm/tcg/mte_helper.c:461:15 #4 0x7f782431a293 (<unknown module>) It's also not clear that the KVM logic is correct either: MTE defaults to on there, rather than being only on if the board wants it on. Revert the whole commit for now so we can sort out the issues. (We didn't catch this in CI because we have no test cases in avocado that use guests with MTE support.) Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20230519145808.348701-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>

…moryRegions Currently when portio_list MemoryRegions are freed using portio_list_destroy() the RCU thread segfaults generating a backtrace similar to that below: #0 0x5555599a34b6 in phys_section_destroy ../softmmu/physmem.c:996 #1 0x5555599a37a3 in phys_sections_free ../softmmu/physmem.c:1011 #2 0x5555599b24aa in address_space_dispatch_free ../softmmu/physmem.c:2430 #3 0x55555996a283 in flatview_destroy ../softmmu/memory.c:292 #4 0x55555a2cb9fb in call_rcu_thread ../util/rcu.c:284 qemu#5 0x55555a29b71d in qemu_thread_start ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:541 qemu#6 0x7ffff4a0cea6 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:477 qemu#7 0x7ffff492ca2e in __clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xfca2e) The problem here is that portio_list_destroy() unparents the portio_list MemoryRegions causing them to be freed immediately, however the flatview still has a reference to the MemoryRegion and so causes a use-after-free segfault when the RCU thread next updates the flatview. Solve the lifetime issue by making MemoryRegionPortioList the owner of the portio_list MemoryRegions, and then reparenting them to the portio_list owner. This ensures that they can be accessed as QOM children via the portio_list owner, yet the MemoryRegionPortioList owns the refcount. Update portio_list_destroy() to unparent the MemoryRegion from the portio_list owner (while keeping mrpio->mr live until finalization of the MemoryRegionPortioList), so that the portio_list MemoryRegions remain allocated until flatview_destroy() removes the final refcount upon the next flatview update. Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20230419151652.362717-4-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

blk_set_aio_context() is not fully transactional because blk_do_set_aio_context() updates blk->ctx outside the transaction. Most of the time this goes unnoticed but a BlockDevOps.drained_end() callback that invokes blk_get_aio_context() fails assert(ctx == blk->ctx). This happens because blk->ctx is only assigned after BlockDevOps.drained_end() is called and we're in an intermediate state where BlockDrvierState nodes already have the new context and the BlockBackend still has the old context. Making blk_set_aio_context() fully transactional solves this assertion failure because the BlockBackend's context is updated as part of the transaction (before BlockDevOps.drained_end() is called). Split blk_do_set_aio_context() in order to solve this assertion failure. This helper function actually serves two different purposes: 1. It drives blk_set_aio_context(). 2. It responds to BdrvChildClass->change_aio_ctx(). Get rid of the helper function. Do #1 inside blk_set_aio_context() and do #2 inside blk_root_set_aio_ctx_commit(). This simplifies the code. The only drawback of the fully transactional approach is that blk_set_aio_context() must contend with blk_root_set_aio_ctx_commit() being invoked as part of the AioContext change propagation. This can be solved by temporarily setting blk->allow_aio_context_change to true. Future patches call blk_get_aio_context() from BlockDevOps->drained_end(), so this patch will become necessary. Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20230516190238.8401-2-stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>

Command "qemu-system-riscv64 -machine virt -m 2G -smp 1 -numa node,mem=1G -numa node,mem=1G" would trigger this problem.Backtrace with: #0 0x0000555555b5b1a4 in riscv_numa_get_default_cpu_node_id at ../hw/riscv/numa.c:211 #1 0x00005555558ce510 in machine_numa_finish_cpu_init at ../hw/core/machine.c:1230 #2 0x00005555558ce9d3 in machine_run_board_init at ../hw/core/machine.c:1346 #3 0x0000555555aaedc3 in qemu_init_board at ../softmmu/vl.c:2513 #4 0x0000555555aaf064 in qmp_x_exit_preconfig at ../softmmu/vl.c:2609 qemu#5 0x0000555555ab1916 in qemu_init at ../softmmu/vl.c:3617 qemu#6 0x000055555585463b in main at ../softmmu/main.c:47 This commit fixes the issue by adding parameter checks. Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com> Reviewed-by: LIU Zhiwei <zhiwei_liu@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Weiwei Li <liweiwei@iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Yin Wang <yin.wang@intel.com> Message-Id: <20230519023758.1759434-1-yin.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>

vhost_dev_start function does not release memory_listener object in case of an error. This may crash the guest when vhost is unable to set memory table: stack trace of thread 125653: Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault #0 memory_listener_register (qemu-kvm + 0x6cda0f) #1 vhost_dev_start (qemu-kvm + 0x699301) #2 vhost_net_start (qemu-kvm + 0x45b03f) #3 virtio_net_set_status (qemu-kvm + 0x665672) #4 qmp_set_link (qemu-kvm + 0x548fd5) qemu#5 net_vhost_user_event (qemu-kvm + 0x552c45) qemu#6 tcp_chr_connect (qemu-kvm + 0x88d473) qemu#7 tcp_chr_new_client (qemu-kvm + 0x88cf83) qemu#8 tcp_chr_accept (qemu-kvm + 0x88b429) qemu#9 qio_net_listener_channel_func (qemu-kvm + 0x7ac07c) qemu#10 g_main_context_dispatch (libglib-2.0.so.0 + 0x54e2f) Release memory_listener objects in the error path. Signed-off-by: Prasad Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org> Message-Id: <20230529114333.31686-2-ppandit@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Fixes: c471ad0 ("vhost_net: device IOTLB support") Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>

When updating to the latest fedora the santizer found more leaks inside xkbmap: FAILED: pc-bios/keymaps/ar /builds/stsquad/qemu/build-oss-fuzz/qemu-keymap -f pc-bios/keymaps/ar -l ara ================================================================= ==3604==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 1424 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x56316418ebec in __interceptor_calloc (/builds/stsquad/qemu/build-oss-fuzz/qemu-keymap+0x127bec) (BuildId: a2ad9da3190962acaa010fa8f44a9269f9081e1c) #1 0x7f60d4dc067e (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x1c67e) (BuildId: b243a34e4e58e6a30b93771c256268b114d34b80) #2 0x7f60d4dc2137 in xkb_keymap_new_from_names (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x1e137) (BuildId: b243a34e4e58e6a30b93771c256268b114d34b80) #3 0x5631641ca50f in main /builds/stsquad/qemu/build-oss-fuzz/../qemu-keymap.c:215:11 and many more. As we can't do anything about the library add a suppression to keep the CI going with what its meant to be doing. Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20230630180423.558337-8-alex.bennee@linaro.org>

in order to avoid requests being stuck in a BlockBackend's request queue during cleanup. Having such requests can lead to a deadlock [0] with a virtio-scsi-pci device using iothread that's busy with IO when initiating a shutdown with QMP 'quit'. There is a race where such a queued request can continue sometime (maybe after bdrv_child_free()?) during bdrv_root_unref_child() [1]. The completion will hold the AioContext lock and wait for the BQL during SCSI completion, but the main thread will hold the BQL and wait for the AioContext as part of bdrv_root_unref_child(), leading to the deadlock [0]. [0]: > Thread 3 (Thread 0x7f3bbd87b700 (LWP 135952) "qemu-system-x86"): > #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x564183365f00 <qemu_global_mutex>, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 > #1 0x00007f3bc1c0d843 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x564183365f00 <qemu_global_mutex>) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80 > #2 0x0000564182939f2e in qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x564183365f00 <qemu_global_mutex>, file=0x564182b7f774 "../softmmu/physmem.c", line=2593) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:94 > #3 0x000056418247cc2a in qemu_mutex_lock_iothread_impl (file=0x564182b7f774 "../softmmu/physmem.c", line=2593) at ../softmmu/cpus.c:504 > #4 0x00005641826d5325 in prepare_mmio_access (mr=0x5641856148a0) at ../softmmu/physmem.c:2593 > qemu#5 0x00005641826d6fe7 in address_space_stl_internal (as=0x56418679b310, addr=4276113408, val=16418, attrs=..., result=0x0, endian=DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN) at /home/febner/repos/qemu/memory_ldst.c.inc:318 > qemu#6 0x00005641826d7154 in address_space_stl_le (as=0x56418679b310, addr=4276113408, val=16418, attrs=..., result=0x0) at /home/febner/repos/qemu/memory_ldst.c.inc:357 > qemu#7 0x0000564182374b07 in pci_msi_trigger (dev=0x56418679b0d0, msg=...) at ../hw/pci/pci.c:359 > qemu#8 0x000056418237118b in msi_send_message (dev=0x56418679b0d0, msg=...) at ../hw/pci/msi.c:379 > qemu#9 0x0000564182372c10 in msix_notify (dev=0x56418679b0d0, vector=8) at ../hw/pci/msix.c:542 > qemu#10 0x000056418243719c in virtio_pci_notify (d=0x56418679b0d0, vector=8) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:77 > qemu#11 0x00005641826933b0 in virtio_notify_vector (vdev=0x5641867a34a0, vector=8) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:1985 > qemu#12 0x00005641826948d6 in virtio_irq (vq=0x5641867ac078) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:2461 > qemu#13 0x0000564182694978 in virtio_notify (vdev=0x5641867a34a0, vq=0x5641867ac078) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:2473 > qemu#14 0x0000564182665b83 in virtio_scsi_complete_req (req=0x7f3bb000e5d0) at ../hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:115 > qemu#15 0x00005641826670ce in virtio_scsi_complete_cmd_req (req=0x7f3bb000e5d0) at ../hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:641 > qemu#16 0x000056418266736b in virtio_scsi_command_complete (r=0x7f3bb0010560, resid=0) at ../hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:712 > qemu#17 0x000056418239aac6 in scsi_req_complete (req=0x7f3bb0010560, status=2) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-bus.c:1526 > qemu#18 0x000056418239e090 in scsi_handle_rw_error (r=0x7f3bb0010560, ret=-123, acct_failed=false) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:242 > qemu#19 0x000056418239e13f in scsi_disk_req_check_error (r=0x7f3bb0010560, ret=-123, acct_failed=false) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:265 > qemu#20 0x000056418239e482 in scsi_dma_complete_noio (r=0x7f3bb0010560, ret=-123) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:340 > qemu#21 0x000056418239e5d9 in scsi_dma_complete (opaque=0x7f3bb0010560, ret=-123) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:371 > qemu#22 0x00005641824809ad in dma_complete (dbs=0x7f3bb000d9d0, ret=-123) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:107 > qemu#23 0x0000564182480a72 in dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f3bb000d9d0, ret=-123) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:127 > qemu#24 0x00005641827bf78a in blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f3bb00021a0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1563 > qemu#25 0x00005641827bfa5e in blk_aio_write_entry (opaque=0x7f3bb00021a0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1630 > qemu#26 0x000056418295638a in coroutine_trampoline (i0=-1342102448, i1=32571) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177 > qemu#27 0x00007f3bc0caed40 in ?? () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 > qemu#28 0x00007f3bbd8757f0 in ?? () > qemu#29 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () > > Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f3bbe3e9280 (LWP 135944) "qemu-system-x86"): > #0 __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x5641856f2a00, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52 > #1 0x00007f3bc1c0d8d1 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x5641856f2a00) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:115 > #2 0x0000564182939f2e in qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x5641856f2a00, file=0x564182c0e319 "../util/async.c", line=728) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:94 > #3 0x000056418293a140 in qemu_rec_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x5641856f2a00, file=0x564182c0e319 "../util/async.c", line=728) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:149 > #4 0x00005641829532d5 in aio_context_acquire (ctx=0x5641856f29a0) at ../util/async.c:728 > qemu#5 0x000056418279d5df in bdrv_set_aio_context_commit (opaque=0x5641856e6e50) at ../block.c:7493 > qemu#6 0x000056418294e288 in tran_commit (tran=0x56418630bfe0) at ../util/transactions.c:87 > qemu#7 0x000056418279d880 in bdrv_try_change_aio_context (bs=0x5641856f7130, ctx=0x56418548f810, ignore_child=0x0, errp=0x0) at ../block.c:7626 > qemu#8 0x0000564182793f39 in bdrv_root_unref_child (child=0x5641856f47d0) at ../block.c:3242 > qemu#9 0x00005641827be137 in blk_remove_bs (blk=0x564185709880) at ../block/block-backend.c:914 > qemu#10 0x00005641827bd689 in blk_remove_all_bs () at ../block/block-backend.c:583 > qemu#11 0x0000564182798699 in bdrv_close_all () at ../block.c:5117 > qemu#12 0x000056418248a5b2 in qemu_cleanup () at ../softmmu/runstate.c:821 > qemu#13 0x0000564182738603 in qemu_default_main () at ../softmmu/main.c:38 > qemu#14 0x0000564182738631 in main (argc=30, argv=0x7ffd675a8a48) at ../softmmu/main.c:48 > > (gdb) p *((QemuMutex*)0x5641856f2a00) > $1 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 2, __count = 2, __owner = 135952, ... > (gdb) p *((QemuMutex*)0x564183365f00) > $2 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 2, __count = 0, __owner = 135944, ... [1]: > Thread 1 "qemu-system-x86" hit Breakpoint 5, bdrv_drain_all_end () at ../block/io.c:551 > #0 bdrv_drain_all_end () at ../block/io.c:551 > #1 0x00005569810f0376 in bdrv_graph_wrlock (bs=0x0) at ../block/graph-lock.c:156 > #2 0x00005569810bd3e0 in bdrv_replace_child_noperm (child=0x556982e2d7d0, new_bs=0x0) at ../block.c:2897 > #3 0x00005569810bdef2 in bdrv_root_unref_child (child=0x556982e2d7d0) at ../block.c:3227 > #4 0x00005569810e8137 in blk_remove_bs (blk=0x556982e42880) at ../block/block-backend.c:914 > qemu#5 0x00005569810e7689 in blk_remove_all_bs () at ../block/block-backend.c:583 > qemu#6 0x00005569810c2699 in bdrv_close_all () at ../block.c:5117 > qemu#7 0x0000556980db45b2 in qemu_cleanup () at ../softmmu/runstate.c:821 > qemu#8 0x0000556981062603 in qemu_default_main () at ../softmmu/main.c:38 > qemu#9 0x0000556981062631 in main (argc=30, argv=0x7ffd7a82a418) at ../softmmu/main.c:48 > [Switching to Thread 0x7fe76dab2700 (LWP 103649)] > > Thread 3 "qemu-system-x86" hit Breakpoint 4, blk_inc_in_flight (blk=0x556982e42880) at ../block/block-backend.c:1505 > #0 blk_inc_in_flight (blk=0x556982e42880) at ../block/block-backend.c:1505 > #1 0x00005569810e8f36 in blk_wait_while_drained (blk=0x556982e42880) at ../block/block-backend.c:1312 > #2 0x00005569810e9231 in blk_co_do_pwritev_part (blk=0x556982e42880, offset=3422961664, bytes=4096, qiov=0x556983028060, qiov_offset=0, flags=0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1402 > #3 0x00005569810e9a4b in blk_aio_write_entry (opaque=0x556982e2cfa0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1628 > #4 0x000055698128038a in coroutine_trampoline (i0=-2090057872, i1=21865) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177 > qemu#5 0x00007fe770f50d40 in ?? () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 > qemu#6 0x00007ffd7a829570 in ?? () > qemu#7 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com> Message-ID: <20230706131418.423713-1-f.ebner@proxmox.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

…ller/qemu-hppa into staging linux-user: Fix fcntl64() and accept4() for 32-bit targets A set of 3 patches: The first two patches fix fcntl64() and accept4(). the 3rd patch enhances the strace output for pread64/pwrite64(). This pull request does not includes Richard's mmap2 patch: https://patchew.org/QEMU/20230630132159.376995-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org/20230630132159.376995-12-richard.henderson@linaro.org/ Changes: v3: - added r-b from Richard to patches #1 and #2 v2: - rephrased commmit logs - return O_LARGFILE for fcntl() syscall too - dropped #ifdefs in accept4() patch - Dropped my mmap2() patch (former patch #3) - added r-b from Richard to 3rd patch Helge # -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iHUEABYKAB0WIQS86RI+GtKfB8BJu973ErUQojoPXwUCZKl5RQAKCRD3ErUQojoP # X82sAQDnW53s7YkU4sZ1YREPWPVoCXZXgm587jTrmwT4v9AenQEAlbKdsw4hzzr/ # ptuKvgZfZaIp5QjBUl/Dh/CI5aVOLgc= # =hd4O # -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- # gpg: Signature made Sat 08 Jul 2023 03:57:09 PM BST # gpg: using EDDSA key BCE9123E1AD29F07C049BBDEF712B510A23A0F5F # gpg: Good signature from "Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>" [unknown] # gpg: aka "Helge Deller <deller@kernel.org>" [unknown] # gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! # gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. # Primary key fingerprint: 4544 8228 2CD9 10DB EF3D 25F8 3E5F 3D04 A7A2 4603 # Subkey fingerprint: BCE9 123E 1AD2 9F07 C049 BBDE F712 B510 A23A 0F5F * tag 'linux-user-fcntl64-pull-request' of https://github.com/hdeller/qemu-hppa: linux-user: Improve strace output of pread64() and pwrite64() linux-user: Fix accept4(SOCK_NONBLOCK) syscall linux-user: Fix fcntl() and fcntl64() to return O_LARGEFILE for 32-bit targets Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>

We can fail the blk_insert_bs() at init_blk_migration(), leaving the BlkMigDevState without a dirty_bitmap and BlockDriverState. Account for the possibly missing elements when doing cleanup. Fix the following crashes: Thread 1 "qemu-system-x86" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000555555ec83ef in bdrv_release_dirty_bitmap (bitmap=0x0) at ../block/dirty-bitmap.c:359 359 BlockDriverState *bs = bitmap->bs; #0 0x0000555555ec83ef in bdrv_release_dirty_bitmap (bitmap=0x0) at ../block/dirty-bitmap.c:359 #1 0x0000555555bba331 in unset_dirty_tracking () at ../migration/block.c:371 #2 0x0000555555bbad98 in block_migration_cleanup_bmds () at ../migration/block.c:681 Thread 1 "qemu-system-x86" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000555555e971ff in bdrv_op_unblock (bs=0x0, op=BLOCK_OP_TYPE_BACKUP_SOURCE, reason=0x0) at ../block.c:7073 7073 QLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(blocker, &bs->op_blockers[op], list, next) { #0 0x0000555555e971ff in bdrv_op_unblock (bs=0x0, op=BLOCK_OP_TYPE_BACKUP_SOURCE, reason=0x0) at ../block.c:7073 #1 0x0000555555e9734a in bdrv_op_unblock_all (bs=0x0, reason=0x0) at ../block.c:7095 #2 0x0000555555bbae13 in block_migration_cleanup_bmds () at ../migration/block.c:690 Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de> Message-id: 20230731203338.27581-1-farosas@suse.de Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>

virtio_load() as a whole should run in coroutine context because it reads from the migration stream and we don't want this to block. However, it calls virtio_set_features_nocheck() and devices don't expect their .set_features callback to run in a coroutine and therefore call functions that may not be called in coroutine context. To fix this, drop out of coroutine context for calling virtio_set_features_nocheck(). Without this fix, the following crash was reported: #0 __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 #1 0x00007efc738c05d3 in __pthread_kill_internal (signo=6, threadid=<optimized out>) at pthread_kill.c:78 #2 0x00007efc73873d26 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/raise.c:26 #3 0x00007efc738477f3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #4 0x00007efc7384771b in __assert_fail_base (fmt=0x7efc739dbcb8 "", assertion=assertion@entry=0x560aebfbf5cf "!qemu_in_coroutine()", file=file@entry=0x560aebfcd2d4 "../block/graph-lock.c", line=line@entry=275, function=function@entry=0x560aebfcd34d "void bdrv_graph_rdlock_main_loop(void)") at assert.c:92 qemu#5 0x00007efc7386ccc6 in __assert_fail (assertion=0x560aebfbf5cf "!qemu_in_coroutine()", file=0x560aebfcd2d4 "../block/graph-lock.c", line=275, function=0x560aebfcd34d "void bdrv_graph_rdlock_main_loop(void)") at assert.c:101 qemu#6 0x0000560aebcd8dd6 in bdrv_register_buf () qemu#7 0x0000560aeb97ed97 in ram_block_added.llvm () qemu#8 0x0000560aebb8303f in ram_block_add.llvm () qemu#9 0x0000560aebb834fa in qemu_ram_alloc_internal.llvm () qemu#10 0x0000560aebb2ac98 in vfio_region_mmap () qemu#11 0x0000560aebb3ea0f in vfio_bars_register () qemu#12 0x0000560aebb3c628 in vfio_realize () qemu#13 0x0000560aeb90f0c2 in pci_qdev_realize () qemu#14 0x0000560aebc40305 in device_set_realized () qemu#15 0x0000560aebc48e07 in property_set_bool.llvm () qemu#16 0x0000560aebc46582 in object_property_set () qemu#17 0x0000560aebc4cd58 in object_property_set_qobject () qemu#18 0x0000560aebc46ba7 in object_property_set_bool () qemu#19 0x0000560aeb98b3ca in qdev_device_add_from_qdict () qemu#20 0x0000560aebb1fbaf in virtio_net_set_features () qemu#21 0x0000560aebb46b51 in virtio_set_features_nocheck () qemu#22 0x0000560aebb47107 in virtio_load () qemu#23 0x0000560aeb9ae7ce in vmstate_load_state () qemu#24 0x0000560aeb9d2ee9 in qemu_loadvm_state_main () qemu#25 0x0000560aeb9d45e1 in qemu_loadvm_state () qemu#26 0x0000560aeb9bc32c in process_incoming_migration_co.llvm () qemu#27 0x0000560aebeace56 in coroutine_trampoline.llvm () Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Buglink: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-832 Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Message-ID: <20230905145002.46391-3-kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>

Thread 1 "qemu-system-x86" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000555555888630 in dpy_ui_info_supported (con=0x0) at ../ui/console.c:812 812 return con->hw_ops->ui_info != NULL; (gdb) bt #0 0x0000555555888630 in dpy_ui_info_supported (con=0x0) at ../ui/console.c:812 #1 0x00005555558a44b1 in protocol_client_msg (vs=0x5555578c76c0, data=0x5555581e93f0 <incomplete sequence \373>, len=24) at ../ui/vnc.c:2585 #2 0x00005555558a19ac in vnc_client_read (vs=0x5555578c76c0) at ../ui/vnc.c:1607 #3 0x00005555558a1ac2 in vnc_client_io (ioc=0x5555581eb0e0, condition=G_IO_IN, opaque=0x5555578c76c0) at ../ui/vnc.c:1635 Fixes: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-2600 Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Albert Esteve <aesteve@redhat.com>

Replace the return path retry logic with finishing and restarting the thread. This fixes a race when resuming the migration that leads to a segfault. Currently when doing postcopy we consider that an IO error on the return path file could be due to a network intermittency. We then keep the thread alive but have it do cleanup of the 'from_dst_file' and wait on the 'postcopy_pause_rp' semaphore. When the user issues a migrate resume, a new return path is opened and the thread is allowed to continue. There's a race condition in the above mechanism. It is possible for the new return path file to be setup *before* the cleanup code in the return path thread has had a chance to run, leading to the *new* file being closed and the pointer set to NULL. When the thread is released after the resume, it tries to dereference 'from_dst_file' and crashes: Thread 7 "return path" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 0x7fffd1dbf700 (LWP 9611)] 0x00005555560e4893 in qemu_file_get_error_obj (f=0x0, errp=0x0) at ../migration/qemu-file.c:154 154 return f->last_error; (gdb) bt #0 0x00005555560e4893 in qemu_file_get_error_obj (f=0x0, errp=0x0) at ../migration/qemu-file.c:154 #1 0x00005555560e4983 in qemu_file_get_error (f=0x0) at ../migration/qemu-file.c:206 #2 0x0000555555b9a1df in source_return_path_thread (opaque=0x555556e06000) at ../migration/migration.c:1876 #3 0x000055555602e14f in qemu_thread_start (args=0x55555782e780) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:541 #4 0x00007ffff38d76ea in start_thread (arg=0x7fffd1dbf700) at pthread_create.c:477 qemu#5 0x00007ffff35efa6f in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 Here's the race (important bit is open_return_path happening before migration_release_dst_files): migration | qmp | return path --------------------------+-----------------------------+--------------------------------- qmp_migrate_pause() shutdown(ms->to_dst_file) f->last_error = -EIO migrate_detect_error() postcopy_pause() set_state(PAUSED) wait(postcopy_pause_sem) qmp_migrate(resume) migrate_fd_connect() resume = state == PAUSED open_return_path <-- TOO SOON! set_state(RECOVER) post(postcopy_pause_sem) (incoming closes to_src_file) res = qemu_file_get_error(rp) migration_release_dst_files() ms->rp_state.from_dst_file = NULL post(postcopy_pause_rp_sem) postcopy_pause_return_path_thread() wait(postcopy_pause_rp_sem) rp = ms->rp_state.from_dst_file goto retry qemu_file_get_error(rp) SIGSEGV ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- We can keep the retry logic without having the thread alive and waiting. The only piece of data used by it is the 'from_dst_file' and it is only allowed to proceed after a migrate resume is issued and the semaphore released at migrate_fd_connect(). Move the retry logic to outside the thread by waiting for the thread to finish before pausing the migration. Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Message-ID: <20230918172822.19052-8-farosas@suse.de>

When the given uuid is already present in the hash table, virtio_add_resource() does not add the passed VirtioSharedObject. In this case, free it in the callers to avoid leaking memory. This fixed the following `make check` error, when built with --enable-sanitizers: 4/166 qemu:unit / test-virtio-dmabuf ERROR 1.51s exit status 1 ==7716==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 320 byte(s) in 20 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f6fc16e3808 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:144 #1 0x7f6fc1503e98 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x57e98) #2 0x564d63cafb6b in test_add_invalid_resource ../tests/unit/test-virtio-dmabuf.c:100 #3 0x7f6fc152659d (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x7a59d) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 320 byte(s) leaked in 20 allocation(s). The changes at virtio_add_resource() itself are not strictly necessary for the memleak fix, but they make it more obvious that, on an error return, the passed object is not added to the hash. Signed-off-by: Matheus Tavares Bernardino <quic_mathbern@quicinc.com> Message-Id: <c61c13f9a0c67dec473bdbfc8789c29ef26c900b.1696624734.git.quic_mathbern@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Albert Esteve <aesteve@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matheus Tavares Bernardino <<a href="mailto:quic_mathbern@quicinc.com" target="_blank">quic_mathbern@quicinc.com</a>><br>

If there is a pending DMA operation during ide_bus_reset(), the fact that the IDEState is already reset before the operation is canceled can be problematic. In particular, ide_dma_cb() might be called and then use the reset IDEState which contains the signature after the reset. When used to construct the IO operation this leads to ide_get_sector() returning 0 and nsector being 1. This is particularly bad, because a write command will thus destroy the first sector which often contains a partition table or similar. Traces showing the unsolicited write happening with IDEState 0x5595af6949d0 being used after reset: > ahci_port_write ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: port write [reg:PxSCTL] @ 0x2c: 0x00000300 > ahci_reset_port ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: reset port > ide_reset IDEstate 0x5595af6949d0 > ide_reset IDEstate 0x5595af694da8 > ide_bus_reset_aio aio_cancel > dma_aio_cancel dbs=0x7f64600089a0 > dma_blk_cb dbs=0x7f64600089a0 ret=0 > dma_complete dbs=0x7f64600089a0 ret=0 cb=0x5595acd40b30 > ahci_populate_sglist ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0] > ahci_dma_prepare_buf ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: prepare buf limit=512 prepared=512 > ide_dma_cb IDEState 0x5595af6949d0; sector_num=0 n=1 cmd=DMA WRITE > dma_blk_io dbs=0x7f6420802010 bs=0x5595ae2c6c30 offset=0 to_dev=1 > dma_blk_cb dbs=0x7f6420802010 ret=0 > (gdb) p *qiov > $11 = {iov = 0x7f647c76d840, niov = 1, {{nalloc = 1, local_iov = {iov_base = 0x0, > iov_len = 512}}, {__pad = "\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000", > size = 512}}} > (gdb) bt > #0 blk_aio_pwritev (blk=0x5595ae2c6c30, offset=0, qiov=0x7f6420802070, flags=0, > cb=0x5595ace6f0b0 <dma_blk_cb>, opaque=0x7f6420802010) > at ../block/block-backend.c:1682 > #1 0x00005595ace6f185 in dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f6420802010, ret=<optimized out>) > at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:179 > #2 0x00005595ace6f778 in dma_blk_io (ctx=0x5595ae0609f0, > sg=sg@entry=0x5595af694d00, offset=offset@entry=0, align=align@entry=512, > io_func=io_func@entry=0x5595ace6ee30 <dma_blk_write_io_func>, > io_func_opaque=io_func_opaque@entry=0x5595ae2c6c30, > cb=0x5595acd40b30 <ide_dma_cb>, opaque=0x5595af6949d0, > dir=DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:244 > #3 0x00005595ace6f90a in dma_blk_write (blk=0x5595ae2c6c30, > sg=sg@entry=0x5595af694d00, offset=offset@entry=0, align=align@entry=512, > cb=cb@entry=0x5595acd40b30 <ide_dma_cb>, opaque=opaque@entry=0x5595af6949d0) > at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:280 > #4 0x00005595acd40e18 in ide_dma_cb (opaque=0x5595af6949d0, ret=<optimized out>) > at ../hw/ide/core.c:953 > qemu#5 0x00005595ace6f319 in dma_complete (ret=0, dbs=0x7f64600089a0) > at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:107 > qemu#6 dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f64600089a0, ret=0) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:127 > qemu#7 0x00005595ad12227d in blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f6460005b10) > at ../block/block-backend.c:1527 > qemu#8 blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f6460005b10) at ../block/block-backend.c:1524 > qemu#9 blk_aio_write_entry (opaque=0x7f6460005b10) at ../block/block-backend.c:1594 > qemu#10 0x00005595ad258cfb in coroutine_trampoline (i0=<optimized out>, > i1=<optimized out>) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177 Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Tested-by: simon.rowe@nutanix.com Message-ID: <20230906130922.142845-1-f.ebner@proxmox.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>

On LoongArch host, we got an Aborted from tcg_out_mov(). qemu-x86_64 configure with '--enable-debug'. > (gdb) b /home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312 > Breakpoint 1 at 0x2576f0: file /home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc, line 312. > (gdb) run hello [...] > Thread 1 "qemu-x86_64" hit Breakpoint 1, tcg_out_mov (s=0xaaaae91760 <tcg_init_ctx>, type=TCG_TYPE_V128, ret=TCG_REG_V2, > arg=TCG_REG_V0) at /home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312 > 312 g_assert_not_reached(); > (gdb) bt > #0 tcg_out_mov (s=0xaaaae91760 <tcg_init_ctx>, type=TCG_TYPE_V128, ret=TCG_REG_V2, arg=TCG_REG_V0) > at /home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312 > #1 0x000000aaaad0fee0 in tcg_reg_alloc_mov (s=0xaaaae91760 <tcg_init_ctx>, op=0xaaaaf67c20) at ../tcg/tcg.c:4632 > #2 0x000000aaaad142f4 in tcg_gen_code (s=0xaaaae91760 <tcg_init_ctx>, tb=0xffe8030340 <code_gen_buffer+197328>, > pc_start=4346094) at ../tcg/tcg.c:6135 [...] > (gdb) c > Continuing. > ** > ERROR:/home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312:tcg_out_mov: code should not be reached > Bail out! ERROR:/home1/gaosong/code/qemu/tcg/loongarch64/tcg-target.c.inc:312:tcg_out_mov: code should not be reached > > Thread 1 "qemu-x86_64" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. > 0x000000fff7b1c390 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 > (gdb) q Fixes: 16288de ("tcg/loongarch64: Lower basic tcg vec ops to LSX") Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn> Message-Id: <20231120065916.374045-1-gaosong@loongson.cn>

…ock_status Using fleecing backup like in [0] on a qcow2 image (with metadata preallocation) can lead to the following assertion failure: > bdrv_co_do_block_status: Assertion `!(ret & BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO)' failed. In the reproducer [0], it happens because the BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE flag will be set by the qcow2 driver, so the caller will recursively check the file child. Then the BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO set too. Later up the call chain, in bdrv_co_do_block_status() for the snapshot-access driver, the assertion failure will happen, because both flags are set. To fix it, clear the recurse flag after the recursive check was done. In detail: > #0 qcow2_co_block_status Returns 0x45 = BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE | BDRV_BLOCK_DATA | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID. > #1 bdrv_co_do_block_status Because of the data flag, bdrv_co_do_block_status() will now also set BDRV_BLOCK_ALLOCATED. Because of the recurse flag, bdrv_co_do_block_status() for the bdrv_file child will be called, which returns 0x16 = BDRV_BLOCK_ALLOCATED | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID | BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO. Now the return value inherits the zero flag. Returns 0x57 = BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE | BDRV_BLOCK_DATA | BDRV_BLOCK_OFFSET_VALID | BDRV_BLOCK_ALLOCATED | BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO. > #2 bdrv_co_common_block_status_above > #3 bdrv_co_block_status_above > #4 bdrv_co_block_status > qemu#5 cbw_co_snapshot_block_status > qemu#6 bdrv_co_snapshot_block_status > qemu#7 snapshot_access_co_block_status > qemu#8 bdrv_co_do_block_status Return value is propagated all the way up to here, where the assertion failure happens, because BDRV_BLOCK_RECURSE and BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO are both set. > qemu#9 bdrv_co_common_block_status_above > qemu#10 bdrv_co_block_status_above > qemu#11 block_copy_block_status > qemu#12 block_copy_dirty_clusters > qemu#13 block_copy_common > qemu#14 block_copy_async_co_entry > qemu#15 coroutine_trampoline [0]: > #!/bin/bash > rm /tmp/disk.qcow2 > ./qemu-img create /tmp/disk.qcow2 -o preallocation=metadata -f qcow2 1G > ./qemu-img create /tmp/fleecing.qcow2 -f qcow2 1G > ./qemu-img create /tmp/backup.qcow2 -f qcow2 1G > ./qemu-system-x86_64 --qmp stdio \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node0,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/disk.qcow2 \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node1,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/fleecing.qcow2 \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node2,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/backup.qcow2 \ > <<EOF > {"execute": "qmp_capabilities"} > {"execute": "blockdev-add", "arguments": { "driver": "copy-before-write", "file": "node0", "target": "node1", "node-name": "node3" } } > {"execute": "blockdev-add", "arguments": { "driver": "snapshot-access", "file": "node3", "node-name": "snap0" } } > {"execute": "blockdev-backup", "arguments": { "device": "snap0", "target": "node1", "sync": "full", "job-id": "backup0" } } > EOF Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru> Message-id: 20240116154839.401030-1-f.ebner@proxmox.com Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>

There is a bug in the blklogwrites driver pertaining to logging "write zeroes" operations, causing log corruption. This can be easily observed by setting detect-zeroes to something other than "off" for the driver. The issue is caused by a concurrency bug pertaining to the fact that "write zeroes" operations have to be logged in two parts: first the log entry metadata, then the zeroed-out region. While the log entry metadata is being written by bdrv_co_pwritev(), another operation may begin in the meanwhile and modify the state of the blklogwrites driver. This is as intended by the coroutine-driven I/O model in QEMU, of course. Unfortunately, this specific scenario is mishandled. A short example: 1. Initially, in the current operation (#1), the current log sector number in the driver state is only incremented by the number of sectors taken by the log entry metadata, after which the log entry metadata is written. The current operation yields. 2. Another operation (#2) may start while the log entry metadata is being written. It uses the current log position as the start offset for its log entry. This is in the sector right after the operation #1 log entry metadata, which is bad! 3. After bdrv_co_pwritev() returns (#1), the current log sector number is reread from the driver state in order to find out the start offset for bdrv_co_pwrite_zeroes(). This is an obvious blunder, as the offset will be the sector right after the (misplaced) operation #2 log entry, which means that the zeroed-out region begins at the wrong offset. 4. As a result of the above, the log is corrupt. Fix this by only reading the driver metadata once, computing the offsets and sizes in one go (including the optional zeroed-out region) and setting the log sector number to the appropriate value for the next operation in line. Signed-off-by: Ari Sundholm <ari@tuxera.com> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Message-ID: <20240109184646.1128475-1-megari@gmx.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>

A memory page poisoned from the hypervisor level is no longer readable. The migration of a VM will crash Qemu when it tries to read the memory address space and stumbles on the poisoned page with a similar stack trace: Program terminated with signal SIGBUS, Bus error. #0 _mm256_loadu_si256 #1 buffer_zero_avx2 #2 select_accel_fn #3 buffer_is_zero #4 save_zero_page qemu#5 ram_save_target_page_legacy qemu#6 ram_save_host_page qemu#7 ram_find_and_save_block qemu#8 ram_save_iterate qemu#9 qemu_savevm_state_iterate qemu#10 migration_iteration_run qemu#11 migration_thread qemu#12 qemu_thread_start To avoid this VM crash during the migration, prevent the migration when a known hardware poison exists on the VM. Signed-off-by: William Roche <william.roche@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130190640.139364-2-william.roche@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>

…B changes The old_bs variable in bdrv_next() is currently determined by looking at the old block backend. However, if the block graph changes before the next bdrv_next() call, it might be that the associated BDS is not the same that was referenced previously. In that case, the wrong BDS is unreferenced, leading to an assertion failure later: > bdrv_unref: Assertion `bs->refcnt > 0' failed. In particular, this can happen in the context of bdrv_flush_all(), when polling for bdrv_co_flush() in the generated co-wrapper leads to a graph change (for example with a stream block job [0]). A racy reproducer: > #!/bin/bash > rm -f /tmp/backing.qcow2 > rm -f /tmp/top.qcow2 > ./qemu-img create /tmp/backing.qcow2 -f qcow2 64M > ./qemu-io -c "write -P42 0x0 0x1" /tmp/backing.qcow2 > ./qemu-img create /tmp/top.qcow2 -f qcow2 64M -b /tmp/backing.qcow2 -F qcow2 > ./qemu-system-x86_64 --qmp stdio \ > --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node0,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/top.qcow2 \ > <<EOF > {"execute": "qmp_capabilities"} > {"execute": "block-stream", "arguments": { "job-id": "stream0", "device": "node0" } } > {"execute": "quit"} > EOF [0]: > #0 bdrv_replace_child_tran (child=..., new_bs=..., tran=...) > #1 bdrv_replace_node_noperm (from=..., to=..., auto_skip=..., tran=..., errp=...) > #2 bdrv_replace_node_common (from=..., to=..., auto_skip=..., detach_subchain=..., errp=...) > #3 bdrv_drop_filter (bs=..., errp=...) > #4 bdrv_cor_filter_drop (cor_filter_bs=...) > qemu#5 stream_prepare (job=...) > qemu#6 job_prepare_locked (job=...) > qemu#7 job_txn_apply_locked (fn=..., job=...) > qemu#8 job_do_finalize_locked (job=...) > qemu#9 job_exit (opaque=...) > qemu#10 aio_bh_poll (ctx=...) > qemu#11 aio_poll (ctx=..., blocking=...) > qemu#12 bdrv_poll_co (s=...) > qemu#13 bdrv_flush (bs=...) > qemu#14 bdrv_flush_all () > qemu#15 do_vm_stop (state=..., send_stop=...) > qemu#16 vm_shutdown () Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com> Message-ID: <20240322095009.346989-3-f.ebner@proxmox.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>

When vhost-user or vhost-kernel is handling virtio net datapath, QEMU should not touch used ring. But with vhost-user socket reconnect scenario, in a very rare case (has pending kick event). VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY is set by QEMU in following code path: #0 virtio_queue_split_set_notification (vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8, enable=0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:511 #1 0x0000559d6dbf033b in virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8, enable=0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:576 #2 0x0000559d6dbbbdbc in virtio_net_handle_tx_bh (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0, vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8) at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:2801 #3 0x0000559d6dbf4791 in virtio_queue_notify_vq (vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:2248 #4 0x0000559d6dbf79da in virtio_queue_host_notifier_read (n=0x7ff5f4c9211c) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:3525 qemu#5 0x0000559d6d9a5814 in virtio_bus_cleanup_host_notifier (bus=0x559d703a6a20, n=1) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:321 qemu#6 0x0000559d6dbf83c9 in virtio_device_stop_ioeventfd_impl (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:3774 qemu#7 0x0000559d6d9a55c8 in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd (bus=0x559d703a6a20) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:259 qemu#8 0x0000559d6d9a53e8 in virtio_bus_grab_ioeventfd (bus=0x559d703a6a20) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:199 qemu#9 0x0000559d6dbf841c in virtio_device_grab_ioeventfd (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:3783 qemu#10 0x0000559d6d9bde18 in vhost_dev_enable_notifiers (hdev=0x559d707edd70, vdev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/virtio/vhost.c:1592 qemu#11 0x0000559d6d89a0b8 in vhost_net_start_one (net=0x559d707edd70, dev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/net/vhost_net.c:266 qemu#12 0x0000559d6d89a6df in vhost_net_start (dev=0x559d703a6aa0, ncs=0x559d7048d890, data_queue_pairs=31, cvq=0) at ../hw/net/vhost_net.c:412 qemu#13 0x0000559d6dbb5b89 in virtio_net_vhost_status (n=0x559d703a6aa0, status=15 '\017') at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:311 qemu#14 0x0000559d6dbb5e34 in virtio_net_set_status (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0, status=15 '\017') at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:392 qemu#15 0x0000559d6dbb60d8 in virtio_net_set_link_status (nc=0x559d7048d890) at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:455 qemu#16 0x0000559d6da64863 in qmp_set_link (name=0x559d6f0b83d0 "hostnet1", up=true, errp=0x7ffdd76569f0) at ../net/net.c:1459 qemu#17 0x0000559d6da7226e in net_vhost_user_event (opaque=0x559d6f0b83d0, event=CHR_EVENT_OPENED) at ../net/vhost-user.c:301 qemu#18 0x0000559d6ddc7f63 in chr_be_event (s=0x559d6f2ffea0, event=CHR_EVENT_OPENED) at ../chardev/char.c:62 qemu#19 0x0000559d6ddc7fdc in qemu_chr_be_event (s=0x559d6f2ffea0, event=CHR_EVENT_OPENED) at ../chardev/char.c:82 This issue causes guest kernel stop kicking device and traffic stop. Add vhost_started check in virtio_net_handle_tx_bh to fix this wrong VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY set. Signed-off-by: Yajun Wu <yajunw@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Message-ID: <20240402045109.97729-1-yajunw@nvidia.com> [PMD: Use unlikely()] Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>

This modification ensures that in scenarios where the buffer size is insufficient for a zone report, the function will now properly set an error status and proceed to a cleanup label, instead of merely returning. The following ASAN log reveals it: ==1767400==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 312 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x64ac7b3280cd in malloc llvm/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:129:3 #1 0x735b02fb9738 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5e738) #2 0x64ac7d23be96 in virtqueue_split_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1612:12 #3 0x64ac7d23728a in virtqueue_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1783:16 #4 0x64ac7cfcaacd in virtio_blk_get_request hw/block/virtio-blk.c:228:27 qemu#5 0x64ac7cfca7c7 in virtio_blk_handle_vq hw/block/virtio-blk.c:1123:23 qemu#6 0x64ac7cfecb95 in virtio_blk_handle_output hw/block/virtio-blk.c:1157:5 Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com> Message-id: 20240404120040.1951466-1-zheyuma97@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>

This patch improves error handling in virtio_snd_handle_tx_xfer() and virtio_snd_handle_rx_xfer() in the VirtIO sound driver. Previously, 'goto' statements were used for error paths, leading to unnecessary processing and potential null pointer dereferences. Now, 'continue' is used to skip the rest of the current loop iteration for errors such as message size discrepancies or null streams, reducing crash risks. ASAN log illustrating the issue addressed: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x0000000000b4 #0 0x57cea39967b8 in qemu_mutex_lock_impl qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:92:5 #1 0x57cea128c462 in qemu_mutex_lock qemu/include/qemu/thread.h:122:5 #2 0x57cea128d72f in qemu_lockable_lock qemu/include/qemu/lockable.h:95:5 #3 0x57cea128c294 in qemu_lockable_auto_lock qemu/include/qemu/lockable.h:105:5 #4 0x57cea1285eb2 in virtio_snd_handle_rx_xfer qemu/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c:1026:9 qemu#5 0x57cea2caebbc in virtio_queue_notify_vq qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2268:9 qemu#6 0x57cea2cae412 in virtio_queue_host_notifier_read qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3671:9 qemu#7 0x57cea39822f1 in aio_dispatch_handler qemu/util/aio-posix.c:372:9 qemu#8 0x57cea3979385 in aio_dispatch_handlers qemu/util/aio-posix.c:414:20 qemu#9 0x57cea3978eb1 in aio_dispatch qemu/util/aio-posix.c:424:5 qemu#10 0x57cea3a1eede in aio_ctx_dispatch qemu/util/async.c:360:5 Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Manos Pitsidianakis <manos.pitsidianakis@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20240322110827.568412-1-zheyuma97@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

Replace qemu_bh_new_guarded() by virtio_bh_new_guarded() so the bus and device use the same guard. Otherwise the DMA-reentrancy protection can be bypassed: $ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 -display none -nodefaults \ -machine q35,accel=qtest \ -m 512M \ -device virtio-gpu \ -qtest stdio outl 0xcf8 0x80000820 outl 0xcfc 0xe0004000 outl 0xcf8 0x80000804 outw 0xcfc 0x06 write 0xe0004030 0x4 0x024000e0 write 0xe0004028 0x1 0xff write 0xe0004020 0x4 0x00009300 write 0xe000401c 0x1 0x01 write 0x101 0x1 0x04 write 0x103 0x1 0x1c write 0x9301c8 0x1 0x18 write 0x105 0x1 0x1c write 0x107 0x1 0x1c write 0x109 0x1 0x1c write 0x10b 0x1 0x00 write 0x10d 0x1 0x00 write 0x10f 0x1 0x00 write 0x111 0x1 0x00 write 0x113 0x1 0x00 write 0x115 0x1 0x00 write 0x117 0x1 0x00 write 0x119 0x1 0x00 write 0x11b 0x1 0x00 write 0x11d 0x1 0x00 write 0x11f 0x1 0x00 write 0x121 0x1 0x00 write 0x123 0x1 0x00 write 0x125 0x1 0x00 write 0x127 0x1 0x00 write 0x129 0x1 0x00 write 0x12b 0x1 0x00 write 0x12d 0x1 0x00 write 0x12f 0x1 0x00 write 0x131 0x1 0x00 write 0x133 0x1 0x00 write 0x135 0x1 0x00 write 0x137 0x1 0x00 write 0x139 0x1 0x00 write 0xe0007003 0x1 0x00 EOF ... ================================================================= ==276099==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60d000011178 at pc 0x562cc3b736c7 bp 0x7ffed49dee60 sp 0x7ffed49dee58 READ of size 8 at 0x60d000011178 thread T0 #0 0x562cc3b736c6 in virtio_gpu_ctrl_response hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:180:42 #1 0x562cc3b7c40b in virtio_gpu_ctrl_response_nodata hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:192:5 #2 0x562cc3b7c40b in virtio_gpu_simple_process_cmd hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1015:13 #3 0x562cc3b82873 in virtio_gpu_process_cmdq hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1050:9 #4 0x562cc4a85514 in aio_bh_call util/async.c:169:5 qemu#5 0x562cc4a85c52 in aio_bh_poll util/async.c:216:13 qemu#6 0x562cc4a1a79b in aio_dispatch util/aio-posix.c:423:5 qemu#7 0x562cc4a8a2da in aio_ctx_dispatch util/async.c:358:5 qemu#8 0x7f36840547a8 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x547a8) qemu#9 0x562cc4a8b753 in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:290:9 qemu#10 0x562cc4a8b753 in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:313:5 qemu#11 0x562cc4a8b753 in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:592:11 qemu#12 0x562cc3938186 in qemu_main_loop system/runstate.c:782:9 qemu#13 0x562cc43b7af5 in qemu_default_main system/main.c:37:14 qemu#14 0x7f3683a6c189 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16 qemu#15 0x7f3683a6c244 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:381:3 qemu#16 0x562cc2a58ac0 in _start (qemu-system-i386+0x231bac0) 0x60d000011178 is located 56 bytes inside of 136-byte region [0x60d000011140,0x60d0000111c8) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x562cc2adb662 in __interceptor_free (qemu-system-i386+0x239e662) #1 0x562cc3b86b21 in virtio_gpu_reset hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1524:9 #2 0x562cc416e20e in virtio_reset hw/virtio/virtio.c:2145:9 #3 0x562cc37c5644 in virtio_pci_reset hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:2249:5 #4 0x562cc4233758 in memory_region_write_accessor system/memory.c:497:5 qemu#5 0x562cc4232eea in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x562cc2adb90e in malloc (qemu-system-i386+0x239e90e) #1 0x7f368405a678 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5a678) #2 0x562cc4163ffc in virtqueue_split_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1612:12 #3 0x562cc4163ffc in virtqueue_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1783:16 #4 0x562cc3b91a95 in virtio_gpu_handle_ctrl hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1112:15 qemu#5 0x562cc4a85514 in aio_bh_call util/async.c:169:5 qemu#6 0x562cc4a85c52 in aio_bh_poll util/async.c:216:13 qemu#7 0x562cc4a1a79b in aio_dispatch util/aio-posix.c:423:5 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:180:42 in virtio_gpu_ctrl_response With this change, the same reproducer triggers: qemu-system-i386: warning: Blocked re-entrant IO on MemoryRegion: virtio-pci-common-virtio-gpu at addr: 0x6 Fixes: CVE-2024-3446 Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu> Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <kangel@zju.edu.cn> Reported-by: Xiao Lei <nop.leixiao@gmail.com> Reported-by: Yiming Tao <taoym@zju.edu.cn> Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1888606 Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20240409105537.18308-3-philmd@linaro.org>

@offset

nand_command() and nand_getio() don't check @offset points into the block, nor the available data length (s->iolen) is not negative. In order to fix: - check the offset is in range in nand_blk_load_NAND_PAGE_SIZE(), - do not set @iolen if blk_load() failed. Reproducer: $ cat << EOF | qemu-system-arm -machine tosa \ -monitor none -serial none \ -display none -qtest stdio write 0x10000111 0x1 0xca write 0x10000104 0x1 0x47 write 0x1000ca04 0x1 0xd7 write 0x1000ca01 0x1 0xe0 write 0x1000ca04 0x1 0x71 write 0x1000ca00 0x1 0x50 write 0x1000ca04 0x1 0xd7 read 0x1000ca02 0x1 write 0x1000ca01 0x1 0x10 EOF ================================================================= ==15750==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61f000000de0 at pc 0x560e61557210 bp 0x7ffcfc4a59f0 sp 0x7ffcfc4a59e8 READ of size 1 at 0x61f000000de0 thread T0 #0 0x560e6155720f in mem_and hw/block/nand.c:101:20 #1 0x560e6155ac9c in nand_blk_write_512 hw/block/nand.c:663:9 #2 0x560e61544200 in nand_command hw/block/nand.c:293:13 #3 0x560e6153cc83 in nand_setio hw/block/nand.c:520:13 #4 0x560e61a0a69e in tc6393xb_nand_writeb hw/display/tc6393xb.c:380:13 qemu#5 0x560e619f9bf7 in tc6393xb_writeb hw/display/tc6393xb.c:524:9 qemu#6 0x560e647c7d03 in memory_region_write_accessor softmmu/memory.c:492:5 qemu#7 0x560e647c7641 in access_with_adjusted_size softmmu/memory.c:554:18 qemu#8 0x560e647c5f66 in memory_region_dispatch_write softmmu/memory.c:1514:16 qemu#9 0x560e6485409e in flatview_write_continue softmmu/physmem.c:2825:23 qemu#10 0x560e648421eb in flatview_write softmmu/physmem.c:2867:12 qemu#11 0x560e64841ca8 in address_space_write softmmu/physmem.c:2963:18 qemu#12 0x560e61170162 in qemu_writeb tests/qtest/videzzo/videzzo_qemu.c:1080:5 qemu#13 0x560e6116eef7 in dispatch_mmio_write tests/qtest/videzzo/videzzo_qemu.c:1227:28 0x61f000000de0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 3424-byte region [0x61f000000080,0x61f000000de0) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x560e611276cf in malloc /root/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x7f7959a87e98 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x57e98) #2 0x560e64b98871 in object_new qom/object.c:749:12 #3 0x560e64b5d1a1 in qdev_new hw/core/qdev.c:153:19 #4 0x560e61547ea5 in nand_init hw/block/nand.c:639:11 qemu#5 0x560e619f8772 in tc6393xb_init hw/display/tc6393xb.c:558:16 qemu#6 0x560e6390bad2 in tosa_init hw/arm/tosa.c:250:12 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow hw/block/nand.c:101:20 in mem_and ==15750==ABORTING Broken since introduction in commit 3e3d581 ("NAND Flash memory emulation and ECC calculation helpers for use by NAND controllers"). Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1445 Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1446 Reported-by: Qiang Liu <cyruscyliu@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20240409135944.24997-4-philmd@linaro.org>

When the MAC Interface Layer (MIL) transmit FIFO is full, truncate the packet, and raise the Transmitter Error (TXE) flag. Broken since model introduction in commit 2a42499 ("LAN9118 emulation"). When using the reproducer from https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2267 we get: hw/net/lan9118.c:798:17: runtime error: index 2048 out of bounds for type 'uint8_t[2048]' (aka 'unsigned char[2048]') #0 0x563ec9a057b1 in tx_fifo_push hw/net/lan9118.c:798:43 #1 0x563ec99fbb28 in lan9118_writel hw/net/lan9118.c:1042:9 #2 0x563ec99f2de2 in lan9118_16bit_mode_write hw/net/lan9118.c:1205:9 #3 0x563ecbf78013 in memory_region_write_accessor system/memory.c:497:5 #4 0x563ecbf776f5 in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18 qemu#5 0x563ecbf75643 in memory_region_dispatch_write system/memory.c:1521:16 qemu#6 0x563ecc01bade in flatview_write_continue_step system/physmem.c:2713:18 qemu#7 0x563ecc01b374 in flatview_write_continue system/physmem.c:2743:19 qemu#8 0x563ecbff1c9b in flatview_write system/physmem.c:2774:12 qemu#9 0x563ecbff1768 in address_space_write system/physmem.c:2894:18 ... [*] LAN9118 DS00002266B.pdf, Table 5.3.3 "INTERRUPT STATUS REGISTER" Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Reported-by: Will Lester Reported-by: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2267 Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20240409133801.23503-3-philmd@linaro.org>

Per "SD Host Controller Standard Specification Version 3.00": * 2.2.5 Transfer Mode Register (Offset 00Ch) Writes to this register shall be ignored when the Command Inhibit (DAT) in the Present State register is 1. Do not update the TRNMOD register when Command Inhibit (DAT) bit is set to avoid the present-status register going out of sync, leading to malicious guest using DMA mode and overflowing the FIFO buffer: $ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 \ -display none -nographic -nodefaults \ -machine accel=qtest -m 512M \ -device sdhci-pci,sd-spec-version=3 \ -device sd-card,drive=mydrive \ -drive if=none,index=0,file=null-co://,format=raw,id=mydrive \ -qtest stdio outl 0xcf8 0x80001013 outl 0xcfc 0x91 outl 0xcf8 0x80001001 outl 0xcfc 0x06000000 write 0x9100002c 0x1 0x05 write 0x91000058 0x1 0x16 write 0x91000005 0x1 0x04 write 0x91000028 0x1 0x08 write 0x16 0x1 0x21 write 0x19 0x1 0x20 write 0x9100000c 0x1 0x01 write 0x9100000e 0x1 0x20 write 0x9100000f 0x1 0x00 write 0x9100000c 0x1 0x00 write 0x91000020 0x1 0x00 EOF Stack trace (part): ================================================================= ==89993==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x615000029900 at pc 0x55d5f885700d bp 0x7ffc1e1e9470 sp 0x7ffc1e1e9468 WRITE of size 1 at 0x615000029900 thread T0 #0 0x55d5f885700c in sdhci_write_dataport hw/sd/sdhci.c:564:39 #1 0x55d5f8849150 in sdhci_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1223:13 #2 0x55d5fa01db63 in memory_region_write_accessor system/memory.c:497:5 #3 0x55d5fa01d245 in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18 #4 0x55d5fa01b1a9 in memory_region_dispatch_write system/memory.c:1521:16 qemu#5 0x55d5fa09f5c9 in flatview_write_continue system/physmem.c:2711:23 qemu#6 0x55d5fa08f78b in flatview_write system/physmem.c:2753:12 qemu#7 0x55d5fa08f258 in address_space_write system/physmem.c:2860:18 ... 0x615000029900 is located 0 bytes to the right of 512-byte region [0x615000029700,0x615000029900) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x55d5f7237b27 in __interceptor_calloc #1 0x7f9e36dd4c50 in g_malloc0 #2 0x55d5f88672f7 in sdhci_pci_realize hw/sd/sdhci-pci.c:36:5 #3 0x55d5f844b582 in pci_qdev_realize hw/pci/pci.c:2092:9 #4 0x55d5fa2ee74b in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:510:13 qemu#5 0x55d5fa325bfb in property_set_bool qom/object.c:2358:5 qemu#6 0x55d5fa31ea45 in object_property_set qom/object.c:1472:5 qemu#7 0x55d5fa332509 in object_property_set_qobject om/qom-qobject.c:28:10 qemu#8 0x55d5fa31f6ed in object_property_set_bool qom/object.c:1541:15 qemu#9 0x55d5fa2e2948 in qdev_realize hw/core/qdev.c:292:12 qemu#10 0x55d5f8eed3f1 in qdev_device_add_from_qdict system/qdev-monitor.c:719:10 qemu#11 0x55d5f8eef7ff in qdev_device_add system/qdev-monitor.c:738:11 qemu#12 0x55d5f8f211f0 in device_init_func system/vl.c:1200:11 qemu#13 0x55d5fad0877d in qemu_opts_foreach util/qemu-option.c:1135:14 qemu#14 0x55d5f8f0df9c in qemu_create_cli_devices system/vl.c:2638:5 qemu#15 0x55d5f8f0db24 in qmp_x_exit_preconfig system/vl.c:2706:5 qemu#16 0x55d5f8f14dc0 in qemu_init system/vl.c:3737:9 ... SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow hw/sd/sdhci.c:564:39 in sdhci_write_dataport Add assertions to ensure the fifo_buffer[] is not overflowed by malicious accesses to the Buffer Data Port register. Fixes: CVE-2024-3447 Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Fixes: d7dfca0 ("hw/sdhci: introduce standard SD host controller") Buglink: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=58813 Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu> Reported-by: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Message-Id: <CAFEAcA9iLiv1XGTGKeopgMa8Y9+8kvptvsb8z2OBeuy+5=NUfg@mail.gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20240409145524.27913-1-philmd@linaro.org>

If a fragmented packet size is too short, do not try to calculate its checksum. Reproduced using: $ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 -display none -nodefaults \ -machine q35,accel=qtest -m 32M \ -device igb,netdev=net0 \ -netdev user,id=net0 \ -qtest stdio outl 0xcf8 0x80000810 outl 0xcfc 0xe0000000 outl 0xcf8 0x80000804 outw 0xcfc 0x06 write 0xe0000403 0x1 0x02 writel 0xe0003808 0xffffffff write 0xe000381a 0x1 0x5b write 0xe000381b 0x1 0x00 EOF Assertion failed: (offset == 0), function iov_from_buf_full, file util/iov.c, line 39. #1 0x5575e81e952a in iov_from_buf_full qemu/util/iov.c:39:5 #2 0x5575e6500768 in net_tx_pkt_update_sctp_checksum qemu/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:144:9 #3 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_setup_tx_offloads qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:478:11 #4 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_tx_pkt_send qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:552:10 qemu#5 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_process_tx_desc qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:671:17 qemu#6 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_start_xmit qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:903:9 qemu#7 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_set_tdt qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:2812:5 qemu#8 0x5575e657d6a4 in igb_core_write qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:4248:9 Fixes: CVE-2024-3567 Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com> Fixes: f199b13 ("igb: Implement Tx SCTP CSO") Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2273 Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20240410070459.49112-1-philmd@linaro.org>

mcayland and others added 12 commits February 9, 2020 10:25

audio: add dummy screamer device

74e7551

Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>

macio: basic AWACS/screamer hookup

ca95fae

Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>

screamer: some basic reg work, plus basic DMA wire-up

e8ba171

WIP: basic DMA functionality for screamer

34dffbe

WIP: wire up to new world machine

b618dea

WIP: screamer now able to play on Debian Linux/snd_powermac

a1cafb9

WIP: working sound in MacOS 9.1/9.2

f0d222a

WIP: Add OpenBIOS with screamer support

677163c

Set the autosave name, to persist the window frame between runs.

4add932

Removed debug logging.

0d8fe86

Tidied code.

f56299d

mcayland force-pushed the screamer branch from 677163c to 0280b1a Compare May 1, 2020 07:38

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Persist the position of the cocoa window #2

Persist the position of the cocoa window #2

samdeane commented Apr 8, 2020 •

edited

Persist the position of the cocoa window #2

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Persist the position of the cocoa window #2

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samdeane commented Apr 8, 2020 • edited

samdeane commented Apr 8, 2020 •

edited