policy: bump TX_MAX_STANDARD_VERSION to 3 #29496
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glozow
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What is your thinking on #29454 ? I would still favor to make the 1000 vb limit dynamic and applying on the whole package, not only the child. If you prefer to have the discussion on the v3 BIP PR let me know. |
Same as said that for sibling evictions - I’ll go to hack a tx-relay jamming / pinning toolkit, that way we’ll have more information on the robustness of those current proposed anti-pinning mitigations. I still maintain there are very incomplete for time-sensitive transaction flows, especially in face of “loophole” and NTA pinnings. I’m incredibly worried for the security of the Lightning Network if we don’t deploy additional anti-pinning mitigations on top of those ones over the future years - We have not seen yet script kiddies attacking the network. Under today inertia, we’ll probably converge towards a centralized network of ~50 LSPs relying on traditional social trust rather than relying on trust-minimized confirmation of pre-signed transactions. This is very problematic if they wish to accept channel traffic from low-resources spokes LN nodes, especially in geographical areas where social trust mechanism cannot be afforded by end-users. On #29454, I still prefer to keep experimenting on “transaction-issuer selected policy limits” which might encompass more stringent tx-relay jamming on a minor fork of Bitcoin Core. Coming up with a sound technical proposal in matters of tx-relay policy likely demands few rounds of iterations and realistically we already have a severe shortage of qualified review bandwidth in those areas. The initial reason closing of #29448 was my own realization that the introduction of differentiated tx-relay policy among the tx-relay network of nodes will probably generate with time tiers of transaction economic traffic priority (I really cannot see how it worsens memory / CPU DoS robustness per se ?). I don’t think this is a phenomena we can do a lot as a full-node implementation, as we’re seeing with the appearance of transaction accelerators by mining pools. There is transaction issuer demand for such services apparently. Yet we should be careful of doing works in parallel to maintain bip152 block propagation and as such long-term decentralization of the base-layer network. I’m not opposing the deployment of |
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Added constant for #29873 (comment) |
| # While v3 transactions are standard, the CURRENT_VERSION is 2. | ||
| # This test can be removed if CURRENT_VERSION is changed, and replaced with tests that the | ||
| # wallet handles v3 rules properly. | ||
| assert_equal(tx_current_version.nVersion, 2) | ||
| wallet_v3.unloadwallet() |
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Good idea to add this!
Note that, as CURRENT_VERSION = 2, the wallet will not make transactions with nVersion=3 yet.
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Rebased for #30072 |
Make
nVersion=3(which is currently nonstandard on mainnet) standard.Note that we will treat these transactions as Topologically Restricted Until Confirmation (TRUC). See #28948, #29306, and bitcoin/bips#1541.
See #27463 for overall project tracking, and #29319 for information about relevance to cluster mempool.