===============================================================================
README
===============================================================================

This is a demonstration of Manger's Oracle* using a modified version of 
libgcrypt to expose the oracle directly (instead of relying on timing 
information).  

* A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding 
 (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 v2.0
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=704143

You MUST use a specific, modified, version of libgcrypt for this example to 
work. To set it up:

1)  Create a directory structure that looks like this:

 mangers-oracle-example/ # This you can name whatever
   libs/
     lib/
   oracle/               # This too I suppose
     Makefile
     decryptoracle.c
     encryptoracle.c
     mangersoracle.py

2)  cd mangers-oracle-example/libs/
3)  git clone git://git.gnupg.org/libgcrypt.git
4)  cd libgcrypt/
5)  git checkout 2d559392b5d2044fc780bfec211f1af9317a5b8f .
6)  echo "--- a/cipher/pubkey.c
+++ b/cipher/pubkey.c
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ oaep_decode (gcry_mpi_t *r_result, unsigned int nbits, int algo,
   if (frame[0])
     {
       gcry_free (frame);
-      return GPG_ERR_ENCODING_PROBLEM;
+      return GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ;//GPG_ERR_ENCODING_PROBLEM;
     }

   dlen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);" | patch -p1

You should see "patching file cipher/pubkey.c".
This adds an oracle we will use.

7)  echo "--- a/cipher/pubkey.c
+++ b/cipher/pubkey.c
@@ -2266,6 +2266,7 @@ gcry_pk_decrypt (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t s_skey)
       rc = oaep_decode (&unpad, gcry_pk_get_nbits (s_skey), ctx.hash_algo,
                        plain, ctx.label, ctx.labellen);
       mpi_free (plain);
+      plain = NULL;
       if (rc)
        goto leave;
       plain = unpad;" | patch -p1
   
You should see "patching file cipher/pubkey.c  Hunk #1 succeeded at 2266 with fuzz 2."
This fixes a bug that caused crashes on my machine that are not included in 
this revision.

8)  ./autogen.sh    # If you get dependecy errors
9)  ./configure     # on these three steps, you're 
10) make            # on your own to resolve them
11) ln -s $(pwd)/src/.libs/libgcrypt.* ../lib/
12) cd ../../oracle
13) make
14) ./encrypt              # You should see hexadecimal output
15) ./decrypt $(./encrypt) # You should see 11223344556677889900AABBCCDDEEFF1122334455667788
16) ./mangersoracle.py

===============================================================================
FAQ/DEBUGGING
===============================================================================

-------------------------------------------------------
What's up with the weird lib directories?

The -L ../libs/lib -Wl,-rpath,../libs/lib in the Makefile tells the binaries to
load libraries from a specific directory at runtime.  This lets you build 
libraries and test with them without needing to install them in /usr/local or
jump through a lot of hoops.  I put them in the lib/ directory just for 
cleanliness.

-------------------------------------------------------
How can I check the libraries I made are being used?

man ldd

$ ldd decrypt
        linux-gate.so.1 =>  (0xb7847000)
        libgcrypt.so.11 => ../libs/lib/libgcrypt.so.11 (0xb77c5000)
        libstdc++.so.6 => /usr/lib/gcc/i686-pc-linux-gnu/4.4.5/libstdc++.so.6 (0xb76a9000)
        libm.so.6 => /lib/libm.so.6 (0xb7683000)
        libgcc_s.so.1 => /usr/lib/gcc/i686-pc-linux-gnu/4.4.5/libgcc_s.so.1 (0xb7667000)
        libc.so.6 => /lib/libc.so.6 (0xb750b000)
        libgpg-error.so.0 => /usr/lib/libgpg-error.so.0 (0xb7506000)
        /lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xb7848000)

You can see libgcrypt is being loaded from a relative directory.  That's 
crucial.

If you see this ouput:
    $ ./encrypt
    Failure encrypting: User defined source 1 / Invalid flag

Then, you're using the system-installed libraries (libgcrypt isn't recognizing
the oaep flag).  You should see something like this:

    $ ./encrypt
    00B4AF97EA4A17017C54A498116BA4C12F3AC22A997D47AE2B455A5619F9404EC6A0DF855C1E90DE13504A356A79CB0A6E2B1D467386107F45F6D885257BAD693A19AA51F6CD9E782797DF9CCEA40BDA7AEB5FEC82EACD8B1CA75D8BD8FCEB78447EC60C4CB389877A2ACFE6C3B78F713C6E255BD12B8B5AEE32AF7A65B460A758

Note that the output changes with every run.

-------------------------------------------------------
You cheated!  You modified the source to create an oracle!

Yes.

-------------------------------------------------------
'make' fails with an error about documentation

Disable the docs build by editing Makefile.am, removing doc from DIST_SUBDIRS 
and SUBDIRS and rerun ./configure

-------------------------------------------------------
Does it work with other keys?

Sure.  I generated a 2048 key and it worked fine:
static const char sample_secret_key[] =
"(private-key"
" (rsa"
"  (n #c37e043054d00026b34cce10f96d46c32f00e765beddaae402a54ebc182dc1dfa7"
"      39699a493a494c9214ff8d499417954a5193b87841fec2a653aebdc38a0b01b0f5"
"      b9d0ce366f8c7cc68b1539c9631b30c25346e5557bc80efd2d3bbffdc80b116911"
"      9a3382382885936dadbc19e9ab17f1756fd705773b1e8e69469be8448628822ccf"
"      5aed1ba968d50155745915cb05681baf7b7f3ce8f2b1b4f00cc9e1ec30a91bf85b"
"      96509c3d221c0f5e63a8fd39495bf74dce87b03ab515181493b8589ef9930a4431"
"      dec3f69c73cc571fb0ca29982c141c6f33344382a3f52752bb0d612033cb08b618"
"      31afb30f4b6e4a1bf9047d781ea50fc6c4e855f94bf4dfe7dd#)"
"  (e #010001#)"
"  (d #98946f92856fbede75cd397c9821093ce81fcd7b65283fec2c80775e6984b52fe9"
"      a5eedd63d0214ba92cc874aefbee1830645166863e04284a873ff88e78dcb45a38"
"      bfe9d0393e8129161191e483615de4859757db41081692545a8cab01d9b381c83e"
"      dbdade0514e384b8f303c039d7b71d576a8e298ef0ce9d9a5f68ea35281cbc1d81"
"      55755b3210c1d0cdc9ba7d7b13f89ca849dacffb5b01f8c5a149274bc7e7a7714b"
"      318629ff34d72de41d7ff1b6cc8014101615c099515458695e529eeed016967c50"
"      42694a253b23a532ab29c1e232a1b31321677fc045d37b277aefcaf7743d1aba88"
"      098a8dc92d75136bcf0d043130b8389189fcab32e737dadb61#)"
"  (p #c4d44f5488d138db689561bb5b9461ad7321b18c385aefc950bd12ca58d65c0324"
"      fcfacf0ec91d63179f461e345989b9beccf53c5d906b955497fad33b52085b16f1"
"      0e15d7c93f6a3050b89c02a14720e3a7ca11c7d1f6b40fff5ce7fbc5bc0a78573b"
"      31b3c3dcc131ab1e89581874836f54edfe121cff7870bf1928677b29c9#)"
"  (q #fe42ce76911cffae22bdfc90197a4803a3a9caa3fe2f700fa84b87140f8e1545da"
"      791e758137b71a11e733285876467c2c8b9768b43454cbc0b697584dbfd9274a07"
"      619a6346b61d5e76bef68876435cc8e6491da4a442ba85713e0dd742a26fb80c13"
"      043592b121b6c6105277f6902b6ebc4140c0b4a906e6478448ac8ed775#)"
"  (u #c741caade6b2f140577c978acfc6dae0934dd1bdc374035937a4fb251e4eb27df1"
"      e2c9596047bddfebacbae2034162a1325bd293866a627b5b9aa69e256206100164"
"      84bfbd99a28dd6545d817ff3a13f3609ec8cb52748ae61fd91613d813186da1c7d"
"      90ae6c61bbfd6baf0dda926332064723113e7612bb55221ecce04c0b73#)))";
static const char sample_public_key[] =
"(public-key"
" (rsa"
"  (n #c37e043054d00026b34cce10f96d46c32f00e765beddaae402a54ebc182dc1dfa7"
"      39699a493a494c9214ff8d499417954a5193b87841fec2a653aebdc38a0b01b0f5"
"      b9d0ce366f8c7cc68b1539c9631b30c25346e5557bc80efd2d3bbffdc80b116911"
"      9a3382382885936dadbc19e9ab17f1756fd705773b1e8e69469be8448628822ccf"
"      5aed1ba968d50155745915cb05681baf7b7f3ce8f2b1b4f00cc9e1ec30a91bf85b"
"      96509c3d221c0f5e63a8fd39495bf74dce87b03ab515181493b8589ef9930a4431"
"      dec3f69c73cc571fb0ca29982c141c6f33344382a3f52752bb0d612033cb08b618"
"      31afb30f4b6e4a1bf9047d781ea50fc6c4e855f94bf4dfe7dd#)"
"  (e #010001#)))";


===============================================================================
TIMING ATTACK
===============================================================================

If a failure occurs in the integer-to-octets conversion - that is, the 
decrypted plaintext overflows into the 0th byte- the function oaep_decode 
(cipher/pubkey.c) exits early:

  /* FRAME = 00 || MASKED_SEED || MASKED_DB */
  if (frame[0])
    {
      gcry_free (frame);
      return GPG_ERR_ENCODING_PROBLEM; 
    }

http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=blob;f=cipher/pubkey.c;h=ba888f3d4596774b3bdcb7add252cbd8bfebc3e0;hb=2d559392b5d2044fc780bfec211f1af9317a5b8f

Although very small, this is enough to build a local timing attack against 
libgcrypt.  Although it is not 100% reliable, I have successfully completed 
decryption using Manger's Oracle based solely on timing information. 

You can confirm the timing differential yourself:

1)  cd timing/
2)  make
3)  ./buildTiming.py
4)  Each trials.X output file should be entered as a column in Gnumeric 
   (Note that Excel doesn't have the type of graph we need)
5)  The columns should be selected, and a box-plot graph created.  
   (In Gnumeric, this is under the 'Statistics' subheader.)
6)  Assuming the machine was sufficiently quiet, a graph similar to the one
    labeled example-times.png should have been produced.
7)  We can see that after the 2nd column the following columns have a 
    consistently lower (faster) execution time than the first two columns
    Although any individual measurement may have been through the range 
   (indicated by the minimum and maximum lines), the 75th through 25th 
    percentile values (shown by the boxes in the graphs) are consistent. 

===============================================================================
ERRATA
===============================================================================

During the implementation I encountered two errata in Manger's original paper.

In step 1.3b: 
       "This implies f1 E [B,2B) for a known (even) multiple f1. Rephrasing this gives (f1/2) * m E [B/2,B) " 
should be 
       "This implies f1 * m E [B,2B) for a known (even) multiple f1. Rephrasing this gives (f1/2) * m E [B/2,B) "

That is, (f1*m) instead of f1.  This is just a typo.



In step 3.3
       3.3 Select a boundary point, in + B, near the range of ftmp * m. i = floor( (ftmp*mmin) / n ).
should be
       3.3 Select a boundary point, in + B, near the range of ftmp * m. i = ceil( (ftmp*mmin) / n ).
       
That is, ceil instead of floor. 

These may be verified experimentally with the included proof of concept.

-------
Update: After talking with James Manger, he notes:

   [the change] should work in almost all common cases, though I suspect it 
   could still fail in some corner cases.  The real flaw isn't actually in 
   choosing the boundary i in step 3.3, but in choosing f_3 in step 3.4. Step 
   3.4 chooses f_3 so the bottom of the m range once multiplied is just bigger 
   than a multiple of the modulus. Instead, it should choose f_3 so the MIDDLE
   of the m range once multiplied is a close as possible to the i * n + B 
   point. That would mean that even if the step 3.3 rounding meant the f * m 
   width was smaller than hoped (eg just less than B, instead of close to 2B), 
   the range would still span the i * n + B boundary so the Oracle check would 
   still reduce the range.

More background if you should need to refer to it.

===============================================================================
MISC
===============================================================================

Source: https://github.com/GDSSecurity/mangers-oracle

Author
	Tom Ritter 
	tom@ritter.vg / tritter@gdssecurity.com
	http://ritter.vg / http://gdssecurity.com

Obviously not possible without the work of James Manger

James Manger. 2001. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal Asymmetric 
  Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 v2.0. 
  In Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on 
  Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO '01), Joe Kilian (Ed.). 
  Springer-Verlag, London, UK, 230-238.
  
Thanks to Mike Arpaia[1] and Gotham Digital Science[2]
 [1] http://apt-sec.org/
 [2] http://gdssecurity.com