Normative: Added note about sets of locales for web browser implementations needing to not change as a result of user behaviour

[ben-allen]

fix #588

[ljharb]

Why would this restriction only apply to web browsers?

[ben-allen]

This PR is in response to feedback from the 2021-05-25 TC39 meeting and is meant to address concerns about potential fingerprinting issues that only pertain to browser implementations.

[ljharb]

Is there any reason not to apply the same restrictions to all engines tho? The ideal is that everything applies to everyone equally; having something only apply to a subset of impls is a suboptimal outcome.

[ben-allen]

updated to apply restriction to all hosts

[ljharb]

(please don't land this until 402 editors have reviewed)

[sffc]

Set of locales, yes, but also the set of all enumerable items including currencies, numbering systems, calendars, etc.

Also, please explain why we're adding this constraint. I imagine that it may be desirable in the future to relax this constraint, and we need to understand why it existed.

[aphillips]

The W3C I18N Working Group discussed this PR today in our teleconference. I am adding this comment on our behalf.

We are concerned that this prohibition will disadvantage smaller language/cultural communities who might rely on installation of support to enable locale-based APIs in the browser or JS host.

We feel that precluding the ability to install a locale or the parts of a locale (such as dictionaries for spell check/breaking/etc.) that assist with high-quality presentation on the Web and in JS applications has the potential to negatively impact those communities that cannot depend on support from browser or system vendors. If there is a "fingerprinting" risk associated with such installation, providing a warning to the user might be the best appropriate response.

Also, note that currently we are not aware of runtimes that allows the list of locales to be updated (other than by updating the entire underlying ICU build), so this strikes us as preventing a feature from existing that might be useful. Also, we note that CLDR releases include new locales twice each year, so presumably browsers would change their list of available locales as updates propagate.

[sffc]

CC @codehag for feedback on @aphillips' comment above (see issue #588 for a reminder of the problem this PR is trying to solve)

[ljharb]

@aphillips doesnt this prohibition only require refreshing the page after installing a new locale?

[aphillips]

@ljharb asked:

doesnt this prohibition only require refreshing the page after installing a new locale?

Not as far as I can tell? It seems to require that any two distinct users on the same version on the same platform (not the "same machine") should always get the same enumerable set of available values. The change in cb6449b extends this to include anything (numbering systems, calendars, etc.). I note that one frequent cause of such patching would be time zone data (which is not listed but is the regular source of runtime patching outside the normal release cycle).

If I understand the threat here, it's to prevent a bad actor from installing a locale into a user's browser and then using that locale ID (perhaps using a well-formed locale ID like: bad-actr-06b3c) to track the specific user (or to differentiate groups of users). That suggests that there should be no silent installation of locales or locale data, not necessarily an outright prohibition?

There is a similar issue (w3c/css-drafts#4055) related to fingerprinting based on fonts (which have a much higher level of per-installation variability and which, unlike locales, can actually be installed currently 😃). The challenge here is to support under-served communities of users--particularly when the threat is more-or-less theoretical--without exposing large groups of Web users to abusive behavior.

[justingrant]

I note that one frequent cause of such patching would be time zone data (which is not listed but is the regular source of runtime patching outside the normal release cycle).

Which hosts and engines currently do runtime patching of time zone data? Are these OS patches or browser patches?

[Constellation]

@ben-allen I would like to ensure that this is including the possibility of vastly different behavior of the same browser. For example, iPhone has lockdown-mode (LDM, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) which explicitly disables some of the features to put some extra defense against the targeted attacks. I don't think Intl related things can be changed based on these modes, but I would like to ensure that there is this kind of explicit possibility and this possibility is allowed in the statement :)

Eemeli pointed in the TG2 meeting that this can be said as a part of platform difference, and then this sounds fine. So I would like to ensure that the above possibility is counted as a part of platform difference.

Other part pretty looks good to me! Thanks for your work.

[ljharb]

@Constellation can lockdown mode come into effect without reloading the page? If it forces a reload, then this note wouldn't apply at all, since it wouldn't be observable within the lifetime of a program.

[sffc]

TG2 notes: https://github.com/tc39/ecma402/blob/master/meetings/notes-2023-06-01.md#editorial-added-note-about-sets-of-locales-for-web-browser-implementations-needing-to-not-change-as-a-result-of-user-behaviour-780

Seeking feedback from @dminor

[dminor]

Our concern is that on-demand installation of locale data could provide an easy fingerprinting vector for members of smaller language/cultural communities who may face discrimination or persecution, for example by dominant cultural groups or by the government of the country in which they live.

Our position is that it is better to ship data for all locales in a single bundle, which ensures that data for smaller communities is available, without exposing them to a fingerprinting risk.

I believe it would be very difficult to create a user warning that would explain the potential risk in a way that would allow a user to make an informed decision about accepting extra locale data. I suspect most people would ignore these warnings. I'd also point out that there's no guarantee that for a small linguistic community the text of the warning would be localized, which would decrease the likelihood of making an informed decision.

The key point is that the set of locales should not change as a result of user behaviour. We're not trying to prevent vendors from shipping a new bundle of locale data to users as part of an update, just data for individual locales. In the case of Firefox, CLDR and timezone updates are done as part of our normal release cycle anyway.

[srl295]

The W3C I18N Working Group discussed this PR today in our teleconference. I am adding this comment on our behalf.

We are concerned that this prohibition will disadvantage smaller language/cultural communities who might rely on installation of support to enable locale-based APIs in the browser or JS host.

This type of feature was recently requested to me, in the context of ICU4C, and explicitly for the purpose of supporting minority, disadvantaged languages. (Which, yes, could potentially be at-risk for fingerprinting of various kinds.)

We feel that precluding the ability to install a locale or the parts of a locale (such as dictionaries for spell check/breaking/etc.) that assist with high-quality presentation on the Web and in JS applications has the potential to negatively impact those communities that cannot depend on support from browser or system vendors. If there is a "fingerprinting" risk associated with such installation, providing a warning to the user might be the best appropriate response.

Agreed. Default breaking for Thai script, for example, in current implementations causes problems for minority script users. more here

Also, note that currently we are not aware of runtimes that allows the list of locales to be updated (other than by updating the entire underlying ICU build), so this strikes us as preventing a feature from existing that might be useful. Also, we note that CLDR releases include new locales twice each year, so presumably browsers would change their list of available locales as updates propagate.

CLDR releases include certain locales as "basic" and above, but there are other locales not included.

ICU4C default build includes certain locales, but not others.

Vendors include certain locales, but not others.

In short, certain locales are already excluded from web implementations. I'm concerned that requiring that these locales cannot be added on the fly could end up negatively impacting users of already-digitally disadvantaged languages.

[srl295]

Is there any reason not to apply the same restrictions to all engines tho? The ideal is that everything applies to everyone equally; having something only apply to a subset of impls is a suboptimal outcome.

On another topic, Node.js has, from the first versions that included Intl by default, had the ability to customize at build and runtime the set of locales available, and also to supplement the locales depending on the startup environment. It's also been requested to have some way to add locales at runtime there as well. This language seems to make Node.js v0.12 onwards potentially noncompliant. I don't see the argument for restriction in this type of environment at all.

[ljharb]

@srl295 that doesn't imply to me that it can be changed during the lifetime of a program, only at program start time.

My understanding of this requirement is that once a JS program has started, it can't observe further changes to the list of available locales. To that end, anything that requires refreshing or navigating a page, or, restarting an application or launching a process, in order to observe a different set of locales seems to me that it complies with this requirement.

[srl295]

@srl295 that doesn't imply to me that it can be changed during the lifetime of a program, only at program start time.

OK. So "user behaviour" is scoped to the JS runtime? That's helpful…  I then don't see how fingerprinting is mitigated.

My understanding of this requirement is that once a JS program has started, it can't observe further changes to the list of available locales. To that end, anything that requires refreshing or navigating a page, or, restarting an application or launching a process, in order to observe a different set of locales seems to me that it complies with this requirement.

That would be very different. And wouldn't then bring as much concern. Adding locales while running has been discussed as well, but certainly has a lot of other challenges.

[ryzokuken]

LGTM

[Manishearth]

Yes, my comment is not about the refresh being manual, it is that it is a pretty onerous thing to ask web developers to refresh their page halfway through; and it strongly impacts how they may design their webpage, alongside having a noticeable effect from the user's perspective.

[ben-allen]

I've pushed a major change to this proposal: instead of forbidding the installation of on-demand locales/locale components, the new language allows it if and only if no information about which non-standard locales are already installed gets disclosed. The normative text presents no preferred mechanism for doing this, though if this version of the text appears acceptable I can add a non-normative note proposing a strategy similar to @Manishearth's / WebXR's.

@dminor @srl295

[ljharb]

It might be worth noting that one potential way to satisfy this constraint is to pretend that all on-the-fly-available locales are already installed.

[sffc]

@ben-allen to update the spec text to incorporate the remainder of @Manishearth's feedback.

[Manishearth]

Should this be normative? The line below should be informative, but it sounds like this is expected to be normative?

[ben-allen]

This should indeed be normative, though it's in that fuzzy space where no extant browser implementation is affected by the change

[sffc]

Changes to the set of locales, currencies, calendars, numbering systems, and other enumerable items made available by ECMAScript hosts must not result in two users using the same version of the same host on the same platform becoming distinguishable from each other. This constraint is imposed to reduce the fingerprinting risk inherent in internationalization, and may be relaxed in future revisions.

How about

The initial set of locales, currencies, calendars, numbering systems, and other enumerable items visible to a particular origin must be the same for all users sharing the same user agent string (engine and platform version). Furthermore, dynamic changes to these sets must not result in users becoming distinguishable from each other. This constraint is imposed to reduce the fingerprinting risk inherent in internationalization, and may be relaxed in future revisions.

[ben-allen]

Much clearer, will use this

[ByteEater-pl]

The notion of "user agent string" is foreign to ECMAScript and not a universal among implementations. @ljharb, please take a look, it seems to be going contrary to your comments above.

As something far from matters typically expected to be specified in a programming language standard (or API closely related to it, being an optional extension of a language's standard library) and pertaining to only a subset of implementations, namely Web browsers, shouldn't it live in a spec for those? Like the one defining what a Web browser is and what requirements it has to satisfy as an ECMAScript implementation (if supported) in addition to ECMA-262?

[ljharb]

I agree the concept and mention of a user agent doesn’t make any sense in an ecma specification.

[Manishearth]

In that case I think we need to step back and consider the premise here. The fingerprinting concerns are largely only relevant for web browser environments.

Either it is ECMA402's job to address these fingerprinting concerns and thus it must be allowed to refer to mechanisms available in those contexts, or it is not ECMA402's job, and we don't need to handle this at all. We can't have our fingerprinting cake if we're not planning on eating it.

I suspect the framing here can be refined a bit to be clear that it is talking in a web browser context only. Alternatively, a more general point can be made about "systems where fingerprinting is a concern, like web browsers", and instead of saying UA strings talk about "already distinguishable bits of information (in the case of browsers, this is platform/version/UA string)". Something like that.

[ByteEater-pl]

IMO it really belongs elsewhere. But if a critical mass insists it's desirable to make the spec longer and draw the attention also therein to this concern present in some implementations, an informative note with sufficiently generic wording could be added.

[sffc]

TG2 approval: https://github.com/tc39/ecma402/blob/master/meetings/notes-2023-09-07.md#normative-added-note-about-sets-of-locales-for-web-browser-implementations-needing-to-not-change-as-a-result-of-user-behaviour-780

[bakkot]

If this is normative, it maybe shouldn't be a NOTE?

[michaelficarra]

Are notes in 402 not all non-normative?

[ben-allen]

Most recent push is a minimal change based on TC39 feedback — all I did was move the text that was in notes into the main text of the Implementation Dependencies section. This may, though, be insufficient or otherwise wrong. @littledan @bakkot @sffc