hkdf: when HMAC key is all zeros, still set a valid key length #24204
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By itself, this is no change in any computation. However, this will unlock enforcing minimum key lengths for NIST and FIPS 140-3 requirements. Also reading RFC8448 and RFC5869, this seems to be strictly correct too. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@surgut.co.uk>
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Hmm... given RFC5869 this is really a bug in our implementation. Apparently we do not test this case at all and we should. But the bug seems to be already in HKDF_Extract() - it should handle NULL salt properly - using the all zeros of mdlen. |
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The change seems fine to me.. HKDF_Extract() calls MAC_Init() which calls HMAC_Init_ex().. So pre and post this change the same result will occur. |
slontis
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Apr 24, 2024
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I think the change should only happen on master, since it makes no difference to the result. |
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shahsb
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This pull request is ready to merge |
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Merged to the master branch. Thank you for your contribution. |
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By itself, this is no change in any computation. However, this will unlock enforcing minimum key lengths for NIST and FIPS 140-3 requirements. Also reading RFC8448 and RFC5869, this seems to be strictly correct too. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@surgut.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from #24204)
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By itself, this is no change in any computation. However, this will unlock enforcing minimum key lengths for NIST and FIPS 140-3 requirements. Also reading RFC8448 and RFC5869, this seems to be strictly correct too. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@surgut.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from openssl#24204) (cherry picked from commit 15d6114)
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By itself, this is no change in any computation. However, this will unlock enforcing minimum key lengths for NIST and FIPS 140-3 requirements.
Also reading RFC8448 and RFC5869, this seems to be strictly correct too.
Submitting this separately from #24199 because this may seem as potentially critical change.
Checklist
No tests adjusted as the expectations are to remain the same.