.ca.def

cat > .conf.apf <<EOF
#!/bin/sh
#
##
# Advanced Policy Firewall (APF) v1.7.5
#             (C) 2002-2019, R-fx Networks <proj@rfxn.com>
#             (C) 2019, Ryan MacDonald <ryan@rfxn.com>
# This program may be freely redistributed under the terms of the GNU GPL v2
##
# NOTE: This file should be edited with word/line wrapping off,
#       if your using pico/nano please start use the -w switch
#       (e.g: nano -w filename)

##
# [Main]
##
# !!! Do not leave set to (1) !!!
# When set to enabled; 5 minute cronjob is set to stop the firewall. Set
# this off (0) when firewall is determined to be operating as desired.
DEVEL_MODE="1"

# The installation path of APF; this can be changed but it is not recommended.
INSTALL_PATH="$INSTALL_PATH"

# Untrusted Network interface; all traffic on defined interface will be
# subject to all firewall rules. This should be your internet exposed
# interface.
IFACE_UNTRUSTED="$IFACE_UNTRUSTED"

# Trusted Network interface(s); all traffic on defined interface(s) will by-pass
# ALL firewall rules, format is white space or comma separated list.
IFACE_TRUSTED="$IFACE_TRUSTED"

# This option enables IPv6 support for APF and loads all appropriate IPv6 kernel
# modules. This feature depends on IPv6 support being enabled in your networking
# configuration and that the modules are explicitly available. Please ensure that
# you do not have IPv6 disabled via modprobe.conf/.d or in sysconfig files.
# Note: The VNET (virtual network) feature does not currently support IPv6.
USE_IPV6="$USE_IPV6"

# This option will allow for all status events to be displayed in real time on
# the console as you use the firewall. Typically, APF used to operate silent
# with all logging piped to \$LOG_APF. The use of this option will not disable
# the standard log file displayed by apf --status but rather compliment it.
SET_VERBOSE="$SET_VERBOSE"

# The fast load feature makes use of the iptables-save/restore facilities to do
# a snapshot save of the current firewall rules on an APF stop then when APF is
# instructed to start again it will restore the snapshot. This feature allows
# APF to load hundreds of rules back into the firewall without the need to
# regenerate every firewall entry. 
# Note: a) if system uptime is below 5 minutes, the snapshot is expired
#       b) if snapshot age exceeds 12 hours, the snapshot is expired
#       c) if conf or a .rule has changed since last load, snapshot is expired
#       d) if it is your first run of APF since install, snapshot is generated
#       - an expired snapshot means APF will do a full start rule-by-rule 
SET_FASTLOAD="$SET_FASTLOAD"

# Virtual Network Sub-System (VNET) creates independent policy rule set for
# each IP on a system to /etc/apf/vnet/IP.rules. These rule files can be 
# configured with conf.apf variables for unique but convenient firewall 
# policies or custom iptables entries for even greater flexibility.
SET_VNET="$SET_VNET"

# This feature firewalls any additional interfaces on the server as untrusted 
# through the VNET sub-system. Excluded are interfaces that have already been
# defined by IFACE_* variables. This feature is ideal for systems running 
# private interfaces where not all hosts on the private network are trusted or 
# are otherwise exposed to "open" networks through this private interface 
# (i.e: the Internet, network accessible storage LAN, corporate WAN, etc..)
SET_ADDIFACE="$SET_ADDIFACE"

# This allows the firewall to work around modular kernel issues by assuming
# that the system has all required firewall modules compiled directly into
# kernel. This mode of operation is not generally recommended but can be used
# scale APF to unique situations.
SET_MONOKERN="$SET_MONOKERN"

# The expiry interval, in seconds, that bans will be expired out of the trust
# system. This only applies to local bans from deny_hosts.rules and not global
# import rules. The value must not be less than equiv. seconds of SET_REFRESH.
# [value in seconds, 0 to disable, recommended 600]
SET_EXPIRE="$SET_EXPIRE"

# This controls how often, if at all, we want the trust system to refresh rules.
# The firewall will flush & reload all static rules, redownload global rules and
# re-resolve any dns names in the rules. This is ideal when using dynamic dns
# names or downloadable global trust rules. [value in minutes, 0 to disable]
SET_REFRESH="$SET_REFRESH"

# The refreshing of large allow/deny trust files can be resource intensive, this
# feature checks for changes to trust files between refreshes and only performs
# a refresh if contents have changed. If you are using dynamic DNS names in trust
# rules, which require regular DNS refreshes, you should keep this disabled.
# [value in minutes, 0 to disable]
SET_REFRESH_MD5="$SET_REFRESH_MD5"

# This is the total amount of rules allowed inside of the deny trust system.
# When this limit is reached, the deny rule files will begin to purge older
# entries to maintain the set limit. [value is max lines, 0 for unlimited]
SET_TRIM="250"

# Verifies that the IFACE_* and IFACE_TRUSTED interfaces are actually routed
# to something. If configured interfaces are found with no routes setup then
# APF will exit with an error to prevent further issues (such as being locked 
# out of the system).
VF_ROUTE="$VF_ROUTE"

# Verifies that all inbound traffic is sourced from a defined local gateway MAC
# address. All other traffic that does not match this MAC address will be
# rejected as untrusted traffic. It is quite easy to forge a MAC address and as 
# such this feature executes NO default accept policy. Leave this option empty
# to disable or enter a 48-bit MAC address to enable.
VF_LGATE="$VF_LGATE"

##
# [Reactive Address Blocking]
##
# The use of RAB is such that it allows the firewall to track an address as it
# traverses the firewall rules and subsequently associate that address across
# any number of violations. This allows the firewall to react to critical
# policy violations by blocking addresses temporarily on the assumed precaution
# that we are protecting the host from what the address may do on the pretext
# of what the address has already done. The interface that allows RAB to work
# resides inside the kernel and makes use of the iptables 'ipt_recent' module,
# so there is no external programs causing any additional load.
RAB="$RAB"

# This enables RAB for sanity violations, which is when an address breaks a
# strict conformity standard such as trying to spoof an address or modify
# packet flags. It is strongly recommended that this option NOT be disabled.
RAB_SANITY="$RAB_SANITY"

# This enables RAB for port scan violations, which is when an address attempts
# to connect to a port that has been classified as malicious. These types of
# ports are those which are not commonly used in today's Internet but are
# the subject of scrutiny by attackers, such as ports 1,7,9,11. Each security
# level defines the amount of ports that RAB will react against. The port
# security groups can be customized in 'internals/rab.ports'.
# 0 = disabled | 1 = low security  | 2 = medium security | 3 = high security
RAB_PSCAN_LEVEL="$RAB_PSCAN_LEVEL"

# This controls the amount of violation hits an address must have before it
# is blocked. It is a good idea to keep this very low to prevent evasive
# measures. The default is 0 or 1, meaning instant block on first violation.
RAB_HITCOUNT="$RAB_HITCOUNT"

# This is the amount of time (in seconds) that an address gets blocked for if
# a violation is triggered, the default is 300s (5 minutes).
RAB_TIMER="$RAB_TIMER"

# This allows RAB to 'trip' the block timer back to 0 seconds if an address
# attempts ANY subsiquent communication while still on the inital block period.
RAB_TRIP="$RAB_TRIP"

# This controls if the firewall should log all violation hits from an address.
# The use of LOG_DROP variable set to 1 will override this to force logging.
RAB_LOG_HIT="$RAB_LOG_HIT"

# This controls if the firewall should log all subsiqent traffic from an address
# that is already blocked for a violation hit, this can generate allot of logs.
# The use of LOG_DROP variable set to 1 will override this to force logging.
RAB_LOG_TRIP="$RAB_LOG_TRIP"

##
# [Packet Filtering/Handling]
##
# How to handle TCP packet filtering?
#
#  RESET (sends a tcp-reset; TCP/IP default)
#  DROP  (drop the packet; stealth ?)
#  REJECT (reject the packet)
TCP_STOP="$TCP_STOP"

# How to handle UDP packet filtering?
#
#  RESET (sends a icmp-port-unreachable; TCP/IP default)
#  DROP  (drop the packet; stealth ?)
#  REJECT (reject the packet)
#  PROHIBIT (send an icmp-host-prohibited)
UDP_STOP="$UDP_STOP"

# How to handle all other packet filtering? 
#
#  DROP  (drop the packet)
#  REJECT (reject the packet)
ALL_STOP="$ALL_STOP"

# The sanity options control the way packets are scrutinized as they flow
# through the firewall. The main PKT_SANITY option is a top level toggle for
# all SANITY options and provides general packet flag sanity as a pre-scrub
# for the other sanity options. In short, this makes sure that all packets
# coming and going conform to strict TCP/IP standards. In doing so we make it
# very difficult for attackers to inject raw/custom packets into the server.
PKT_SANITY="$PKT_SANITY"

# Block any packets that do not conform as VALID, this feature is safe for most
# but some may experience protocol issues with broken remote clients. This is
# very similar to PKT_SANITY but has a wider scope and as such has the ability
# to affect many application protocols in undesirable ways.
PKT_SANITY_INV="$PKT_SANITY_INV"

# Block any fragmented UDP packets, this is safe as no UDP packets should
# ever be fragmented.
PKT_SANITY_FUDP="$PKT_SANITY_FUDP"

# Block packets with a source or destination of port 0, this is safe as
# nothing should ever communicate on port 0 (technically does not exist).
PKT_SANITY_PZERO="$PKT_SANITY_PZERO"

# The implementation of Type of Service (TOS) in APF is such that it allows
# you to classify service priorities by port. These priorities are broken down
# into 5 groups and they are:
# 0 = No Change
# 2 = Minimize-Cost
# 4 = Minimize Delay - Maximize Reliability
# 8 = Maximum Throughput - Minimum Delay
# 16 = No Delay - Moderate Throughput - High Reliability
#
# Set the default TOS value [0,2,4,8,16]
TOS_DEF="$TOS_DEF"

# Set the default TOS port range
TOS_DEF_RANGE="512:65535"

# 0: Ports for Normal-Service
TOS_0="$TOS_0"

# 2: Ports for Minimize-Cost
TOS_2="$TOS_2"

# 4: Ports for Minimize Delay - Maximize Reliability
TOS_4="$TOS_4"

# 8: Ports for Maximum Throughput - Minimum Delay
TOS_8="$TOS_8"

# 16: Ports for No Delay - Moderate Throughput - High Reliability
TOS_16="$TOS_16"

# Allow traceroute requests on the defined range of ports. This feature
# is not required for normal operations and some even prefer it disabled.
# Enable Traceroute 	# Traceroute ports
TCR_PASS="$TCR_PASS"		TCR_PORTS="33434:33534"

# Set a reasonable packet/time ratio for ICMP packets, exceeding this flow
# will result in dropped ICMP packets. Supported values are in the form of: 
# pkt/s (packets/seconds), pkt/m (packets/minutes)
# Set value to 0 for unlimited, anything above is enabled.
ICMP_LIM="$ICMP_LIM"

# Creates firewall rules based on the local name servers as defined in the
# /etc/resolv.conf file. This is the preferred secure method for client side
# name server requests. This option has no bearing on a locally hosted DNS 
# service.
RESV_DNS="$RESV_DNS"

# When RESV_DNS is enabled, all the untrusted name server traffic can fill the 
# logs with client DNS traffic. This can be suppressed with an implicit drop 
# of all such traffic (sport 53 inbound) as so to avoid log chains. If you run
# applications that have unique name servers configured, this may break them.
RESV_DNS_DROP="$RESV_DNS_DROP"

# A common set of known Peer-To-Peer (p2p) protocol ports that are often
# considered undesirable traffic on public Internet servers. These ports
# are also often abused on web hosting servers where clients upload p2p
# client agents for the purpose of distributing or downloading pirated media.
# Format is comma separated for single ports and an underscore separator for
# ranges (4660_4678).
BLK_P2P_PORTS="$BLK_P2P_PORTS"

# These are common Internet service ports that are understood in the wild 
# services you would not want logged under normal circumstances. All ports
# that are defined here will be implicitly dropped with no logging for
# TCP/UDP traffic inbound or outbound. Format is comma separated for single
# ports and an underscore separator for ranges (135_139).
BLK_PORTS="$BLK_PORTS"

# You need multicasting if you intend to participate in the MBONE, a high 
# bandwidth network on top of the Internet which carries audio and video
# broadcasts. More about MBONE at: www-itg.lbl.gov/mbone/, this is generally
# safe to enable. 
BLK_MCATNET="$BLK_MCATNET"

# Block all private ipv4 addresses, this is address space reserved for private
# networks or otherwise unroutable on the Internet. If this host resides behind 
# a router with NAT or routing scheme that otherwise uses private addressing,
# leave this option OFF. Refer to the 'internals/private.networks' file for 
# listing of private address space. 
BLK_PRVNET="$BLK_PRVNET"

# Block all ipv4 address space marked reserved for future use (unassigned),
# such networks have no business talking on the Internet. However they may at
# some point become live address space. The USE_RD option further in this file
# allows for dynamic updating of this list on every full restart of APF. Refer
# to the 'internals/reserved.networks' file for listing of address space.
BLK_RESNET="$BLK_RESNET"

# Block all ident (tcp 113) requests in and out of the server IF the port is
# not already opened in *_TCP_CPORTS. This uses a REJECT target to make sure
# the ident requests terminate quickly. You can see an increase in irc and 
# other connection performance with this feature.
BLK_IDENT="$BLK_IDENT"

# Three related flaws were found in the Linux kernel’s handling of TCP Selective
# Acknowledgement (SACK) packets handling with low MSS size. The extent of impact
# is understood to be limited to denial of service at this time.
#
# ref: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/tcpsack
#      CVE-2019-11477, CVE-2019-11478, CVE-2019-11479
#
# This may affect traffic from legitimate sources that require the lower MSS values
# to transmit correctly.
#
# The recommended safe path is to disable TCP SACK with SYSCTL_TCP_NOSACK=1
# This can be safely ignored if you are running on a modern patched kernel newer
# than June 16th 2019.
BLK_TCP_SACK_PANIC="$BLK_TCP_SACK_PANIC"

# This is the maximum number of "sessions" (connection tracking entries) that
# can be handled simultaneously by the firewall in kernel memory. Increasing
# this value too high will simply waste memory - setting it too low may result
# in some or all connections being refused, in particular during denial of
# service attacks.
SYSCTL_CONNTRACK="$SYSCTL_CONNTRACK"

# These are system control (sysctl) option changes to disable TCP features
# that can be abused in addition to tweaking other TCP features for increased
# performance and reliability.
SYSCTL_TCP="$SYSCTL_TCP"

# Three related flaws were found in the Linux kernel’s handling of TCP Selective
# Acknowledgement (SACK) packets handling with low MSS size. The extent of impact
# is understood to be limited to denial of service at this time.
#
# ref: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/tcpsack
#      CVE-2019-11477, CVE-2019-11478, CVE-2019-11479
#
# This can be safely ignored if you are running on a modern patched kernel newer
# than June 16th 2109.
SYSCTL_TCP_NOSACK="$SYSCTL_TCP_NOSACK"

# These are system control (sysctl) option changes intended to help mitigate
# syn-flood attacks by lowering syn retry, syn backlog & syn time-out values.
SYSCTL_SYN="$SYSCTL_SYN"

# These are system control (sysctl) option changes to provide protection from
# spoofed packets and ip/arp/route redirection. If you are performing advanced
# routing policies on this host such as NAT/MASQ you should disable this.
SYSCTL_ROUTE="0"

# This system control (sysctl) option will log all network traffic that is
# from impossible source addresses. This option can discover attacks or issues
# on your network you may otherwise not be aware of.
SYSCTL_LOGMARTIANS="$SYSCTL_LOGMARTIANS"

# This system control (sysctl) option will allow you to control ECN support
# (Explicit Congestion Notification). This feature provides an improved method 
# for congestion avoidance by allowing the network to mark packets for 
# transmission later, rather than dropping them from the queue. Please also
# see related USE_ECNSHAME option further down in this file. 
SYSCTL_ECN="$SYSCTL_ECN"

# This system control (sysctl) option will allow you to make use of SynCookies 
# support. This feature will send out a 'syn-cookie' when the syn backlog for a
# socket becomes overflowed. The cookie is used to interrupt the flow of syn
# transmissions with a hashed sequence number that must be correlated with the
# sending host. The hash is made up of the sending host address, packet flags
# etc..; if the sending host does not validate against the hash then the tcp
# hand-shake is terminated. In short, this helps to mitigate syn-flood attacks.
# Note: syncookies seriously violates TCP protocol and can result in serious
#       degradation of some services (i.e. SMTP); visible not by you, but your
#       clients and relays whom are contacting your system.
SYSCTL_SYNCOOKIES="$SYSCTL_SYNCOOKIES"

# This system control (sysctl) option allows for the use of Abort_On_Overflow
# support. This feature will help mitigate burst floods if a listening service
# is too slow to accept new connections. This option is an alternative for
# SynCookies and both should NEVER be enabled at once. 
# Note: This option can harm clients contacting your system. Enable option only
#       if you are sure that the listening daemon can not be tuned to accept
#       connections faster.
SYSCTL_OVERFLOW="$SYSCTL_OVERFLOW"

# The helper chains are designed to assist applications in working with the
# stateful firewall in a more reliable fashion. You should keep these settings
# current with the ports SSH and FTP are operating on. Please DO NOT CONFUSE
# these settings with opening the SSH/FTP port as they have no bearing on
# actually connecting to the services. They are only for helping maintain your
# connection to the services [ESTABLISHED,RELATED connection states, not NEW].
HELPER_SSH="$HELPER_SSH"
HELPER_SSH_PORT="$HELPER_SSH_PORT"

HELPER_FTP="$HELPER_FTP"
HELPER_FTP_PORT="$HELPER_FTP_PORT"
HELPER_FTP_DATA="$HELPER_FTP_DATA"

# Configure inbound (ingress) accepted services. This is an optional
# feature; services and customized entries may be made directly to an ip's
# virtual net file located in the vnet/ directory. Format is comma separated
# and underscore separator for ranges.
#
# Example:
# IG_TCP_CPORTS="21,22,25,53,80,443,110,143,6000_7000"
# IG_UDP_CPORTS="20,21,53,123"
# IG_ICMP_TYPES="3,5,11,0,30,8"

# Common inbound (ingress) TCP ports
IG_TCP_CPORTS="$IG_TCP_CPORTS"

# Common inbound (ingress) UDP ports
IG_UDP_CPORTS="$IG_UDP_CPORTS"

# Common ICMP inbound (ingress) types
# 'internals/icmp.types' for type definition; 'all' is wildcard for any
IG_ICMP_TYPES="$IG_ICMP_TYPES"

# Configure outbound (egress) accepted services. This is an optional
# feature; services and customized entries may be made directly to an ip's
# virtual net file located in the vnet/ directory.
#
# Outbound (egress) filtering is not required but makes your firewall setup
# complete by providing full inbound and outbound packet filtering. You can
# toggle outbound filtering on or off with the EGF variable. Format is comma
# separated and underscore separator for ranges.
#
# Example:
# EG_TCP_CPORTS="21,25,80,443,43"
# EG_UDP_CPORTS="20,21,53"
# EG_ICMP_TYPES="all"

# Outbound (egress) filtering 
EGF="$EGF"

# Common outbound (egress) TCP ports
EG_TCP_CPORTS="$EG_TCP_CPORTS"

# Common outbound (egress) UDP ports
EG_UDP_CPORTS="$EG_UDP_CPORTS"

# Common ICMP outbound (egress) types
# 'internals/icmp.types' for type definition; 'all' is wildcard for any
EG_ICMP_TYPES="$EG_ICMP_TYPES"

# Configure user-id specific outbound (egress) port access. This is a more
# granular feature to limit the scope of outbound packet flows with user-id
# conditioning. Format is comma separated and underscore separator for ranges.
# This is NOT A FILTERING FEATURE, this is an ACCESS CONTROL feature. That
# means EG_TCP_UID and EG_UDP_UID are intended to ALLOW outbound access for
# specified users, not DENY.
#
# Format: EG_[TCP|UDP]_UID="uid:port"
# Example:
# Allow outbound access to destination port 22 for uid 0
# EG_TCP_UID="0:22"

# UID-Match outbound (egress) TCP ports
EG_TCP_UID="$EG_TCP_UID"

# UID-Match outbound (egress) UDP ports
EG_UDP_UID="$EG_UDP_UID"

# Configure executable specific outbound (egress) filtering. This is a more
# granular feature to limit the scope of outbound packet flows with executable
# conditioning. The packet filtering is based on the CMD process field being
# passed along to iptables. All logged events for these rules will also include
# the executable CMD name in the log chain. This is A FILTERING FEATURE, not an
# ACCESS CONTROL feature. That means EG_DROP_CMD is intended to DENY outbound
# access for specified programs, not ALLOW.
#
# Format is comma separated list of executable names you wish to ban from being
# able to transmit data out of your server.

# CMD-Match outbound (egress) denied applications
EG_DROP_CMD="$EG_DROP_CMD"

##
# [Remote Rule Imports]
##
# Project Honey Pot is the first and only distributed system for identifying
# spammers and the spambots they use to scrape addresses from your website.
# This aggregate list combines Harvesters, Spammers and SMTP Dictionary attacks
# from the PHP IP Data at:  http://www.projecthoneypot.org/list_of_ips.php
DLIST_PHP="$DLIST_PHP"
DLIST_PHP_URL="http://rfxn.com/downloads/php_list"

# The Spamhaus Don't Route Or Peer List (DROP) is an advisory "drop all
# traffic" list, consisting of stolen 'zombie' netblocks and netblocks
# controlled entirely by professional spammers. For more information please
# see http://www.spamhaus.org/drop/.
DLIST_SPAMHAUS="$DLIST_SPAMHAUS"
DLIST_SPAMHAUS_URL="http://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.lasso"

# DShield collects data about malicious activity from across the Internet.
# This data is cataloged, summarized and can be used to discover trends in
# activity, confirm widespread attacks, or assist in preparing better firewall
# rules. This is a list of top networks that have exhibited suspicious activity.
DLIST_DSHIELD="$DLIST_DSHIELD"
DLIST_DSHIELD_URL="http://feeds.dshield.org/top10-2.txt"

# The reserved networks list is addresses which ARIN has marked as reserved
# for future assignement and have no business as valid traffic on the internet.
# Such addresses are often used as spoofed (Fake) hosts during attacks, this
# will update the reserved networks list in order to prevent new ip assignments
# on the internet from getting blocked; this option is only important when
# BLK_RESNET is set to enabled.
DLIST_RESERVED="1"
DLIST_RESERVED_URL="http://rfxn.com/downloads/reserved.networks"

# ECN is an extension which helps reduce congestion. Unfortunately some
# clueless software/hardware vendors have setup their sites or implemented
# TCP/IP in a very broken manner. If you try to talk to these sites with ECN
# turned on, they will drop all packets from you. This feature uses the ECN
# hall of shame list to turn off ECN in packets to these hosts so your traffic
# is accepted as intended. This option is dependent on setting SYSCTL_ECN="1"
# otherwise it stays disabled.
DLIST_ECNSHAME="$DLIST_ECNSHAME"
DLIST_ECNSHAME_URL="http://rfxn.com/downloads/ecnshame.lst"

##
# Global Trust
##
# This is an implementation of the trust rules (allow/deny_hosts) but
# on a global perspective. You can define below remote addresses from
# which the glob_allow/deny.rules files should be downloaded from on
# a daily basis. The files can be maintained in a static fashion by
# leaving USE_RGT=0, ideal for a host serving the files.
USE_RGT="$USE_RGT"

GA_URL="$GA_URL"
GD_URL="$GD_URL"

##
# [Logging and control settings]
##
# Log all traffic that is filtered by the firewall
LOG_DROP="$LOG_DROP"

# What log level should we send all log data too?
# refer to man syslog.conf for levels
LOG_LEVEL="$LOG_LEVEL"

# Where should we send all the logging data?
# ULOG (Allow ulogd to handle the logging)
# LOG (Default; sends logging to kernel log)
LOG_TARGET="$LOG_TARGET"

# Log interactive access over telnet & ssh; uses
# custom log prefix of ** SSH ** & ** TELNET **
LOG_IA="$LOG_IA"

# Log all foreign gateway traffic
LOG_LGATE="$LOG_LGATE"

# Extended logging information; this forces the output of tcp options and
# ip options for packets passing through the log chains
LOG_EXT="$LOG_EXT"

# Max firewall events to log per/minute. Log events exceeding these limits
# will be lost (1440 minutes/day * 30 events/minute = 43200 events per/day)
LOG_RATE="$LOG_RATE"

# Location of the apf status log; all startup, shutdown and runtime status
# sends outputs to this file
LOG_APF="$LOG_APF"

# Adds -w flag to iptables to enable locking support. This is only available
# on iptables >= 1.4.20, but if supported you probably want this.
IPT_LOCK_SUPPORT="$IPT_LOCK_SUPPORT"
IPT_LOCK_TIMEOUT="$IPT_LOCK_TIMEOUT"

##
# [Import misc. conf]
##
# Internal variable file
CNFINT="\$INSTALL_PATH/internals/internals.conf"
. \$CNFINT
EOF