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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch6-10</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>The Lunar Module and the Apollo Program</h2>
<p>
Although configuration was not settled and major subsystems development
was not begun until near the end of 1964, NASA had begun taking stock of
where the lunar module stood in relation to other pieces of Apollo.
Structural connections between the lunar module and other Apollo
hardware were confined primarily to the command and service modules and
the adapter. Unlike its scratchy relations with MIT, Grumman's
association with North American was smooth.<a href =
"#explanation1"><b>*</b></a> Early meetings between the contractors were
devoted to hardware designs and docking requirements. Initially, each
manufacturer was to design and test all equipment mounted on his own
vehicle, but in March 1963 North American assumed responsibility for the
complete docking device as well as the adapter structure.<p>
Late in 1963, design engineers from Downey recommended, and NASA
approved, a center probe and drogue for docking. Stowage of the lander
in the adapter was settled in October 1963, when the contractors and
Houston agreed upon a truncated cone, 8.8 meters long, with the lunar
module mounted against the interior wall by a landing-gear outrigger
truss. Thereafter, detailed design focused on the dynamic loads expected
during launch and on the deployment of the four panels for removal of
the lander during flight. Grumman sent North American a mockup to use in
confirming the structural mounting and panel opening characteristics.<a
href = "#source41"><b>41</b></a><p>
Lunar module ground testing to prove the practicality of the design and
flight testing to verify the spaceworthiness of the flight vehicle also
had to be worked into overall Apollo plans. Gilruth had stated that one
fundamental requirement for mission success was employing "the kind
of people who will not permit it to fail." The basic reliability
philosophy, he said, was "that every manned spacecraft that leaves
the earth . . . shall represent the best that dedicated and inspired men
can create. We cannot ask for more; we dare not settle for less."
As the lander grew larger and more complex, it became, in the eyes of
some observers, the "most critical part of the [Apollo]
vehicle." The many things that could doom the crew made
ground-testing all the more important. Reliability for the lander
dictated either redundant systems or, where that was impractical because
of weight and size, ample margins of safety.<p>
Grumman's basic plan for ground testing, set forth in May 1963, called
for extensive use of test models and lunar test articles (called
"TMs" and "LTAs" by the engineers), as well as for
propulsion rigs to test propellant lines and for engine firing programs.
Because the lander's flight would be brief, Bethpage engineers adopted a
practice of testing hardware until it failed, to provide an indication
of strength and to gather information on failure points. Ground testing
began with individual parts and subsystems and progressed upward, before
the spacecraft was committed to flight.<a href =
"#source42"><b>42</b></a><p>
Bethpage came up with a scheme for testing the lander in simulated
flight by powering the vehicle with six jet engines, to overcome the
pull of gravity, and using a modified descent engine to practice
maneuvering the vehicle. Although the idea appeared workable, it would
be both costly and complex. There were also suggestions for swinging the
lander from a gantrylike frame at Langley or from a helicopter or a
blimp at White Sands. After a second look, the last two were also
scrapped. Grumman and Houston hoped that the lunar landing training
vehicle being developed by Bell could test some of the flight components
at least, but installing extra equipment might slow the development of
the training vehicle. A few flight instruments and the hand controller
might be incorporated at a later date into the training vehicle, which
the astronauts would use to practice simulated lunar landings. Flight
testing within the earth's atmosphere was finally ruled out when Langley
discovered in wind tunnel investigations that the Little Joe II-lander
combination would be aerodynamically unstable.<a href =
"#source43"><b>43</b></a><p>
Grumman had wanted some unmanned missions, using the Little Joe II and
the Saturn IB launch vehicles, before men flew the lunar lander. Houston
authorized the procurement of autopilots for unmanned spacecraft but did
not actually schedule any such flights. After Mueller invoked the all-up
concept, with each flight groomed as though it were the ultimate
mission, Houston planners began to think about putting both the lander
and the North American spacecraft aboard a single Saturn IB. One Houston
engineer even went to Huntsville to ask von Braun about the possibility
of increasing the launch vehicle's payload capacity. And there was some
discussion about strapping Minuteman missile solid-fueled rocket stages
onto the launch vehicle to provide the extra boost needed!<p>
In the meantime, ground testing would have to carry the burden of
qualifying the lander until the Saturn was ready to fly the vehicle,
which caused some realignment of the lunar module program. Eleven flight
vehicles and two flight test articles were earmarked for Saturn
development flights. NASA also decided that the first three flight
vehicles must be able to fly either manned or unmanned.<a href =
"#source44"><b>44</b></a><p>
In November 1964, Shea, Mueller, and Phillips decided on a tentative
flight schedule. Saturn IB missions 201, 202, 204, and 205 would be
Block I command module flights. There was no assignment for 203 at this
time. Shea told the Houston senior staff that it looked as though an
unmanned lander might be flown on 206. The first flight of a combined
Block II command module and lunar module would be Mission 207 in July
1967. By that time, the Saturn V was expected to be ready to take over
the job of flying the missions.<a href = "#source45"><b>45</b></a><p>
The lunar module had to be worked into Apollo facilities, as well as
into flight schedules. Grumman had its own testing equipment in Bethpage
and on the Peconic River, both on Long Island. But the lander's
propulsion systems would have to be tested at the Air Force's Arnold
Center and at White Sands. Fitting the lunar module into the launch
complex at the Cape raised some interesting issues. One of the earliest
was the rule that any vehicle flown from there must carry a destruct
mechanism, in case a mission had to be aborted shortly after launch. The
rule was based on a philosophy that it was better to explode propellants
in the air than to have them burst into flame on the ground. Houston,
however, refused to put a destruct button in the vehicle that was
intended to land men on the moon, with the gruesome possibilities of a
malfunction on the lunar surface that would either kill the astronauts
outright or leave them stranded. Eventually, the Air Force Range Safety
Officer agreed to drop this requirement for the lander.<a href =
"#source46"><b>46</b></a><p>
A difficult task at all locations, Bethpage included, was getting ground
support equipment (GSE) ready to check out the lunar module subsystems.
Traditionally, GSE has been a problem, since it cannot be designed and
built until the spacecraft design is fairly firm. Because the lander was
the first of its kind and changed from day to day as the mission
requirements changed, Grumman was even slower than other contractors in
getting its checkout equipment on the line. Shea complained that
"the entire GSE picture at Grumman looks quite gloomy." He
insisted that Grumman use some equipment that North American had
developed for the command module. The situation had improved by the end
of 1964, but much work was yet to be done over the next two years before
the equipment could be considered satisfactory<a href =
"#source47"><b>47</b></a><p>
By mid-1964, both the lander and the command module were beginning to
experience the weight growth that seems inevitable in spacecraft
development programs. Von Braun promised Mueller in May that he would
try to get an extra 2,000 kilograms of weight-lifting capability from
the Saturn V, which eased some of the pressure on Gilruth's team in
Houston. Even so, the lander was getting dangerously fat, moving
steadily toward its top limit of 13,300 kilograms. Most of the
weight-reducing talent in Houston was busy with the command module,
whose Block II configuration was not as well defined at the time as the
lander's. Several modifications in the landing vehicle were suggested,
but any that limited either operational flexibility or reliability were
resisted. Moreover, the lander was so unlike other spacecraft that
projections were almost useless in estimating future weight increases.
Containing this growth would be a major project during the coming
year.<a href = "#source48"><b>48</b></a><p>
The years 1963 and 1964 had seen the lunar module move from the drawing
boards to the manufacturing line. During 1965, hardware fabrication,
assembly, and testing would begin. After that, it would take only a few
steps to put the craft into space. These steps, though few after the
spacecraft design had been "frozen," would not be easy ones.
There proved to be several more pitfalls to overcome. Some of these
problems - difficulty with combustion in the ascent propulsion system,
for example - were resolved only a short time before the mission that
fulfilled Apollo's goal of landing men on the moon.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> The two contractors had worked
together amicably enough on the Project Christmas Present Report
(detailed vehicle test plan), led by North American, and on the Apollo
Mission Planning Task Force, headed by Grumman. Both are discussed in <a
href = "ch5-3.html">Chapter 5</a>.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source41"><b>41</b>.</a> Shea to Mueller, 29 July 1964;
Newlander to Actg. Mgr., RASPO-GAEC, "Trip . . . to MSC on March 12
and 13, 1963 to attend Mechanical Systems Meeting," 15 March 1963;
C. A. Rodenberger to Chief, Structural-Mechanical Syst. Br., "Trip
to NAA to Discuss LEM Adapter Structural Design," 9 Aug. 1963;
Rector to LEM Proc. Off., "Request for CCA, Drogue Design and
Manufacture," 1 June 1964; Henry P. Yschek to North American,
contract change authorization no. 2, rev. 1, 29 March 1963; MSC.
abstract of Structural-Mechanical Systems Meeting no. 17. 21–22 May
1963; Rector TWX to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, 19 Oct. 1964; Piland TWX
to MSFC, Attn.: Joachim P. Kuettner, 21 Oct. 1963; Maynard to Grumman,
Attn.: Mullaney, "Implementation of Actions Recommended in Apollo
Program Systems Meetings," 5 Dec. 1963; Yschek to North American,
contract change authorization no. 166, 19 March 1964; Rector to Chief,
CSM CEB, "LEM/Adapter Mockup," 20 April 1964.<p>
<a name = "source42"><b>42</b>.</a> Robert R. Gilruth, "MSC
Viewpoints on Reliability and Quality Control," paper presented
before American Institute of Architects, Houston, 15 Nov. 1962,
reprinted as NASA/MSC Fact Sheet 93, title as above, p. 10; William F.
Rector III, "LEM Lesson: Reliability As Never Before,"
<cite>Grumman Horizons</cite> 4 (1964): 20-23; Grumman, "The Test
Plan for the Lunar Excursion Module, Project Apollo," 1.
"Summary of Ground and Flight Tests," LPL-600-1, 15 May 1963;
Grumman Report no. 8, LPR-10-24, 10 Oct. 1963, p. 45; Grumman, "LTA
Program presented to NASA/NAA, 13 June 1963"; Maynard to Grumman.
Attn.: Mullaney, "Lunar Landing Test Program." 10 Dec. 1963;
letter, Piland to MSFC, Attn.: Alvin Steinberg, "Determination of
Reliability Achievement," 23 Aug. 1963; George E. Mueller,
["Discussion of Objectives of U.S. Manned Space Flight
Goals"], address to 1966 Annual Symposium on Reliability, San
Francisco, 26 Jan. 1966; Mueller, "Apollo Program," no. 3 in
series of lectures at University of Sydney, Australia, 10–11 Jan. 1967.
pp. 13-14; Shea, untitled luncheon speech, n.d. [probably April 1963],
p. 7.<p>
<a name = "source43"><b>43</b>.</a> Project Apollo Quarterly Status
Report no. 3, for period ending 31 March 1963, p. 47; Zavasky, minutes
of MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 29 March 1963, p. 4; Donald R. Bellman to
Chief, Research Div., "Meeting of the LEM-LTA-9 committee at MSC,
Houston, Texas, October 18, 1963," 21 Oct. 1963; Newlander to
Small, "Trip . . . to FRC on 4/21/64," 24 April 1964; Rector
to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Use of Flight Research Center LLRV
for LEM Flight Control System Testing and Programming of LTA-9 and WSMR
Static Test Article," 4 June 1964; Rector to Shea, "Status
Report, LEM LLRV," 20 July 1964; Rector to Grumman, Attn.:
Mullaney, "Use of Flight Research Center LLRV for LEM Flight
Control System Testing," 12 Aug. 1964; Grumman, "LEM
Requirement Study for Little Joe II Flight," 13 June 1963; Aleck C.
Bond to ASPO, Attn.: William W. Petynia. "LEM/LJ-II longitudinal
vibrations," 24 June 1963; Chilton to ASPO, Attn.: Paul E.
Fitzgerald, "Performance study of the Little Joe II booster with
the LEM as the payload," 2 July 1963, with encs.; Decker TWX to
Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, 21 Aug. 1963; Grumman Report no. 11, p. 42;
Axel T. Mattson, LaRC, memo, 7 Aug. 1964; Shea memo, "Cancellation
of LEM/LJ II Program," 10 Feb. 1964; Rector to Robert E. Vale,
"Cancellation of LEM-LJ II Test Program," 25 Feb. 1964, with
encs.<p>
<a name = "source44"><b>44</b>.</a> Alfred D. Mardel to Mgrs., Syst.
Integration et al., "Review of the Preliminary LEM Flight Test Plan
from Grumman," 11 Feb. 1963, with encs.; Donald R. Segna to Mgr.,
ASPO, "Trip Report to Grumman, February 5, 1963," 12 Feb.
1963; Rector to Mgr., Flight Proj. Off., "Comments on GAEC
Preliminary LEM Flight Test Plan" 19 Feb. 1963; Thomas F. Baker to
Frank W. Casey, Jr., "Mission Profile for a Saturn IB-Launched
LEM," 11 June 1964, with enc.; Small to Decker, "Unmanned LEM
Development Flights," 17 May 1963; Mueller to Dirs., MSC, LOC, and
MSFC, "Manned Space Flight Schedule," 18 Nov. 1963; Rector TWX
to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "LEM Flight Development Plans,"
10 Sept. 1964; Baker memo for file, "Test planning direction
provided Apollo spacecraft contractors to date," 24 Sept. 1964.<p>
<a name = "source45"><b>45</b>.</a> John B. Lee, recorder, minutes of
MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 6 Nov. 1964; William Lee to Apollo Trajectory
Support Off., Attn.: Cohen, "Mission Objectives and Profile
Requirements for Mission 206A, LEM Development (Unmanned Launch),"
6 Nov. 1964; Shea to Phillips, 1 Dec. 1964.<p>
<a name = "source46"><b>46</b>.</a> Col. Jean A. Jack to MSC, Attn.:
Baker, "FY 64–65 Apollo Test Support at AEDC," 16 Nov. 1962;
Frick to Jack, 12 Dec. 1962; Goree to Dep. Mgr., LEM, "Visit to
Arnold Engineering Development Center for Discussion of Potential LEM
Test Requirements, May 14, 1963," 20 May 1963; AEDC TWX to MSC, 17
Jan. 1964; Shea TWX to AEDC, Attn.: DCS/Test, 17 Feb. 1964; Madyda to
Chief, Prop. and Energy Syst. Div., "Trip to AEDC to attend the
Ascent Engine Development Test Coordination Meeting," 19 March
1964; Madyda to LEM PO, "Availability of Lewis altitude test
facilities for LEM propulsion," 17 March 1964; Maynard to SEDD,
Attn.: Pohl, "LEM Reaction Control System (RCS) Testing and
Facility Requirements at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR)," 5 Sept.
1963; Jack B. Hartung to Actg. Mgr., ASPO, "Trip . . . to Cape
Canaveral on August 29, 1963," 3 Sept. 1963; Kraft memo,
"Aspects of Apollo Range Safety," 1 Nov. 1963; William Lee to
Mgr., ASPO, "Apollo Range Safety Policy," 27 Oct. 1964;
William Lee to Chief, Mission Feasibility Br., "Range Safety
characteristics of Apollo spacecraft propellants," 24 Nov. 1964.<p>
<a name = "source47"><b>47</b>.</a> Shea to Mullaney, 17 Dec. 1964;
Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney, "Common Use GSE Meeting,"
20 Dec. 1963, with enc., abstract of proceedings of GSE Common Use
Meeting, 17 Dec. 1963; idem, "Common Use GSE," 29 Jan. 1964,
with enc.; Paul E. Purser, recorder, minutes of MSC Senior Staff
Meeting, 18 Dec. 1964, p. 4.<p>
<a name = "source48"><b>48</b>.</a> Maynard to Mgr., CSM Eng. Off.,
"LEM Design Goal and Control Weights," 5 Aug. 1963; Maynard to
Dep. Mgr., LEM, "LEM Weight," 9 Aug. 1963; Decker to Mgr.,
Syst. Integration, "Spacecraft Weights," 27 Sept. 1963; Paul
E. Cotton, notes on 22 April 1964 meeting between Mueller, Gilruth,
Wernher von Braun, and Kurt H. Debus, 1 May 1964; Zavasky, minutes of
MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 22 May 1964, p. 4; Rector to Shea, "LEM
Weight Report (LED-490-8, dated May 1, 1964)," 1 June 1964;
Newlander to Small, "Trip . . . to MSC on 6/12/64," 15 June
1964; Newlander to Small and Gaylor, "Weight control," 20 Aug.
1964; Maynard to Mgr., ASPO, "Spacecraft weight status
summary," 13 Nov. 1964, with enc.
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