This repository has been archived by the owner on Jul 17, 2020. It is now read-only.
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 2
/
ch1-8.html
562 lines (505 loc) · 30.2 KB
/
ch1-8.html
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch1-8</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>Portents for Apollo</h2>
<p>
During the latter part of the 1960 presidential campaign, Apollo (and
even Mercury) faced a murky future. This period of doubt, caused by the
imminent change in administrations, led Glennan to call a mid-October
session at Williamsburg, Virginia, to wrestle with the question of
future NASA programs. The attendees - including top management from
Headquarters and all the centers - voiced varying opinions, but the need
for a manned lunar landing program threaded throughout the discussions.
Glennan observed that the decision on Apollo would have to wait until
the new President took office, although he assumed there would be few
changes, since space flight was surely a nonpartisan ambition. But the
next month, November 1960, Glennan was still not sure that Apollo was
ready to move beyond the study phase without more answers than all his
committees and groups had yet produced. Before spending the $15 billion
he estimated Apollo would cost, Glennan wanted the reasons for going to
the moon - international prestige or whatever they might be - laid out
more clearly.<p>
With the coming of the new year, then, there was a measure of
uncertainty. Assuming that manned space flight would have some part in
John F. Kennedy's "New Frontier," however, Glennan
strengthened the chances for an Apollo program by announcing that the
Space Task Group was a separate autonomous field element, responsible
for all civilian manned space flight programs. Although the location of
its permanent home was still unsettled - and Glennan favored Ames in
California - Gilruth's position was affirmed. On the heels of this move,
Glennan called the Space Exploration Program Council together again, to
talk with many of those who had been at Williamsburg. He still warned
that an Apollo hardware contract lacked presidential endorsement, but he
also conceded that NASA seemed to be inevitably headed toward a lunar
landing mission.<a href = "#source57">57</a><p>
During the first week of January 1961, Glennan waited in vain for some
member of the incoming administration to get in touch with him about the
transition. Meanwhile, Dryden and Seamans discussed the coming
congressional budget hearings for fiscal 1962.<a href =
"#explanation1">*</a> At this time, they decided to formalize Low's
committee as the "Manned Lunar Landing Task Group." The
expanded team was to prepare a position paper to answer, in some depth,
the questions, "What is NASA's Manned Lunar Landing Program? . . .
How much is it going to cost to land a man on the moon and how long is
it going to take?"<a href = "#source58">58</a><p>
Low and his committee (still primarily a Headquarters group - Hall,
Nicks, Alfred M. Mayo, and Pearson - but now including Faget and Koelle
as spokesmen from the field centers for the spacecraft and launch
vehicle) met on 9 January. Seamans outlined the group's task in detail.
The members were to draft plans for a lunar program, describing both
direct ascent and rendezvous, for use in budget presentations to
Congress. They were to include cost and schedule estimates for both
modes. Developing a plan for manned lunar landings was among NASA's
major objectives, the group was reminded, even though the program was
not yet approved.<a href = "#source59">59</a><p>
During the next four weeks, the committee labored over "A Plan for
Manned Lunar Landing" and submitted it on 7 February. Low told
Seamans that the report "accurately represents, to the best of my
knowledge, the views of the entire Group." No major technological
breakthroughs, no crash programs, and no real physiological barriers
were envisioned. The concurrent development of spacecraft and launch
vehicle should lead, if financially supported, almost inevitably to a
manned lunar landing in 1968 to 1970, they thought. Its costs ought to
peak around 1966 and total about $7 billion. The big Saturn and bigger
Nova boosters would be built and tested anyway, the group reasoned, and
a manned space station in earth orbit would probably be extant by then.
Low conceived Apollo in two phases: first, extended earth-orbital
missions; second, circumlunar, leading to lunar landing missions.<p>
The Low Committee stated that lunar landings could be made by using
either direct-ascent or earth-orbital rendezvous modes. Launch vehicle
development would determine how large a step NASA could take in space at
any given time. Moon landings demanded launch vehicles that could lift
from 27,200 to 36,300 kilograms into space fast enough to escape the
earth's gravitational pull. (The C-2 Saturn in the agency's fiscal 1962
budget request would be able to boost no more than 7,000-8,000 kilograms
to that velocity. It could thus send manned flights to the vicinity of
the moon, but it could not land there and then return its cargo to the
earth.) The committee cited two ways of getting this booster capability
for manned landings, either refueling a number of C-2s in earth orbit or
building a vehicle large enough to perform the mission directly from the
ground. Although both appeared feasible, the earth-orbital-rendezvous
scheme would probably be quicker. Accordingly, NASA must develop orbital
operations techniques; refueling in orbit would probably be possible by
1967 or 1968.<a href = "#source60">60</a><p>
And there the matter rested. Early 1961 was an unsettled period for
NASA. With the country acquiring a new President and the agency a new
Administrator, the prospect for moon flights was highly uncertain. But
Kennedy was deeply interested in space. Before his inauguration, he had
appointed an ad hoc committee, headed by Jerome B. Wiesner of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to review the entire missile and
space effort. The Wiesner Committee's report, quite critical of the way
Mercury was being managed and of NASA's apparent bias in favor of manned
space flight at the expense of the unmanned science programs, called for
a stronger technical competency within NASA and a redefinition of
goals.<a href = "#source61">61</a> Because Wiesner had joined in the
"missile gap" rhetoric during the November presidential
campaign, his committee's report the following January was suspect in
some quarters. Nevertheless, it spurred NASA's civil service workers to
prove it wrong.<p>
The Wiesner report also touched off a debate on the choice of a new
leader for the space agency. Wiesner, like other scientifically oriented
advisers within the administration, favored a proved and respected
scientist-engineer. Shortly before his inauguration, however, Kennedy
had delegated responsibility for space matters to Vice President-Elect
Lyndon B. Johnson, long-time champion of America's space programs in
Congress and architect of the 1958 legislation that created NASA. In
contrast to Wiesner, Johnson wanted a hard-driving, politically
experienced administrator to preside over the agency. When he was named
to head the powerful National Aeronautics and Space Council, Johnson
won.<p>
Glennan's resignation from NASA was effective 20 January, but Kennedy
did not announce his successor until the end of the month. In the
interim, at the request of the White House staff, Dryden was Acting
Administrator. On 30 January, the President ended a spate of speculation
by naming James E. Webb as NASA's new head. Quickly confirmed by the
Senate, Webb was sworn in on 15 February. Dryden, whose continued
service the new Administrator solicited, remained as Deputy
Administrator, personifying scientific interests within the agency.<p>
Dramatic changes for NASA seemed likely. Webb was a man with a long and
varied background in government, industry, and public service. During
the Truman era he had first been Director of the Bureau of the Budget
(1946–1949) and later Under Secretary of State (1949–1952). With
forceful demeanor, grandiloquent style, and a genius for
extemporization, Webb soon became a familiar figure on Capitol Hill as
champion of the space program and defender of the agency - and its
fiscal interests - before Congress.<a href = "#source62">62</a><p>
Webb met with his key officials from Headquarters and the field centers
at NASA's fifth semiannual retreat, in Luray, Virginia, 8–10 March 1961.
He announced that Seamans would be the "operating vice
president" of the agency and that the field centers would, in
future, report directly to Seamans rather than to the major Headquarters
staff offices, as in the past. There were hints of other significant
changes that would be needed to manage a program the size of Apollo,
once it was approved. Webb's ideas were not hatched overnight but were
founded, in part at least, on documents passed on to him by Glennan. The
principal contribution was a study led by Lawrence A. Kimpton,
Chancellor of the University of Chicago. Contained in the "Kimpton
Report" were recommendations that the centers should report
directly to the Associate Administrator, that formally established
project offices should manage projects, and that NASA should rely more
on contracting support. In 1961, many of these suggestions were
implemented. Seamans' new assignment was the first step along that
path.<a href = "#source63">63</a><p>
Testimony before congressional committees began at the end of February.
George Low described Apollo both as an earth-orbiting laboratory and as
a program for circumlunar flight that could lead to a manned lunar
landing. Abraham Hyatt outlined NASA's long-term objectives, with charts
that showed large launch vehicle development as the pacing item.<p>
Before Seamans and Low finished this round of testimony, a Russian test
pilot named Yuri A. Gagarin circled the earth on 12 April in
<cite>Vostok I.</cite> Congressional deliberations changed into direct
demands to respond to the Russian challenge, just as they had in October
1957 after <cite>Sputnik I.</cite> Overton Brooks, chairman of the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics, said bluntly on 14 April,
"My objective, and this is speaking individually, is to beat the
Russians." Seamans reminded the committee that Webb had told them
only the day before that the cost of Apollo, without a crash program,
would be between $20 billion and $40 billion over the next ten years.
With an accelerated program, that figure could go even higher.<a href =
"#source64">64</a><p>
President Kennedy had begun strengthening the space program in late
March. He sent Congress a revised fiscal 1962 budget for NASA, raising
the agency's funding more than $125 million over Eisenhower's
recommended level of $1.11 billion. Much of this increase was earmarked
for the Saturn C-2 and the F-1 engine and was expected to speed up
development of these important items significantly.<a href =
"#explanation2">**</a> <a href = "#source65">65</a><p>
Seamans suggested even greater increases than NASA actually received.
Given the funding levels he proposed, manned circumlunar flight with the
C-2 would be feasible in 1967 rather than 1969. The F-1 engine,
essential to an even larger launch vehicle, was the key to manned
landings. <em>"The first manned lunar landings,"</em> Seamans
stressed, "depend upon this chemical engine as well as on the
orbital and circumlunar programs and <em>can be achieved in 1970 rather
than 1973."</em> More money, he told Webb, "will increase the
rate of closure on the USSR's lead in weight lifting capability and
significantly advance our manned exploration of space beyond Project
Mercury." Webb forwarded Seamans' memorandum to President Kennedy
on 23 March 1961, in response to a request for information about NASA's
plans.<a href = "#source66">66</a><p>
While NASA's leaders appeared to have pushed Apollo closer to an
approved program, activities in the field had also accelerated. The
Technical Liaison Groups formed to evaluate the three industrial studies
had grown to include, part-time, virtually every senior engineer in the
Space Task Group, as well as representatives from other NASA centers. By
mid-February, feverish preparations were being made by Donlan's office
for separate midterm reviews of the Martin, General Electric, and
Convair contracts. In March, the industrial teams came to Langley one by
one and stood before a large audience who had come to hear what the
contractors had to tell.<p>
Each company followed roughly the same agenda: trajectory analysis;
guidance and control; configuration and aerodynamics; heating;
structures and materials; human factors; onboard propulsion; mechanical
systems; and instrumentation and communications.<p>
The NASA auditors commented on the presentations, each of which seemed a
bit too general and lacking in the technical information the NASA
planners wanted. Martin Company's team, for instance, led by E. E. Clark
and Carlos de Moraes, was complimented for its briefing on mechanical
systems but chided for neglecting structures and materials analyses
related to Apollo design requirements. The General Electric group,
headed by George R. Arthur and Ladislaus W. Warzecha, scored high on
human factors but low in its discussions of mission abort studies,
instrumentation, and communications.<a href = "#source67">67</a><p>
Faget was especially irritated that none of the contractors had proposed
modifying and expanding the blunt-body, Mercury-style spacecraft. Some
theoreticians had predicted that the hot gas radiation heating caused by
Apollo's greater reentry speeds would make this shape unacceptable, but
experiments by Clarence Syvertson at the Ames Research Center indicated
that these predictions would not materialize. In addition, Caldwell
Johnson, Faget's chief design assistant, had recently finished a study
on the advantages of the conical, blunt-body command module over the
designs of any of the three contractors. Willard M. Taub, of the same
office, later recalled that the contractors, after the midterm review,
"had to jump in real fast and come in with a new vehicle based on
the [Space Task Group] version." Conversely, Mel Barlow of Convair
looked on the modified Mercury as only a slight technological advance.
He said he was shocked to learn that NASA intended to keep that
configuration.<a href = "#source68">68</a><p>
While most of the Space Task Group labored under heavy operational
pressures - the third Mercury-Atlas had failed almost as miserably as
the first - the nine Technical Liaison Groups at Langley tried to
clarify the engineering designs for a spacecraft that would
circumnavigate, and perhaps land on, the moon. Although they
acknowledged that Saturn C-2 (or its next larger version) should be
capable of sending a large payload to that body, the questions of how
large, by what route, and with what capacities were by no means settled
or even well defined.<a href = "#source69">69</a><p>
In early May of 1961, the first reports from the completed study
contracts began arriving at the Space Task Group. All three contractors
had spent considerably more than the $250,000 NASA paid them for the
work.<p>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c028a.jpg" width=403 height= 586 ALT="William Rector"><p>
<cite>Using a model at upper left, William Rector of General Dynamics
Corp. describes the design his company proposed for the Apollo lunar
mission.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Convair/Astronautics' report depicted a three-module lunar-orbiting
spacecraft. Command, mission, and propulsion modules were designed
primarily for lunar orbit, with flexibility and growth potential built
in for more advanced missions (such as a lunar landing) with the same
basic vehicle design. A total Apollo cost of $1.25 billion over about
six years was estimated.<p>
The San Diego-based company had selected a lifting-body concept, much
like one conceived several years earlier by Alfred Eggers of Ames for
the return vehicle. The command module, with an abort tower attached
through launch, would nestle inside a large mission module. What
Astronautics proposed was similar in its mode of operation to the
command and service modules that ultimately evolved for Apollo.
Convair/Astronautics envisioned mission planning as building
progressively upon many earth-orbital flights before attempting
circumlunar and then lunar-orbital missions. Earth landings would be by
glidesail parachute near San Antonio, Texas. Elementary experiments that
would evolve into rendezvous, docking, artificial gravity, maneuverable
landing, and an eventual lunar landing were foreseen. The study cost the
contractor about $1 million, four times what NASA paid the company. The
other two contractors spent even more of their own money.<a href =
"#source70">70</a><p>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c028b.jpg" width=525 height=409 ALT="Webb and Low view GE's vehicle">
<p>
<cite>NASA's second Administrator, James E. Webb (at center above), and
George M. Low (right above) of NASA Headquarters receive a model of
General Electric's proposed vehicle.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
General Electric's study cost twice as much as Convair's and featured a
semiballistic blunt-body reentry vehicle. Had this configuration been
selected, the payload sent to the moon would have resembled the nose
cone flown on the early Saturn C-1. General Electric's design
capitalized upon hardware already almost ready to fly, but it did offer
one innovation - a cocoonlike wrapping for secondary pressure
protection in case of cabin leaks or meteoroid puncture. Although
General Electric did not estimate the final costs in its summary, the
company was confident of achieving circumlunar flight by the end of 1966
and lunar-orbital flight shortly thereafter.<a href =
"#source71">71</a><p>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c028c.jpg" width=406 ALT="Martin's Apollo study"><p>
<cite>At lower left, E. E. Clark and Carlos de Moraes of the Martin
Company display three of a dozen command module configurations
considered before the choice of the one to the right. De Moraes' hand
rests on volumes containing about 9,000 pages that the company submitted
as its Apollo study.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
The Martin Company produced the most elaborate study of the three.
Martin not only followed all the Space Task Group guidelines, but also
went far beyond in systems analysis. Focusing on versatility,
flexibility, safety margins, and growth, this was the only study that
detailed the progression of steps from lunar orbiting to lunar landing.
Martin's spacecraft would have been similar to the Apollo spacecraft
that ultimately emerged. Later, when the hardware contract proposals
were evaluated, Martin scored first on configuration design.<p>
Martin recommended a five-part spacecraft. The command module was a
flat-bottomed cone with a rounded apex and a tower for a tractor-rocket
launch escape system. Behind the flat aft bulkhead were propulsion,
equipment, and mission modules. Tradeoffs between weight and propulsion
requirements led to the selection of a pressurized shell of
semimonocoque aluminum alloy coated with a composite heatshield of
superalloy plus charring ablator. Two crewmen would sit abreast, with
the third behind, in couches that could rotate for reentry g-load
protection and for getting in and out of the spacecraft. Flaps for
limited maneuverability on reentry, a parachute landing system, and a
jettisonable mission module that could also serve as a solar storm
cellar, a laboratory, or even the descent stage for a lunar lander were
also featured. Almost 300 persons in Martin spent the better part of the
six months and about $3 million on the data and designs for their
recommendations.<a href = "#source72">72</a><p>
NASA and its Space Task Group might have evaluated the contractor
reports at a more measured pace in more normal times, but in April - the
month before these reports came in - the pressures "to get America
moving" toward the moon became intense.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1">*</a> Budget estimates drafted in September
1960 placed Apollo costs at $100,000 for FY 1960 and $1,000,000 for
1961; NASA intended to ask for $35,500,000 for the program for FY
1962.<p>
<a name = "explanation2">**</a> Kennedy and Webb held budgetary
discussions on 22 March, in which they covered 11 actions NASA would
have to take to accelerate the space program: (1) increase the number of
Mercury flights to learn more about man's behavior in space; (2)
initiate possible long-duration Mercury flights with intermediate launch
vehicles; (3) accelerate exploration to provide data for manned flights;
(4) speed up studies of manned reentries at lunar return velocities; (5)
begin development of solid-propellant rockets for first or second stages
of Nova; (6) start design work on clustered F-1 engines for Nova; (7)
commence design engineering of Nova, using clustered F-1 engines for the
first stage; (8) begin developing tankage and engines for Nova's second
stage; (9) expedite supporting technology required for attainment of
lunar goal; (10) start construction of launch pads and other facilities;
and (11) provide additional vehicles and spacecraft to hasten the Tiros
meteorological program. Budget Director David E. Bell later wrote the
President that Webb and his associates had presented the case for an
accelerated space program very well. But, he warned, the United States
might be better advised to concern itself with <cite>"men on
earth"</cite> rather than with putting <cite>"men on the
moon."</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source57"><b>57</b>.</a> NASA, "Fourth Semi-Annual Staff
Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia, October 16–19, 1960"; Donald H.
Heaton to Seamans, "Space Task Group Staffing," 23 Nov. 1960;
Seamans to Dir., Space Flight Prog., "Space Task Group Internal
Organization," 28 Nov. 1960; Seamans, administrator's briefing
memo, "Space Task Group Functions and Staffing," 30 Nov. 1960;
Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, <cite>This New Ocean</cite>, pp.
300-01; NASA, "Functions and Authority - Space Task Group,"
General Management Instruction 2-2-7, 1 Jan. 1961; STG, "Space Task
Group Becomes Separate NASA Field Element," news release, 3 Jan.
1961; House Committee on Science and Astronautics, <cite>Aeronautical
and Astronautical Events of 1961: Report,</cite> 87th Cong., 2nd sess.,
7 June 1962, p. 1; Minutes of Space Exploration Program Council, 5–6
Jan. 1961; Heaton, "U.S. Lunar Travel Program," paper
presented to the Society of Automotive Engineers, New York, 8 Dec.
1960.<p>
<a name = "source58"><b>58</b>.</a> Dryden, interview, Washington, 1 Sept.
1965; Dryden to Emme, "Eisenhower-Kennedy transition," 27
Sept. 1965; NASA, "Fiscal Year 1962 Estimates, Manned Space Flight:
Project Apollo," 5 Sept. 1960; anon., "Instructions to Manned
Lunar Landing Task Group," 6 and 9 Jan. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source59"><b>59</b>.</a> Eldon W. Hall, "Manned Lunar
Exploration Working Group, January 9, 1961."<p>
<a name = "source60"><b>60</b>.</a> Low to Assoc. Admin., NASA,
"Transmittal of Report Prepared by Manned Lunar Working
Group," 7 Feb. 1961, with enc., "A Plan for Manned Lunar
Landing," January 1961; Hall, "Manned Lunar Exploration
Working Group"; Hall to Rosen and Asst. Dirs., Office of Launch
Vehicle Prog., "Manned Lunar Landing Program," 20 Feb. 1961;
Low interview, 1 May 1964.<p>
<a name = "source61"><b>61</b>.</a> Jerome B. Wiesner et al., "Report to
the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space," 10 Jan.
1961. For background to both Eisenhower's attitude toward man-in-space
and Wiesner's advice to Kennedy, see remarks of retiring PSAC Chm. and
President of MIT James R. Killian, Jr., "Making Science a Vital
Force in Foreign Policy," Science 130 (6 Jan. 1961).<p>
<a name = "source62"><b>62</b>.</a> Dryden, 27 Sept. 1965; Rosholt,
<cite>Administrative History</cite>, pp. 187-88; Jay Holmes,
<cite>America on the Moon: The Enterprise of the Sixties</cite>
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962), pp. 189-92. For Webb background, see
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, <cite>Nomination:
Hearing on the Nomination of James Edwin Webb to Be Administrator of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,</cite> 87th Cong., 1st
sess., 2 Feb. 1961, pp. 2-7.<p>
<a name = "source63"><b>63</b>.</a> NASA, "Summary of Presentations and
Discussions, Fifth Semi-Annual Staff Conference, Luray, Virginia, March
8–10, 1961," n.d.; NASA, "Transition Memorandum Prepared by T.
Keith Glennan, January 1961," n.d.; NASA, "Report of the
Advisory Committee on Organization, October 1960," [Kimpton
Report], n.d.<p>
<a name = "source64"><b>64</b>.</a> Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, <cite>NASA Scientific and Technical Programs: Hearings,</cite>
87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 131-80; House Committee on Science and
Astronautics and Subcommittees 1, 3, and 4, <cite>1962 NASA
Authorization: Hearings on H.R. 3238 and 6029 (Superseded by H.R.
6874),</cite> 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 341-47, 354-82; Swenson,
Grimwood, and Alexander. <cite>This New Ocean</cite>, pp. 309, 332, 335;
John M. Logsdon, <cite>The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo
and the National Interest</cite> (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970);
House Committee on Science and Astronautics, <cite>Discussion of Soviet
Man-in-Space Shot:</cite> Hearing, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 13 April
1961.<p>
<a name = "source65"><b>65</b>.</a> Hyatt to Edward C. Welsh, Exec. Secy.,
National Aeronautics and Space Council, 27 April 1961, with encs.;
agenda, NASA-BOB Conference with the President, 22 March 1961; David E.
Bell, Dir., Bureau of the Budget, to the President, "National
Aeronautics and Space Administration budget problem," n.d.
(emphasis in original); Logsdon, "NASA's Implementation of the
Lunar Landing Decision," NASA HHN-81, August 1969, p. 9; Ivan D.
Ertel and Mary Louise Morse,<cite> The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology,
vol. 1, Through November 7, 1962,</cite> NASA SP-4009 (Washington,
1969), p. 77.<p>
<a name = "source66"><b>66</b>.</a> Webb to the President, no subj., 23 March
1961, with enc., Seamans to Admin., NASA, "Recommended Increases in
FY 1962 Funding for Launch Vehicles and Manned Space Exploration,"
23 March 1961 (emphasis in original).<p>
<a name = "source67"><b>67</b>.</a> Piland note to Donlan, "Apollo
Programming - January 1961," 20 Jan. 1961, with enc., subj. as
above; agenda, "Space Task Group Study Progress Report," 15
Feb. 1961, with attachments; Piland to Assoc. Dir., STG, "Apollo
study midterm review," 27 Jan. 1961, with enc., "Proposed
Items for Inclusion on Agenda for Midterm Contractor Study Review";
Jack Cohen memo, "Mid-term presentations by Apollo study
contractors," 27 Feb. 1961; Donlan, "Apollo Systems Study -
Midterm reviews, March 1, 2, and 3, 1961," introductory remarks;
STG, "Comments on the Convair Astronautics Company Midterm
Presentation, March 1, 1961," "Comments on the Martin Company
Midterm Presentation, March 2, 1961," and "Comments on the
General Electric (MSVD) Company Midterm Presentation, March 3,
1961," all 8 March 1961; John D. Hodge to Chief, Ops. Div.,
"Mid-term Apollo Briefings Operations Critique," 9 March 1961;
Smith J. De France to STG, Attn.: Donlan, "Midterm review of Apollo
study contracts," 21 March 1961.<p>
<a name = "source68"><b>68</b>.</a> Caldwell Johnson, "Apollo
Configurations: A Case for Selection of the Blunt Body - Semi-integrated
Command Module for Concentrated Study," 9 March 1961; Faget
interview; Willard M. Taub, interview, Houston, 10 April 1967; Mel R.
Barlow, interview, San Diego, 28 Jan. 1970.<p>
<a name = "source69"><b>69</b>.</a> "Remarks by Mr. Robert R. Gilruth to
the Apollo Technical Liaison Groups," 10 April 1961; minutes of
meetings of Apollo Technical Liaison Groups: Configuration and
Aerodynamics, Heating, Human Factors, Instrumentation and
Communications, Onboard Propulsion, Structures and Materials, Trajectory
Analysis, and Navigation, Guidance, and Control, 10–14 April 1961; Ertel
and Morse, <cite>Apollo Spacecraft Chronology, 1:</cite> 78-81.<p>
<a name = "source70"><b>70</b>.</a> Convair (Astronautics) Div., General
Dynamics Corp., and Avco Corp., "Apollo: Final Study Report,"
Rept. AE10363, 15 May 1961, 5 vols.: 1, "Summary"; 2,
"Selected Vehicle Design"; 3, "Supporting Design
Analyses"; 4, "Growth and Advanced Concepts"; and 5,
"Implementation Plan."<p>
<a name = "source71"><b>71</b>.</a> General Electric Co., Missile and Space
Vehicle Dept., "Project Apollo: A Feasibility Study of an Advanced
Manned Spacecraft and System, Final Report," 15 May 1961, 11 vols.:
1, "Summary and Conclusions"; 2, "Systems
Considerations"; 3, "Trajectories, Navigation, and
Guidance"; 4, "On-board Propulsion"; 5, "Human
Factors"; 6, "Aerodynamics, Configurations, Heating, and
Structures and Materials"; 7, "Mechanical and Electrical
Systems"; 8, "Preliminary Design"; 9, "Apollo
Program Implementation Plan"; 10, "Cost Information"; and
11, "Selected Studies Applicable to Apollo."<p>
<a name = "source72"><b>72</b>.</a> Martin Co., "Apollo: Final
Report," ER 12001, May 1961, 18 parts: 1, "System and
Operation"; 2, "Support"; 3, "Trajectory
Analysis"; 4, "Configuration"; 5, "Mechanical
Systems"; 6, "Aerodynamic Heating"; 7, "Guidance and
Control"; 8, "Life Sciences"; 9, "Onboard
Propulsion"; 10, "Structures and Materials"; 11,
"Instrumentation and Communications"; 12, "Test
Program"; 13, "Fabrication and Quality Assurance"; 14,
"Program Management"; 15, "Business Plan"; 16,
"Preliminary Specifications"; 17, "Aerodynamics";
and 18, "Space Environment Factors."<p>
<P>
<HR>
<P>
<CENTER><A HREF="ch1-7.html">
<IMG SRC="previous.gif" ALIGN="left"
ALT="Previous Page">
</A>
<A HREF="ch1-9.html">
<IMG SRC="next.gif" ALIGN="right"
ALT="Next Page">
</A>
<A HREF="contents.html">
<IMG SRC="index.gif" ALIGN="middle"
ALT="Table of Contents"></A>
</CENTER><BR>
<HR>
<P>
</BODY>
<!--ADA TEAM 2001-->
</HTML>