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feed.xml
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" ><generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="3.7.3">Jekyll</generator><link href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" /><link href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" /><updated>2021-02-13T11:50:21+01:00</updated><id>https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/</id><title type="html">MDNC | Malware don’t need Coffee</title><subtitle>Sleep is a symptom of caffeine deprivation.</subtitle><author><name>Kafeine</name></author><entry><title type="html">Choose Again.</title><link href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2020/02/ChooseAgain.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Choose Again." /><published>2020-02-28T14:50:00+01:00</published><updated>2020-02-28T14:50:00+01:00</updated><id>https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2020/02/ChooseAgain</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2020/02/ChooseAgain.html"><p>This is the last post/activity you’ll see on MDNC.</p>
<p>I have now chosen to bring the MDNC (Blog/Kafeine/MISP) project to an end.<br />
Thanks to those who helped me during this incredible 8 years journey.<br />
<br />
The blog and twitter account will stay up (but inactive) for the records.<br />
The MDNC MISP instance will be shut down in several weeks.<br />
<br /></p>
<blockquote>
<p>‘Choose again.’ said Aenea.
<cite>‘Dan Simmons, The Rise of Endymion‘</cite></p>
</blockquote>
<p>That’s all Folks!</p></content><author><name>Kafeine</name><uri>https://twitter.com/kafeine</uri></author><summary type="html">This is the last post/activity you’ll see on MDNC. I have now chosen to bring the MDNC (Blog/Kafeine/MISP) project to an end. Thanks to those who helped me during this incredible 8 years journey. The blog and twitter account will stay up (but inactive) for the records. The MDNC MISP instance will be shut down in several weeks. ‘Choose again.’ said Aenea. ‘Dan Simmons, The Rise of Endymion‘ That’s all Folks!</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/%7B%22thumb%22=%3E%22blog/OverAndOut.png%22,%20%22title%22=%3E%22blog/OverAndOut_.png%22%7D" /></entry><entry><title type="html">CVE-2018-15982 (Flash Player up to 31.0.0.153) and Exploit Kits</title><link href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2019/01/CVE-2018-15982.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="CVE-2018-15982 (Flash Player up to 31.0.0.153) and Exploit Kits" /><published>2019-01-16T14:50:00+01:00</published><updated>2019-01-16T14:50:00+01:00</updated><id>https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2019/01/CVE-2018-15982</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2019/01/CVE-2018-15982.html"><p>The <a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-15982" title="Mitre CVE-2018-15982">CVE-2018-15982</a> is a bug that allows remote code execution in Flash Player up to 31.0.0.153, spotted in the wild as a 0day. Patched on December 05, 2018 with <a href="https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb18-42.html">APSB18-42</a>.</p>
<h2 id="underminer"><a href="#underminer">Underminer</a>:</h2>
<p><a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/12/underminer-exploit-kit-improves-latest-iteration/">Underminer exploit kit improves in its latest iteration</a> - 2018-12-21 - Malwarebytes</p>
<h2 id="fallout"><a href="#fallout">Fallout</a>:</h2>
<p>2019-01-16</p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-15982/fallout_cve-2018-15982.png" alt="Fallout_CVE-2018-15982" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 4: Fallout exploiting CVE-2018-15982 on Windows 7 - 2019-01-16 </em></center>
<p>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/dfbf61cca208e7a6397c3e5edc14d7fef64ca6c1b31e55a8c41da86c59a30cf2/analysis/">Fiddler on VT</a> - <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/a96e998297c50b26accb4ce2860e511b76f71c23b022d80fdf9028abae2d10df/analysis/">Pcap on VT</a></p>
<p>Associated Advert underground:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Итак! Тяжкие работы по восстановлению всей инфраструктуры связки закончены, были проведены тесты и в данный момент связка работает в полном объеме. Также были произведены множество правок и изменений.</p>
<p>Изменения:</p>
<ol>
<li>Увеличена производительность</li>
<li>Полностью переработан механизм обфускации кода и генерации лэндинга.</li>
<li>Убран CVE-2018-8373 на переработку. В данный момент сплоит ведет себя не стабильно.</li>
<li>Добавлен новый флеш сплоит CVE-2018-15982.</li>
<li>Для запуска повершелл в шеллкод добавлен код отключения AMSI</li>
<li>Кучка мелких правок</li>
</ol>
<p>ИЗМЕНЕНА ЦЕНОВАЯ ПОЛИТИКА
Неделя 400$
Месяц 1300$</p>
<p>В данный момент при проверке отстука софта со связки было выявлено:</p>
<ol>
<li>Отстук EXE на уровне 80-90%</li>
<li>Отстук PowerShell на уровне 95-100%</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>Translated by google as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>So! The hard work on the restoration of the entire infrastructure of the bundle was completed, tests were carried out and at the moment the bundle is working in full. There have also been many edits and changes.</p>
<p>Changes:</p>
<ol>
<li>Increased performance</li>
<li>The code obfuscation and landing generation mechanism has been completely redesigned.</li>
<li>Removed CVE-2018-8373 for recycling. At the moment, the flow rate is not stable.</li>
<li>Added new flash sploit CVE-2018-15982.</li>
<li>To launch Powershell, the disable code AMSI is added to the shellcode</li>
<li>A bunch of minor edits</li>
</ol>
<p>CHANGED PRICE POLICY
Week 400 $
Month $ 1300</p>
<p>At the moment, when checking the otstuk software from the bundle, it was revealed:</p>
<ol>
<li>Otstuk EXE level 80-90%</li>
<li>Otstuk PowerShell at the level of 95-100%</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>payformyattention[.]site|51.15.35[.]154</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Fallout EK</td>
<td>2019-01-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whereismyteam[.]press|51.15.111[.]159</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Fallout EK</td>
<td>2019-01-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bd31d8f5f7d0f68222517afc54f85da9d305e63a2ff639c6c535e082de13dede</td>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>GandCrab Ransomware</td>
<td>2019-01-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="spelevo"><a href="#spelevo">Spelevo</a>:</h2>
<p>2019-03-06
Appears to be a new Exploit Kit which has some similarities with “SPL EK”. (CVE-2018-8174 has been spotted there as well)</p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-15982/spelevo_cve-2018-15982.png" alt="Spelevo_CVE-2018-15982" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 4: Spelevo exploiting CVE-2018-15982 on Windows 7 - 2019-03-07 </em></center>
<p>Acknowledgement:</p>
<p>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/ring_lcy">Chaoying Liu</a> for CVE confirmation.</p>
<p>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/daf734b681bd4814838934decef6d30cea4e7299729aec88641a2ab2f95e42b1/analysis/">Fiddler on VT</a> - <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/aa29390e35889aea262985088be0ed0c96da78465ce0c43a4f8c05706b6d64dd/analysis/">Pcap on VT</a> (note: Some proxy were used)</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>letsdoitquick[.]site|194.113.107.71</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Redirector (Keitaro TDS)</td>
<td>2019-03-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>index.microsoft-ticket[.]xyz|85.17.197[.]101</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Spelevo EK</td>
<td>2019-03-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blasian.bestseedtodo[.]xyz|85.17.197[.]101</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Spelevo EK</td>
<td>2019-03-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flashticket[.]xyz|85.17.197[.]101</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Spelevo EK</td>
<td>2019-03-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>read.updateversionswf[.]xyz|85.17.197[.]101</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Spelevo EK</td>
<td>2019-03-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9aa8e341cc895350addaf268b21f7a716f6d7993575fdba67a3fe7a9e23b8f90</td>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>Gootkit “1999”</td>
<td>2019-03-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2feba3cc47b7f1d47a9e1277c4f4ad5aa5126e59798ac096459d1eae8f573c35</td>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>Gootkit “3012” (2nd Stage)</td>
<td>2019-03-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ws.blueberryconstruction[.]it|185.158.250[.]163</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Gootkit C2</td>
<td>2019-03-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ws.diminishedvaluevirginia[.]com|185.158.251[.]115</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Gootkit C2</td>
<td>2019-03-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gttopr[.]space|198.251.83[.]27</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Gootkit C2</td>
<td>2019-03-07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><a href="#gf-sundown">GreenFlash Sundown</a>:</p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/vigilantbeluga/status/1114216872725995520">19.03.26 #Malvertising -&gt; #GreenFlashSundown EK-&gt; #SeonRansomware ver 0.2 &amp; #pony &amp; #miner using CVE-2018-15982</a> - 2019-04-05 - <a href="https://twitter.com/vigilantbeluga">@vigilantbeluga</a></p>
<p><a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/shadowgate-returns-to-worldwide-operations-with-evolved-greenflash-sundown-exploit-kit/">Shadowgate Returns to Worldwide Operations With Evolved Greenflash Sundown Exploit Kit</a> - 2019-06-27 - Trendmicro</p>
<p><strong>Read More:</strong><br /></p>
<p><a href="https://atr-blog.gigamon.com/2018/12/05/adobe-flash-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild/">Adobe Flash Zero-Day Exploited In the Wild</a> - 2018-12-05 - Gigamon<br /></p>
<p><a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/12/underminer-exploit-kit-improves-latest-iteration/">Underminer exploit kit improves in its latest iteration</a> - 2018-12-21 - Malwarebytes</p></content><author><name>Kafeine</name><uri>https://twitter.com/kafeine</uri></author><category term="CVE-2018-15982" /><category term="Fallout" /><category term="Underminer" /><category term="Spelevo" /><summary type="html">The CVE-2018-15982 is a bug that allows remote code execution in Flash Player up to 31.0.0.153, spotted in the wild as a 0day. Patched on December 05, 2018 with APSB18-42. Underminer: Underminer exploit kit improves in its latest iteration - 2018-12-21 - Malwarebytes Fallout: 2019-01-16 Figure 4: Fallout exploiting CVE-2018-15982 on Windows 7 - 2019-01-16 Files: Fiddler on VT - Pcap on VT Associated Advert underground: Итак! Тяжкие работы по восстановлению всей инфраструктуры связки закончены, были проведены тесты и в данный момент связка работает в полном объеме. Также были произведены множество правок и изменений. Изменения: Увеличена производительность Полностью переработан механизм обфускации кода и генерации лэндинга. Убран CVE-2018-8373 на переработку. В данный момент сплоит ведет себя не стабильно. Добавлен новый флеш сплоит CVE-2018-15982. Для запуска повершелл в шеллкод добавлен код отключения AMSI Кучка мелких правок ИЗМЕНЕНА ЦЕНОВАЯ ПОЛИТИКА Неделя 400$ Месяц 1300$ В данный момент при проверке отстука софта со связки было выявлено: Отстук EXE на уровне 80-90% Отстук PowerShell на уровне 95-100% Translated by google as: So! The hard work on the restoration of the entire infrastructure of the bundle was completed, tests were carried out and at the moment the bundle is working in full. There have also been many edits and changes. Changes: Increased performance The code obfuscation and landing generation mechanism has been completely redesigned. Removed CVE-2018-8373 for recycling. At the moment, the flow rate is not stable. Added new flash sploit CVE-2018-15982. To launch Powershell, the disable code AMSI is added to the shellcode A bunch of minor edits CHANGED PRICE POLICY Week 400 $ Month $ 1300 At the moment, when checking the otstuk software from the bundle, it was revealed: Otstuk EXE level 80-90% Otstuk PowerShell at the level of 95-100% IOC Type Comment Date payformyattention[.]site|51.15.35[.]154 domain|IP Fallout EK 2019-01-16 whereismyteam[.]press|51.15.111[.]159 domain|IP Fallout EK 2019-01-16 bd31d8f5f7d0f68222517afc54f85da9d305e63a2ff639c6c535e082de13dede SHA-256 GandCrab Ransomware 2019-01-16 Spelevo: 2019-03-06 Appears to be a new Exploit Kit which has some similarities with “SPL EK”. (CVE-2018-8174 has been spotted there as well) Figure 4: Spelevo exploiting CVE-2018-15982 on Windows 7 - 2019-03-07 Acknowledgement: Thanks to Chaoying Liu for CVE confirmation. Files: Fiddler on VT - Pcap on VT (note: Some proxy were used) IOC Type Comment Date letsdoitquick[.]site|194.113.107.71 domain|IP Redirector (Keitaro TDS) 2019-03-07 index.microsoft-ticket[.]xyz|85.17.197[.]101 domain|IP Spelevo EK 2019-03-06 blasian.bestseedtodo[.]xyz|85.17.197[.]101 domain|IP Spelevo EK 2019-03-06 flashticket[.]xyz|85.17.197[.]101 domain|IP Spelevo EK 2019-03-06 read.updateversionswf[.]xyz|85.17.197[.]101 domain|IP Spelevo EK 2019-03-07 9aa8e341cc895350addaf268b21f7a716f6d7993575fdba67a3fe7a9e23b8f90 SHA-256 Gootkit “1999” 2019-03-07 2feba3cc47b7f1d47a9e1277c4f4ad5aa5126e59798ac096459d1eae8f573c35 SHA-256 Gootkit “3012” (2nd Stage) 2019-03-07 ws.blueberryconstruction[.]it|185.158.250[.]163 domain|IP Gootkit C2 2019-03-07 ws.diminishedvaluevirginia[.]com|185.158.251[.]115 domain|IP Gootkit C2 2019-03-07 gttopr[.]space|198.251.83[.]27 domain|IP Gootkit C2 2019-03-07 GreenFlash Sundown: 19.03.26 #Malvertising -&gt; #GreenFlashSundown EK-&gt; #SeonRansomware ver 0.2 &amp; #pony &amp; #miner using CVE-2018-15982 - 2019-04-05 - @vigilantbeluga Shadowgate Returns to Worldwide Operations With Evolved Greenflash Sundown Exploit Kit - 2019-06-27 - Trendmicro Read More: Adobe Flash Zero-Day Exploited In the Wild - 2018-12-05 - Gigamon Underminer exploit kit improves in its latest iteration - 2018-12-21 - Malwarebytes</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/%7B%22thumb%22=%3E%22blog/CVE-2018-15982/CVE-2018-15982.png%22,%20%22title%22=%3E%22blog/CVE-2018-15982/CVE-2018-15982_title.png%22%7D" /></entry><entry><title type="html">CVE-2018-8174 (VBScript Engine) and Exploit Kits</title><link href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2018/05/CVE-2018-8174.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="CVE-2018-8174 (VBScript Engine) and Exploit Kits" /><published>2018-05-25T07:50:00+02:00</published><updated>2018-05-25T07:50:00+02:00</updated><id>https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2018/05/CVE-2018-8174</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2018/05/CVE-2018-8174.html"><p>The <a href="http://cve.circl.lu/cve/CVE-2018-8174" title="Circl.lu CVE-2018-8174">CVE-2018-8174</a> is a bug that allows remote code execution in the VBScript Engine. Found exploited in the wild as a 0day via Word documents, <a href="https://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404230886689265523" title="新型Office攻击使用浏览器“双杀”漏洞">announced by Qihoo360 on April 20, 2018</a>, <a href="https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-8174" title="CVE-2018-8174 | Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability">patched by Microsoft</a> on May 8, 2018 and explained in details by <a href="https://securelist.com/root-cause-analysis-of-cve-2018-8174/85486/" title="The King is dead. Long live the King!
Root cause analysis of the latest Internet Explorer zero day – CVE-2018-8174">Kaspersky</a> the day after.</p>
<p>A Proof of Concept for Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 7 has been <a href="https://github.com/smgorelik/Windows-RCE-exploits/tree/master/Web/VBScript">shared publicly 3 days ago</a>, it’s now beeing integrated in Browser Exploit Kits.</p>
<p>This will replace <a href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/07/cve-2016-0189-internet-explorer-and.html">CVE-2016-0189</a> from july 2016 and might shake the Drive-By landscape for the coming months.</p>
<h2 id="rig"><a href="#rig">RIG</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted on the 2018-05-25</em></p>
<p>“TakeThat” wrote yesterday (2018-05-24) that he has integrated it and that infection rate has increased:</p>
<p>Добавлен CVE-2018-8174<br />
Add CVE-2018-8174<br />
Пробив/rate + <img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-8174/boom.gif" alt="boom.gif" /><br />
[redacted]@exploit.im<br />
[redacted]@xmpp.jp<br /></p>
<p>And indeed today:</p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-8174/rig_cve-2018-8174.png" alt="RIG_CVE-2018-8174" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 1: RIG launching code exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-05-25 </em></center>
<p><br /></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>206.189.147.254</td>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Redirector</td>
<td>2018-05-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95.142.40.187</td>
<td>IP</td>
<td>RIG</td>
<td>2018-05-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95.142.40.185</td>
<td>IP</td>
<td>RIG</td>
<td>2018-05-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95.142.40.184</td>
<td>IP</td>
<td>RIG</td>
<td>2018-05-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.30.42.164</td>
<td>IP</td>
<td>RIG</td>
<td>2018-05-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vnz[.]bit|104.239.213[.]7</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Smoke Bot C2</td>
<td>2018-05-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vnz2107[.]ru|104.239.213[.]7</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Smoke Bot C2</td>
<td>2018-05-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/eeaa1ff2e9d33573590a8acb63cc8e6f390c0b056ff709e2945bf375d5ac5003/analysis/">92e7cfc803ff73ed14c6bf7384834a09</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>Smoke Bot</td>
<td>2018-05-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/21062145f36a21cd7d8de7066f18be71f3f5bb16b1347c6d1f1065f627744fe4/analysis/">58648ed843655d63570f8809ec2d6b26</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>Extracted VBS</td>
<td>2018-05-25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/57281640e8ed514803a1c47c4ecb4e14462795b02308511d154b56d33e57ec00/detection">PCAP on VT</a></p>
<p><strong>Acknowledgement:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/node5">William Metcalf</a> and Frank Ruiz (FoxIT InTELL) for their help.</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="magnitude"><a href="#magnitude">Magnitude</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted on the 2018-06-02</em></p>
<p>After a week without buying traffic, Magnitude is active again, now with CVE-2018-8174:
<img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-8174/magnitude_cve-2018-8174.png" alt="Magnitude_CVE-2018-8174" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 2: Magnitude successfully exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 to deploy Magniber Ransomware - 2018-06-02 </em></center>
<p>Note: Magniber is back (after 1 month and half of GandCrab) in this infection chain and is now (as GandCrab) also accepting Dash cryptocurrency as payment</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>taxhuge[.]com|149.56.159.203</td>
<td>Domain|IP</td>
<td>Magnigate step 1</td>
<td>2018-06-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69j366ma35.fedpart[.]website|167.114.33.110</td>
<td>Domain|IP</td>
<td>Magnigate step 2</td>
<td>2018-06-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a23e5cwd602oe46d.addrole[.]space|167.114.191.124</td>
<td>Domain|IP</td>
<td>Magnitude</td>
<td>2018-06-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/5990f09396ff018600f022e621921909bea8ea823398bd10dbade4f27b59e12f/analysis/">f48a248ddec2b7987778203f2f6a11b1</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>Extracted VBS</td>
<td>2018-06-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/24d17158531180849f5b0819ac965d796886b8238d8a690e2a7ecb3d7fd3bf2b/analysis/">30bddd0ef9f9f178aa39599f0e49d733</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>Magniber</td>
<td>2018-06-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ID].bitslot[.]website|139.60.161.51</td>
<td>Domain|IP</td>
<td>Magniber Payment Server</td>
<td>2018-06-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ID].carefly[.]space|54.37.57.152</td>
<td>Domain|IP</td>
<td>Magniber Payment Server</td>
<td>2018-06-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ID].trapgo[.]host|185.244.150.110</td>
<td>Domain|IP</td>
<td>Magniber Payment Server</td>
<td>2018-06-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ID].farmand[.]site|64.188.10.44</td>
<td>Domain|IP</td>
<td>Magniber Payment Server</td>
<td>2018-06-02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/1e5d0903198baac5eb213d290dd2c53124685de250ad18b709a6e83b826cdc69/detection">Fiddler on VT</a> <em>(note: some proxy were used)</em></p>
<h2 id="grandsoft"><a href="#grandsoft">GrandSoft</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted by <a href="https://twitter.com/jspchc">Joseph Chen</a> on 2018-06-14</em></p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-8174/grandsoft_cve-2018-8174.png" alt="GrandSoft_CVE-2018-8174" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 3: GrandSoft exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-06-14 </em></center>
<p><br /></p>
<p>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/b9847896178e810f9b51b07a89a78b88d5b651a629ca8c1290df57eada788937/detection">Fiddler on VT</a> - <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/9bec88033de8f4d913a6674168faf124ec5bb47216d15a42a7293e47c54ff7ff/detection">Pcap on VT</a></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>easternflow[.]ml|200.74.240.219</td>
<td>Domain|IP</td>
<td>BlackTDS</td>
<td>2018-06-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uafcriminality[.]lesbianssahgbrewingqzw[.]xyz|185.17.122.212</td>
<td>Domain|IP</td>
<td>GrandSoft EK</td>
<td>2018-06-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/69ec63646a589127c573fed9498a11d3e75009751ac5e16a80e7aa684ad66240/analysis/">cec253acd39fe5d920c7da485e367104</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>Undefined Loader</td>
<td>2018-06-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f75c442895e7b8c005d420759dfcd4414ac037cf6bdd5771e23cedd73693a075/analysis/">a15d9257a0c1421353edd31798f03cd6</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>GandCrab</td>
<td>2018-06-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.210.104.247</td>
<td>IP</td>
<td>AscentorLoader C2</td>
<td>2018-06-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carder[.]bit</td>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>GandCrab C2</td>
<td>2018-06-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ransomware[.]bit</td>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>GandCrab C2</td>
<td>2018-06-14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><strong>Acknowledgement:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/jspchc">Joseph Chen</a> who spotted the new exploit and allowed the capture of this traffic.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Edits:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>2018-06-19 - Added the name for the Loader <br /></li>
</ul>
<h2 id="fallout"><a href="#fallout">Fallout</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted on 2018-06-30, most probably there since 2018-06-16</em></p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-8174/fallout_cve-2018-8174.png" alt="Fallout_CVE-2018-8174" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 4: Fallout exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-08-30 </em></center>
<p>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/5202d382cb8e629a037e33117883dc4f44996b9f17ac774e18e7b0152e526eea/analysis/">Fiddler on VT</a> - <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/54fa6d37f97e65cc62d96a5f0c2e3de9f32f2c0b2b2bbb7bc51f4d2f1e07b206/analysis/">Pcap on VT</a></p>
<p><strong>Acknowledgement:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/nao_sec">Nao_Sec</a> for the initial referer. Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/jspchc">Joseph Chen</a> for additionnal inputs</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="kaixin-ek"><a href="#kaixin">Kaixin EK</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted by <a href="https://twitter.com/wugeej/status/1017208092482625536">JayK</a> on 2018-07-12</em></p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-8174/kaixin_cve-2018-8174.png" alt="Kaixin_CVE-2018-8174" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 5: Kaixin exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-08-11 </em></center>
<p>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/fc46d7d51778396261eae02f11eaddce18c97aab9ef8227547094023ee58d3cf/analysis/">Fiddler on VT</a> - <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/d442c4c9e0911de27f28c0d06565c1790460b832e7439233ebd0b5526eb9f801/analysis/">Pcap on VT</a></p>
<h2 id="hunter-ek"><a href="#hunter">Hunter EK</a>:</h2>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-8174/hunter_cve-2018-8174.png" alt="Hunter_CVE-2018-8174" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 6: Hunter including CVE-2018-8174 in its carpet bombing against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-08-30 </em></center>
<p>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/cc9e0347ae679b9d15d2138bff532cd27edae2b4e171d6b0a46c09adc5aaed19/analysis/">Fiddler on VT</a></p>
<p><strong>Acknowledgement:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>Thanks to Frank Ruiz (FoxIT InTELL) for allowing this capture.</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="greenflash-sundown"><a href="#sundown-gf">Greenflash Sundown</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted by <a href="https://twitter.com/ring_lcy">Chaoying Liu</a> on 2018-09-05</em></p>
<p><strong>Acknowledgement:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/ring_lcy">Chaoying Liu</a> for the CVE identification.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Read More:</strong><br />
<a href="https://securelist.com/root-cause-analysis-of-cve-2018-8174/85486/">The King is dead. Long live the King!</a> - 2018-05-09 - SecureList<br />
<a href="http://blogs.360.cn/blog/cve-2018-8174-en/">Analysis of CVE-2018-8174 VBScript 0day</a> - 2018-05-09 - Qihoo360<br /></p>
<p><strong>Post publication reading:</strong><br />
<a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rig-exploit-kit-now-using-cve-2018-8174-to-deliver-monero-miner/">Rig Exploit Kit Now Using CVE-2018-8174 to Deliver Monero Miner</a> - 2018-05-31 - Trend Micro<br />
<a href="https://securelist.com/delving-deep-into-vbscript-analysis-of-cve-2018-8174-exploitation/86333/">Delving deep into VBScript - Analysis of CVE-2018-8174 exploitation</a> - 2018-07-03 - SecureList<br />
<a href="https://www.nao-sec.org/2018/09/hello-fallout-exploit-kit.html">Hello “Fallout Exploit Kit”</a> - 2018-09-01 - <a href="https://twitter.com/nao_sec">Nao_Sec</a><br /></p></content><author><name>Kafeine</name><uri>https://twitter.com/kafeine</uri></author><category term="CVE-2018-8174" /><category term="RIG" /><category term="GrandSoft" /><category term="Magnitude" /><category term="Greenflash" /><category term="Hunter" /><category term="Kaixin" /><category term="Fallout" /><summary type="html">The CVE-2018-8174 is a bug that allows remote code execution in the VBScript Engine. Found exploited in the wild as a 0day via Word documents, announced by Qihoo360 on April 20, 2018, patched by Microsoft on May 8, 2018 and explained in details by Kaspersky the day after. A Proof of Concept for Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 7 has been shared publicly 3 days ago, it’s now beeing integrated in Browser Exploit Kits. This will replace CVE-2016-0189 from july 2016 and might shake the Drive-By landscape for the coming months. RIG: Spotted on the 2018-05-25 “TakeThat” wrote yesterday (2018-05-24) that he has integrated it and that infection rate has increased: Добавлен CVE-2018-8174 Add CVE-2018-8174 Пробив/rate + [redacted]@exploit.im [redacted]@xmpp.jp And indeed today: Figure 1: RIG launching code exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-05-25 IOC Type Comment Date 206.189.147.254 IP Redirector 2018-05-23 95.142.40.187 IP RIG 2018-05-24 95.142.40.185 IP RIG 2018-05-24 95.142.40.184 IP RIG 2018-05-24 46.30.42.164 IP RIG 2018-05-24 vnz[.]bit|104.239.213[.]7 domain|IP Smoke Bot C2 2018-05-25 vnz2107[.]ru|104.239.213[.]7 domain|IP Smoke Bot C2 2018-05-25 92e7cfc803ff73ed14c6bf7384834a09 md5 Smoke Bot 2018-05-25 58648ed843655d63570f8809ec2d6b26 md5 Extracted VBS 2018-05-25 Files: PCAP on VT Acknowledgement: Thanks to William Metcalf and Frank Ruiz (FoxIT InTELL) for their help. Magnitude: Spotted on the 2018-06-02 After a week without buying traffic, Magnitude is active again, now with CVE-2018-8174: Figure 2: Magnitude successfully exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 to deploy Magniber Ransomware - 2018-06-02 Note: Magniber is back (after 1 month and half of GandCrab) in this infection chain and is now (as GandCrab) also accepting Dash cryptocurrency as payment IOC Type Comment Date taxhuge[.]com|149.56.159.203 Domain|IP Magnigate step 1 2018-06-02 69j366ma35.fedpart[.]website|167.114.33.110 Domain|IP Magnigate step 2 2018-06-02 a23e5cwd602oe46d.addrole[.]space|167.114.191.124 Domain|IP Magnitude 2018-06-02 f48a248ddec2b7987778203f2f6a11b1 md5 Extracted VBS 2018-06-02 30bddd0ef9f9f178aa39599f0e49d733 md5 Magniber 2018-06-02 [ID].bitslot[.]website|139.60.161.51 Domain|IP Magniber Payment Server 2018-06-02 [ID].carefly[.]space|54.37.57.152 Domain|IP Magniber Payment Server 2018-06-02 [ID].trapgo[.]host|185.244.150.110 Domain|IP Magniber Payment Server 2018-06-02 [ID].farmand[.]site|64.188.10.44 Domain|IP Magniber Payment Server 2018-06-02 Files: Fiddler on VT (note: some proxy were used) GrandSoft: Spotted by Joseph Chen on 2018-06-14 Figure 3: GrandSoft exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-06-14 Files: Fiddler on VT - Pcap on VT IOC Type Comment Date easternflow[.]ml|200.74.240.219 Domain|IP BlackTDS 2018-06-14 uafcriminality[.]lesbianssahgbrewingqzw[.]xyz|185.17.122.212 Domain|IP GrandSoft EK 2018-06-14 cec253acd39fe5d920c7da485e367104 md5 Undefined Loader 2018-06-14 a15d9257a0c1421353edd31798f03cd6 md5 GandCrab 2018-06-14 91.210.104.247 IP AscentorLoader C2 2018-06-14 carder[.]bit Domain GandCrab C2 2018-06-14 ransomware[.]bit Domain GandCrab C2 2018-06-14 Acknowledgement: Thanks to Joseph Chen who spotted the new exploit and allowed the capture of this traffic. Edits: 2018-06-19 - Added the name for the Loader Fallout: Spotted on 2018-06-30, most probably there since 2018-06-16 Figure 4: Fallout exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-08-30 Files: Fiddler on VT - Pcap on VT Acknowledgement: Thanks to Nao_Sec for the initial referer. Thanks to Joseph Chen for additionnal inputs Kaixin EK: Spotted by JayK on 2018-07-12 Figure 5: Kaixin exploiting CVE-2018-8174 against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-08-11 Files: Fiddler on VT - Pcap on VT Hunter EK: Figure 6: Hunter including CVE-2018-8174 in its carpet bombing against IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-08-30 Files: Fiddler on VT Acknowledgement: Thanks to Frank Ruiz (FoxIT InTELL) for allowing this capture. Greenflash Sundown: Spotted by Chaoying Liu on 2018-09-05 Acknowledgement: Thanks to Chaoying Liu for the CVE identification. Read More: The King is dead. Long live the King! - 2018-05-09 - SecureList Analysis of CVE-2018-8174 VBScript 0day - 2018-05-09 - Qihoo360 Post publication reading: Rig Exploit Kit Now Using CVE-2018-8174 to Deliver Monero Miner - 2018-05-31 - Trend Micro Delving deep into VBScript - Analysis of CVE-2018-8174 exploitation - 2018-07-03 - SecureList Hello “Fallout Exploit Kit” - 2018-09-01 - Nao_Sec</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/%7B%22thumb%22=%3E%22blog/CVE-2018-8174/CVE-2018-8174.png%22,%20%22title%22=%3E%22blog/CVE-2018-8174/CVE-2018-8174_title.png%22%7D" /></entry><entry><title type="html">CVE-2018-4878 (Flash Player up to 28.0.0.137) and Exploit Kits</title><link href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2018/03/CVE-2018-4878.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="CVE-2018-4878 (Flash Player up to 28.0.0.137) and Exploit Kits" /><published>2018-03-09T20:19:00+01:00</published><updated>2018-03-09T20:19:00+01:00</updated><id>https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2018/03/CVE-2018-4878</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2018/03/CVE-2018-4878.html"><p>The <a href="http://cve.circl.lu/cve/CVE-2018-4878" title="Circl.lu CVE-2018-4878">CVE-2018-4878</a> is a bug that allows remote code execution in Flash Player up to 28.0.0.137, spotted in the wild as a 0day, <a href="https://www.krcert.or.kr/data/secNoticeView.do?bulletin_writing_sequence=26998">announced by the South-Korean CERT on the 31st of January</a>. Patched on February 6, 2018 with <a href="https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb18-03.html">ASPB18-03</a>. Seen in <a href="https://blog.morphisec.com/flash-exploit-cve-2018-4878-spotted-in-the-wild-massive-malspam-campaign" title="Morphisec Blog">malspam campaign</a> two weeks after, it’s now beeing integrated in Exploit Kits.</p>
<p>This is, as far as i know, the first new working RCE integrated in non targeted Exploit Kit<sup id="fnref:1"><a href="#fn:1" class="footnote">1</a></sup> since <a href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/07/cve-2016-0189-internet-explorer-and.html">CVE-2016-0189</a> in july 2016 (!).</p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-4878/zZzWhat.gif" width="240" alt="zzZz..what?!" class="center" /></p>
<h2 id="greenflash-sundown"><a href="#gf-sundown">GreenFlash Sundown</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted on the 2018-03-09 (but probably there since several days)</em></p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-4878/SundownGF.png" alt="CVE-2018-4878-Successful pass on GreenFlash Sundown" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 1: Greenflash Sundown successfully deploying Hermes 2.1 Ransomware after exploiting Flash 26.0.0.131 in IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-03-09 </em></center>
<p><br />
GreenFlash is a private heavily modified version of <a href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/06/fast-look-at-sundown-ek.html">Sundown EK</a> spotted <a href="http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-bizarro-sundown-exploit-kit-spreads-locky/">in october 2016 by Trendmicro</a>. It’s beeing exclusively used by the “WordsJS” (aka “ShadowGate”) group.
This group is getting traffic from crompromised OpenRevive/OpenX advertising server since at least <a href="http://www.malekal.com/en-openx-hacks-example-malvertising/">may 2015</a>.</p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-4878/WordsJS.png" alt="MISP WordsJS" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 2: Some tagged activity from WordsJS displayed in <a href="https://www.misp-project.org/">MISP</a>.</em></center>
<p><br />
<strong>Some references about the activities of this group:</strong></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog/Tweet</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.malekal.com/en-openx-hacks-example-malvertising/">OpenX Hacks example (malvertising)</a></td>
<td>2015-05-19</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/malekal_morte">@malekal_morte</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Tweet] <a href="https://twitter.com/BelchSpeak/status/653605534915014656">Malvertising via psychecentral[.]com</a></td>
<td>2015-10-12</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/belchspeak">@BelchSpeak</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www-test.cyphort.com/psychcental-com-infected-with-angler-ek-installs-bedep-vawtrak-and-pos-malware/">Psychcentral.com […] Angler EK: Installs bedep, vawtrak and POS malware</a></td>
<td>2015-11-02</td>
<td>Cyphort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/music-themed-malvertising-lead-to-angler.html">Music-themed Malvertising Lead To Angler</a></td>
<td>2016-01-19</td>
<td>Zscaler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[FR] <a href="http://www.malekal.com/malvertising-openx/">Exemple d’une Malvertising sur OpenX</a></td>
<td>2016-04-13</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/malekal_morte">@malekal_morte</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/05/top-chilean-news-website-emol-pushes-angler-exploit-kit/">Top Chilean News Website Emol Pushes Angler Exploit Kit</a></td>
<td>2016-05-11</td>
<td>Malwarebytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/06/is-it-end-of-angler.html">Is it the End of Angler ?</a></td>
<td>2016-06-11</td>
<td>MDNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/shadowed-domains-lead-to-neutrino-exploit-kit/">HillaryNixonClinton.com Shadowed Domains Lead to Neutrino EK</a></td>
<td>2016-08-12</td>
<td>RiskIQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/09/shadowgate-takedown.html">Talos ShadowGate Take Down: Global Malvertising Campaign Thwarted</a><sup id="fnref:2"><a href="#fn:2" class="footnote">2</a></sup></td>
<td>2016-09-01</td>
<td>Talos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2016/10/17/index3.html">Sundown EK from 37.139.47.53 sends Locky Ransomware</a></td>
<td>2016-10-17</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/malware_traffic">@malware_traffic</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-bizarro-sundown-exploit-kit-spreads-locky/">New Bizarro Sundown Exploit Kit Spreads Locky</a></td>
<td>2016-11-04</td>
<td>Trendmicro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><em>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/8c10a9abf05d6a6e09ff7f2ac8e5845a5f5f942cfab69c6f0184138f9da2f1a6/detection">Fiddler on VT</a> - <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/207a655f6232875085f18ca08a3e5e4eab7bc2f1f2d2cb11b43ae89b991297af/detection">Pcap on VT</a> (note: some https proxies were used)</em><br />
<em>IOCs: <a href="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kafeine/public/master/IOCs/SundownGF_misp.event.2556.5aa2f05c-4d1c-436f-9c5d-1199c0a8a8de.json">MISP Json</a></em><br /></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bannerssale[.]com|159.65.131[.]94</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Sundown GF Step 1</td>
<td>2018-01-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aquaadvertisement[.]com|159.65.131[.]95</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Sundown GF Step 2</td>
<td>2018-03-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>listening.secondadvertisements[.]com|207.148.104[.]5</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Sundown GF Step 3</td>
<td>2018-03-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b78682d960385bdd0fe5db9c631f0f38607a3d09a08ddd4024e4922c01cc0533/analysis/">65bd3d860aaf8874ab76a1ecc852a570</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>Ransomware Hermes 2.1</td>
<td>2018-03-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/8217e5503b34f55edfa9266236c1d88885cbc06276f97b4c1374d679e289d206/analysis/">f84435880c4477d3a552fb5e95f141e1</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>Ransomware Hermes 2.1</td>
<td>2018-03-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><em>If you saw this kind of traffic in your perimeter/telemetry, i’d be happy to get more referer</em> <br /></p>
<p><strong>Edits:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>2018-03-10 - 15:40 GMT - Removed mention of steganography. <a href="https://twitter.com/smogoreli">@smogoreli</a>: “simple offset in the dat file” <br /></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Acknowledgement:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>Thanks to Genwei Jiang <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/">(FireEye)</a> for the CVE identification.</li>
<li>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/jspchc">Joseph Chen</a> for inputs allowing the capture of a fresh pass of GreenFlash Sundown.</li>
<li>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/GelosSnake">@GelosSnake</a> &amp; <a href="https://twitter.com/baberpervez2">@baberpervez2</a> for the ping on suspicious activity that could be associated to “WordsJS” (aka “ShadowGate”) and triggered those checks.<br /></li>
</ul>
<h2 id="magnitude"><a href="#magnitude">Magnitude</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted on the 2018-04-01</em></p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-4878/Magnitude.png" alt="Magnitude_CVE-2018-4878" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 3: Magnitude successfully deploying Magniber Ransomware after exploiting CVE-2018-4878 on Flash 27.0.0.170 in IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-04-01 </em></center>
<p><br />
Magnitude is using the <a href="https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/">WSH injection described</a> by <a href="https://twitter.com/enigma0x3">Matt Nelson</a> in August 2017.</p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-4878/magnitude_wshinjection.png" alt="Magnitude_WSHinject" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 4: UAC prompt on the wsh injection executed upon successful exploitation</em></center>
<p><br />
Payload is the Magniber Ransomware, first spotted in the wild in <a href="https://twitter.com/kafeine/status/920038453924024320">october 2017</a>, in a <a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/magnitude-exploit-kit-now-targeting-korea-with-magniber-ransomware/">context documented</a> by Trendmicro.</p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-4878/magnitude_misp.png" alt="MagnigateMagnitudeHistory" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 5: Some tagged activity from Magnigate displayed in <a href="https://www.misp-project.org/">MISP</a>.</em></center>
<p><br />
<strong>Select OSINT about this infection chain:</strong></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog/Tweet</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/magnitude-actor-social-engineering-scheme-windows-10">Magnitude Actor Adds a Social Engineering Scheme for Windows 10</a></td>
<td>2017-08-03</td>
<td>Proofpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Tweet] <a href="https://twitter.com/kafeine/status/920038453924024320">Ransomware spread by Magnitude. Hosted behind same infra. KOR focused for now </a></td>
<td>2017-10-16</td>
<td>Kafeine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/magnitude-exploit-kit-now-targeting-korea-with-magniber-ransomware/">Magnitude Exploit Kit Now Targeting South Korea With Magniber Ransomware</a></td>
<td>2017-10-18</td>
<td>Trendmicro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><em>Files: <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/b1b51bc0b48789ad64b178a6c5e7555734b02aba16392341ef7f86378eb9fcd0/detection">Fiddler on VT</a> - <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/b796f308658fc505432b54b60be373810dee0b2ba4da82bf6ea51c3a12b84863/detection">Pcap on VT</a> (note: some https proxies were used)</em><br />
<em>IOCs: <a href="https://github.com/Kafeine/public/blob/master/IOCs/Magnitude_CVE-2018-4878_misp.event.2652.5ac10f16-8c28-4c22-991c-55e0c0a8a8de.json">MISP Json</a> (note: all those are changing almost hourly)</em><br /></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>finansee[.]credit|209.95.60[.]115</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Magnigate Step 1</td>
<td>2018-04-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adex7s92616.fryrids[.]com|144.217.197[.]9</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Magnigate Step 2</td>
<td>2018-04-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>353kb544cv.anlogs[.]space|66.70.223[.]111</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Magnitude Exploit Kit</td>
<td>2018-04-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*.fitpint[.]website|139.60.161[.]43</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Magniber Payment server</td>
<td>2018-04-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*.riskjoy[.]pw|162.213.25[.]235</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Magniber Payment server</td>
<td>2018-04-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*.ratesor[.]site|198.56.183[.]147</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Magniber Payment server</td>
<td>2018-04-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*.accorda[.]space|107.167.77[.]100</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Magniber Payment server</td>
<td>2018-04-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*.uxijz4kdhr4jp3wf[.]onion</td>
<td>domain</td>
<td>Magniber Payment server on tor</td>
<td>2018-04-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/e3b52d94521dd0e1f6a5a4cde0d73654388492a28f4a72989f105bc72bb91a16/analysis/">1d4b9c4b4058bfc2238e92c0eebb5906</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>Magniber Ransomware</td>
<td>2018-04-01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="rig"><a href="#rig">RIG</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted on the 2018-04-09</em></p>
<p>Replying to a customer complaining yesterday (2018-04-08) about the lack of CVE-2018-4878, “TakeThat” wrote early this morning (2018-04-09):</p>
<div class="highlighter-rouge"><div class="highlight"><pre class="highlight"><code>Чистки выполняются вовремя
Конечно мы добавили флеш CVE-2018-4878 он доступен на подписке от недели
</code></pre></div></div>
<p>Translated by google as:</p>
<div class="highlighter-rouge"><div class="highlight"><pre class="highlight"><code>Cleaning is done on time
Of course, we added the flash CVE-2018-4878 it is available on subscription from the week
</code></pre></div></div>
<p>And indeed today as spotted by <a href="https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/983381097328214016">@nao_sec</a>:</p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-4878/rig_cve-2018-4878.png" alt="RIG_CVE-2018-4878" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 6: RIG successfully exploiting CVE-2018-4878 on Flash 27.0.0.170 in IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-04-09 </em></center>
<p><br /></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cash111[.]club|18.220.221[.]2</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Keitaro TDS</td>
<td>2018-04-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185.154.53.190</td>
<td>IP</td>
<td>RIG</td>
<td>2018-04-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>omega.level7[.]gdn|89.45.67[.]198</td>
<td>domain|IP</td>
<td>Urausy C2</td>
<td>2018-04-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/437520117f4deb7691bc0975e413b72c862aef8b18851930f515a385a6a3d54f/analysis/">1bd20aa0433f3f03001b7f3e6f1fb110</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>RIG Flash Exploit</td>
<td>2018-04-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/66aa01238a0fd28311fc0eb3c3d748eda761a7cdc66538eda18f66e502174ef7/analysis/">712385a6073303a20163e4c9fb079117</a></td>
<td>md5</td>
<td>Urausy - probably as a loader</td>
<td>2018-04-09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="fallout"><a href="#fallout">Fallout</a>:</h2>
<p><em>Spotted on 2018-06-28, most probably there since 2018-06-16</em></p>
<p>Despite seeing code pointing to it, we did not saw it properly called in traffic.</p>
<p><img src="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/images/blog/CVE-2018-4878/fallout_1.png" alt="Fallout_CVE-2018-4878 Call" class="center" /></p>
<center><em>Figure 6: Fallout call for CVE-2018-4878 in it's landing 2018-08-30 </em></center>
<p><br /></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blog/Tweet</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.nao-sec.org/2018/09/hello-fallout-exploit-kit.html">Hello “Fallout Exploit Kit”</a></td>
<td>2018-09-01</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/nao_sec/">Nao_Sec</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>md5</td>
<td><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/c148012f9ce59daea1abce2cfaac9c0732e86b7eb00468222b63436306c39d26/details">747c32e55b4e847c3274503290507aa1</a></td>
<td>Fallout Flash Exploit</td>
<td>2018-08-31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><strong>Edits:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>2018-04-10 - 10:05 GMT - Modified to reflect payload id: Urausy. Not seen since 2015-06-09<br /></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Acknowledgement:</strong><br /></p>
<ul>
<li>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/StopMalvertisin">Kimberly</a> for the payload identification.</li>
</ul>
<div class="footnotes">
<ol>
<li id="fn:1">
<p>For instance CVE-2016-7855 has been integrated as a 0day in Sednit EK in october 2016. <a href="#fnref:1" class="reversefootnote">&#8617;</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn:2">
<p>It was not exactly a malvertising but some ad server compromission and nothing, but a bunch of shadowed domains, was really taken down <a href="#fnref:2" class="reversefootnote">&#8617;</a></p>
</li>
</ol>
</div></content><author><name>Kafeine</name><uri>https://twitter.com/kafeine</uri></author><category term="CVE-2018-4878" /><category term="GreenFlash Sundown" /><category term="WordsJS" /><category term="ShadowGate" /><category term="Hermes" /><category term="Magnitude" /><category term="Magniber" /><category term="Magnigate" /><summary type="html">The CVE-2018-4878 is a bug that allows remote code execution in Flash Player up to 28.0.0.137, spotted in the wild as a 0day, announced by the South-Korean CERT on the 31st of January. Patched on February 6, 2018 with ASPB18-03. Seen in malspam campaign two weeks after, it’s now beeing integrated in Exploit Kits. This is, as far as i know, the first new working RCE integrated in non targeted Exploit Kit1 since CVE-2016-0189 in july 2016 (!). GreenFlash Sundown: Spotted on the 2018-03-09 (but probably there since several days) Figure 1: Greenflash Sundown successfully deploying Hermes 2.1 Ransomware after exploiting Flash 26.0.0.131 in IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-03-09 GreenFlash is a private heavily modified version of Sundown EK spotted in october 2016 by Trendmicro. It’s beeing exclusively used by the “WordsJS” (aka “ShadowGate”) group. This group is getting traffic from crompromised OpenRevive/OpenX advertising server since at least may 2015. Figure 2: Some tagged activity from WordsJS displayed in MISP. Some references about the activities of this group: Blog/Tweet Date Author OpenX Hacks example (malvertising) 2015-05-19 @malekal_morte [Tweet] Malvertising via psychecentral[.]com 2015-10-12 @BelchSpeak Psychcentral.com […] Angler EK: Installs bedep, vawtrak and POS malware 2015-11-02 Cyphort Music-themed Malvertising Lead To Angler 2016-01-19 Zscaler [FR] Exemple d’une Malvertising sur OpenX 2016-04-13 @malekal_morte Top Chilean News Website Emol Pushes Angler Exploit Kit 2016-05-11 Malwarebytes Is it the End of Angler ? 2016-06-11 MDNC HillaryNixonClinton.com Shadowed Domains Lead to Neutrino EK 2016-08-12 RiskIQ Talos ShadowGate Take Down: Global Malvertising Campaign Thwarted2 2016-09-01 Talos Sundown EK from 37.139.47.53 sends Locky Ransomware 2016-10-17 @malware_traffic New Bizarro Sundown Exploit Kit Spreads Locky 2016-11-04 Trendmicro Files: Fiddler on VT - Pcap on VT (note: some https proxies were used) IOCs: MISP Json IOC Type Comment Date bannerssale[.]com|159.65.131[.]94 domain|IP Sundown GF Step 1 2018-01-09 aquaadvertisement[.]com|159.65.131[.]95 domain|IP Sundown GF Step 2 2018-03-09 listening.secondadvertisements[.]com|207.148.104[.]5 domain|IP Sundown GF Step 3 2018-03-09 65bd3d860aaf8874ab76a1ecc852a570 md5 Ransomware Hermes 2.1 2018-03-09 f84435880c4477d3a552fb5e95f141e1 md5 Ransomware Hermes 2.1 2018-03-10 If you saw this kind of traffic in your perimeter/telemetry, i’d be happy to get more referer Edits: 2018-03-10 - 15:40 GMT - Removed mention of steganography. @smogoreli: “simple offset in the dat file” Acknowledgement: Thanks to Genwei Jiang (FireEye) for the CVE identification. Thanks to Joseph Chen for inputs allowing the capture of a fresh pass of GreenFlash Sundown. Thanks to @GelosSnake &amp; @baberpervez2 for the ping on suspicious activity that could be associated to “WordsJS” (aka “ShadowGate”) and triggered those checks. Magnitude: Spotted on the 2018-04-01 Figure 3: Magnitude successfully deploying Magniber Ransomware after exploiting CVE-2018-4878 on Flash 27.0.0.170 in IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-04-01 Magnitude is using the WSH injection described by Matt Nelson in August 2017. Figure 4: UAC prompt on the wsh injection executed upon successful exploitation Payload is the Magniber Ransomware, first spotted in the wild in october 2017, in a context documented by Trendmicro. Figure 5: Some tagged activity from Magnigate displayed in MISP. Select OSINT about this infection chain: Blog/Tweet Date Author Magnitude Actor Adds a Social Engineering Scheme for Windows 10 2017-08-03 Proofpoint [Tweet] Ransomware spread by Magnitude. Hosted behind same infra. KOR focused for now 2017-10-16 Kafeine Magnitude Exploit Kit Now Targeting South Korea With Magniber Ransomware 2017-10-18 Trendmicro Files: Fiddler on VT - Pcap on VT (note: some https proxies were used) IOCs: MISP Json (note: all those are changing almost hourly) IOC Type Comment Date finansee[.]credit|209.95.60[.]115 domain|IP Magnigate Step 1 2018-04-01 adex7s92616.fryrids[.]com|144.217.197[.]9 domain|IP Magnigate Step 2 2018-04-01 353kb544cv.anlogs[.]space|66.70.223[.]111 domain|IP Magnitude Exploit Kit 2018-04-01 *.fitpint[.]website|139.60.161[.]43 domain|IP Magniber Payment server 2018-04-01 *.riskjoy[.]pw|162.213.25[.]235 domain|IP Magniber Payment server 2018-04-01 *.ratesor[.]site|198.56.183[.]147 domain|IP Magniber Payment server 2018-04-01 *.accorda[.]space|107.167.77[.]100 domain|IP Magniber Payment server 2018-04-01 *.uxijz4kdhr4jp3wf[.]onion domain Magniber Payment server on tor 2018-04-01 1d4b9c4b4058bfc2238e92c0eebb5906 md5 Magniber Ransomware 2018-04-01 RIG: Spotted on the 2018-04-09 Replying to a customer complaining yesterday (2018-04-08) about the lack of CVE-2018-4878, “TakeThat” wrote early this morning (2018-04-09): Чистки выполняются вовремя Конечно мы добавили флеш CVE-2018-4878 он доступен на подписке от недели Translated by google as: Cleaning is done on time Of course, we added the flash CVE-2018-4878 it is available on subscription from the week And indeed today as spotted by @nao_sec: Figure 6: RIG successfully exploiting CVE-2018-4878 on Flash 27.0.0.170 in IE11 on Windows 7 - 2018-04-09 IOC Type Comment Date cash111[.]club|18.220.221[.]2 domain|IP Keitaro TDS 2018-04-09 185.154.53.190 IP RIG 2018-04-09 omega.level7[.]gdn|89.45.67[.]198 domain|IP Urausy C2 2018-04-09 1bd20aa0433f3f03001b7f3e6f1fb110 md5 RIG Flash Exploit 2018-04-09 712385a6073303a20163e4c9fb079117 md5 Urausy - probably as a loader 2018-04-09 Fallout: Spotted on 2018-06-28, most probably there since 2018-06-16 Despite seeing code pointing to it, we did not saw it properly called in traffic. Figure 6: Fallout call for CVE-2018-4878 in it's landing 2018-08-30 Blog/Tweet Date Author Hello “Fallout Exploit Kit” 2018-09-01 Nao_Sec IOC Type Comment Date md5 747c32e55b4e847c3274503290507aa1 Fallout Flash Exploit 2018-08-31 Edits: 2018-04-10 - 10:05 GMT - Modified to reflect payload id: Urausy. Not seen since 2015-06-09 Acknowledgement: Thanks to Kimberly for the payload identification. For instance CVE-2016-7855 has been integrated as a 0day in Sednit EK in october 2016. &#8617; It was not exactly a malvertising but some ad server compromission and nothing, but a bunch of shadowed domains, was really taken down &#8617;</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/%7B%22thumb%22=%3E%22blog/CVE-2018-4878/CVE-2018-4878.png%22,%20%22title%22=%3E%22blog/CVE-2018-4878/CVE-2018-4878_title.png%22%7D" /></entry><entry><title type="html">The King of traffic distribution</title><link href="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/hosted/anonymous/kotd.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="The King of traffic distribution" /><published>2018-03-07T10:01:00+01:00</published><updated>2018-03-07T10:01:00+01:00</updated><id>https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/hosted/anonymous/kotd</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/hosted/anonymous/kotd.html"><p>Disclaimer: This post is hosted here as a courtesy to the author who prefers to remain anonymous. MDNC was not involved in any way with this study.</p>
<h2 id="introduction">Introduction</h2>
<p>EITest is one of the longest malicious delivery campaigns that has continued to evolve. In the spring of 2017, it started redirecting Internet Explorer users to tech support scams in addition to the existing redirections with the fake Chrome fonts.</p>
<p>We believe the tech support scam campaign we are describing in this post is one of the most widespread and well organized because it relies on several schemes in addition to EITest, such as traffic redirection using a distributed system infrastructure.</p>
<p>Actors behind this campaign are generating hundreds of domains per day.The only purpose of those domains names is to redirect users to tech support scams or malicious websites.</p>
<h2 id="highlights">Highlights</h2>
<ul>
<li>
<p>We were able to redirect a considerable amount of traffic destined to Tech Support Scam websites to a controlled infrastructure for a period of 8 hours. After they fixed the flaw that allowed us to do that, we were able to bypass the new protection in place to take control again of the traffic for another 6 hours.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>We discovered a network of bots controlled by a fraudulent Traffic Monetization company</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>We’ve collected a list of 1562+1294 compromised websites responsible for the redirections of users to scams</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The actors are generating over 100 new domains each day to serve TSS via <a href="http://www.freenom.com">Freenom</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="the-scam">The scam</h2>
<p>The landing page sometimes changes, but always has the same goal: trying to take control of the browser so the user cannot close it, in hopes that they will panic and call the phone number for assistance.</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tSJMGVg.png" alt="TSS-IE" class="center" /></p>
<p>Tech support scammer (TSS) are sometimes changing the landing page to better abuse the browser. Anyhow, this is what the current landing page looks like.</p>
<p>People that call those numbers will be told how to install a remote control software so the interlocutor can show Windows log events and services to the user, pretending that those are signs of an infected machine. The crooks will then offer a remote reparation service varying from $100 to $600.</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ofxzCJt.png" alt="Tech Support Scammer" class="center" /></p>
<h2 id="look-at-different-redirection-mechanisms">Look at different redirection mechanisms</h2>
<p>While analyzing the different ways for a user to be redirected to those scam support pages that try to hijack the browsers, we quickly documented multiple different redirection schemes using many different infrastructure. For this reason, we believe that many differents actors are responsible for sending traffic to the redirection network. Let’s begin by describing the most prolific methods of redirections.</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lxHMnaw.png" alt="Redirections_mechanisms" class="center" /></p>
<h2 id="eitest-redirection">EITest Redirection</h2>
<p>EITest infected websites have the capability of injecting javascript in page upon loading. We can observe redirections to tech support scam (TSS) websites <a href="http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2017/05/25/index3.html">since 2017</a>. The injection that occurs when the victim’s user-agent is IE, Edge or Firefox, is the following:</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NXWZrn3.png" alt="EITest TSS" class="center" /></p>
<p>This script will, after verifying that it is running in a real browser, set a cookie named “<strong>popundr</strong>” and redirect the user at a decoy URL, <code class="highlighter-rouge">hxxp://checkalldir.bid/index/?MGjJPm</code> in this case. Decoy domains injected resolve to IP <strong>204.155.28.5</strong>, in a range belonging to KING-SERVERS (AS 14576). Since 2018-02-26, injected domains were resolving to IP <strong>54.36.180.110</strong> at OVH instead (AS16276). It later changed back to <strong>162.244.35.33</strong>, where TSS domains are now pointing.</p>
<p>This EITest campaign is generating ~1 new domain per day (usually with the TLD .bid). Those are easily recognizable by their patterns “<strong>/?{6 characters}</strong>” in the URL, but the pattern is changing about 4 times per day. The reason they are using a decoy URL and a specific pattern is so they can be routed through their Keitaro TDS (traffic distribution system). In fact, we can browse to the panel of this TDS by accessing it with the IP address at URN <strong>/admin</strong>:</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ubrDuCY.png" alt="tds" class="center" /></p>
<p>Routing requests to their TDS before landing on the final destination allows them to have better control of the traffic and manage multiple campaigns. They are also doing more filtering on who will be redirected through this URL. We know that they are verifying at least the user-agent of the requester before allowing any redirection. Here is what will happen when the victims get redirected to one of those domains:</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/32udaW5.png" alt="Curl referenz.bid" class="center" /></p>
<p>In this case, querying the decoy EITest URL with an user-agent set to “MSIE” was enough for the TDS to send a 302 redirection to the landing page: <code class="highlighter-rouge">hxxp://coloured-canvas.tk/?number=800-803-1741</code></p>
<h2 id="crypper-redirection">Crypper Redirection</h2>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/r715xB2.jpg" alt="Crypper Redirection" class="center" /></p>
<p>This campaign generates about 165 redirections / hour. Website <code class="highlighter-rouge">luyengame.com</code> was responsible for 904 redirections (68%).</p>
<p>For this redirection, we were able to get our hands on the malicious PHP file that is responsible for the generation of the script that redirects users:</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wl9prP0.png" alt="Crypper code" class="center" /></p>
<p>The PHP code will start by hiding any errors from the output and get the user-agent and referer of the visitor. Prior to the creation of the javascript that will redirect the user, the code checks that the visitor is not a bot (crawler) and that the visitor is not on a mobile device. If those checks pass, it will fetch the current Tech Support Scam (TSS) domain <code class="highlighter-rouge">hxxp://roi777.com/domain.php</code> and append the path “<strong>/index/?2661511868997</strong>” to it.</p>
<p>Finally, the function “<strong>redirectdd</strong>” is called with the created URL and the script will output with the latest domain that <code class="highlighter-rouge">roi777.com</code> provided:</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZhZRVlM.png" alt="Crypper TSS" class="center" /></p>
<p>The script then sets a cookie “<strong>1561065164894_CRYPPER</strong>” and redirects the user with <strong>window.location</strong>. Although simple, this script is efficient enough to redirect many visitors.</p>
<h2 id="biz-redirection">Biz Redirection</h2>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zoIK5qq.jpg" alt="Biz Redirection jpeg" class="center" /></p>
<p>This campaign generates about 1888 redirections / hour. Website <code class="highlighter-rouge">myilifestyle.com</code> was responsible for 1199 redirections (8%) and <code class="highlighter-rouge">www.fertilitychef.com</code> for 1091 (7%) of the redirections.</p>
<p>This redirection is distinguishable with the added path to the TSS domain: “<strong>/index/?2171506271081</strong>”.</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/G7lfNPK.png" alt="Biz Code" class="center" /></p>
<p>The script will fetch another script from <code class="highlighter-rouge">hxxp://5.45.67.97/1/jquery.js.php</code> and run it, leading to a redirection:</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ROiaKat.png" alt="Biz Redirection png" class="center" /></p>
<h2 id="plugin-redirection">Plugin Redirection</h2>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/H9JjeBT.jpg" alt="Plugin Redirection" class="center" /></p>
<p>This campaign generates about 184 redirections / hour. Website <code class="highlighter-rouge">Archive-s54.info</code> was responsible for 119 redirections (8%).</p>
<p>This campaign has malicious Javascript slightly obfuscated by using the “reverse string” function:</p>
<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YIYBvDd.png" alt="Plugin TSS" class="center" /></p>
<p>There are a few variants of this script containing different URLs. By applying the reverse string function again on the string containing the malicious URL, we were able to identified all of them:</p>
<ul>
<li>hxxp://kodmax.com/wp-content/plugins/twitter-widget-pro/lib/<INFECTED.PHP></INFECTED.PHP></li>
<li>hxxp://www.katiatenti.com/wp-content/plugins/sydney-toolbox/inc/<INFECTED.PHP></INFECTED.PHP></li>
<li>hxxp://emarketing-immobilier.com/wp-content/plugins/gotmls/safe-load/<INFECTED.PHP></INFECTED.PHP></li>
<li>hxxp://stefanialeto.it/wp-content/plugins/flexible-lightbox/css/<INFECTED.PHP></INFECTED.PHP></li>