Perfect Darknet Roadmap Ticket

[synctext]

• Tribler anonymous downloads are fast

  Only 330KByte/sec is unacceptable for our video streaming use-case. Currently our GCM cypto or other bottleneck is slowing things down. slow anonymous downloads: Crypto CPU bottleneck #1882

• Tribler users never seed naked in Bittorrent swarms.

  Bittorrent swarms offer no protection, they leave people exposed and naked. Hidden seeding is the default in Tribler for sharing content and cannot be disabled. This ensures sufficient content becomes available with strong privacy in our darknet. Hidden seeding requires connectability of rendezvous and introduction points.

• Tribler can download from both hidden seeders and existing Bittorrent swarms.

  Tribler offers the best of both worlds. It always prefers downloading from hidden seeders using end-to-end encryption. If there are no hidden seeders available, you can anonymously download from normal Bittorrent seeders. Tribler offers this fallback option by default after trying for 180 seconds. This feature can be disabled easily if you prefer pure darknet-only downloads. Fallback option background: anonymous seeding and public-swarm fallback policies #885

• Tribler users never become an exit node, unless they explicitly volunteer.

  Our smooth backwards compatibility with Bittorrent comes with the cost of exposure in existing Bittorrent swarms. We need volunteers to run "exit nodes". These are the peers that receive encrypted messages from the darknet and unencrypted messages from Bittorrent peers. Running an exit node has proven to be a risky non-trivial task for the main Tor community. Lawyer-based attacks are very real for exit node volunteers. Ideally, only a single copy of each piece of content needs to be relayed by our exit nodes. If content is "pulled into the darknet" we can switch to end-to-end encryption and rely on hidden seeding. Ticket: No longer serve by default as an "Exit node" flag #1174 @rjruigrok

• long-term tit-for-tat for anonymity

  Develop an open community to disseminate sharing ratio of participants. You need to help and relay traffic of others. Related experimental work in the Tor community: GoldStar, PAR, BRAIDS, LIRA, TEARS, and TorCoin (Tribler Tickets: partly Bartercast statistics community #1230, also Rewarding good behavior #5)

• Collective intelligence around reliability of anonymous relay partners

  Share with the rest of the network who is actively helping others and who is freeriding. Introduce a Bitcoin-like accounting system. Instead of pointless hashing we use proxy helping bandwidth as our proof-of-work. Our protocol follows the Tor specification as much as possible, our circuits have a maximum lifetime of 10 minutes and also terminate after 55MByte of traffic (security limiters). Similar to private Bittorrent communities we use the sharing ratio to identify freeriders. Double signed signature record is created after proxy helping. These proof-of-work records are shared in the community (like Bitcoin public ledger). Each peer builds a database with the reliability of their neighbors, visualize in a graph (locally; no central accountant, controlling server). Rewarding good behavior #5

• real-time statistics of your relaying contributions and tunnel ratio

  Notify users they are freeriding and disable anonymous downloading. Be harsh, Tribler is only for social people!

• real-time anonymous tunnels reliability statistics

  Each member of the collective measures their perception of network performance and shows it to the user. Advanced programmer-minded feature and debugging. Add to the Tribler debug screen how many unique neighbors have been seen. Measure the proxy bandwidth donations and online duration (reliability) of yourself and neighbors. Show broken tunnel events. Show overall tunnel + hidden seeding reliability and performance for a tunnel tests and 50MB downloads.

• improved anti-spam measures, family filter accuracy and metadata in general

  Toward a Youtube-like experience within Tribler. With just as reliable metadata. @LipuFei

• credit mining for anonymous seeding

  Automatically boost poorly seeded anonymous swarms. Maximize the yield of your bandwidth by automatically detecting and anonymous seeding of swarms. Youtube-like streaming focus and auto-seeding #573 Anonymous seeding and rewards experiments #655 1 TByte of seeding #21, running code: Credit investments test: donate 1 TByte anonymously #23

• darknet mode: deny any connection with strangers

  Here we start to deviate fundamentally from the random-circuit building approach, used in Tor. In our fully distributed setting it is difficult to protect yourself from various kind of attacks, like the Sybil attack. By not accepting connections from strangers we constrain a lot of attack classes. Every Tribler user that has a healthy set of neighbors to relay traffic with shall not interact with strangers.

• DTLS

  Besides our existing onion encryption we need additional point-to-point encryption. This is not needed for simple lawyer-based adversaries or snooping ISPs, but for more advanced attackers.

[colin1497]

With regard to "never" being an exit node, a more logical/usable approach is to allow being an exit node only for your own torrents. While ideally the darknet just works, a reasonable method of usage is: download torrent non-anonymously and switch to anonymous and only seed to the darknet after completion. Upon starting a torrent download, this process should be automatically selectable as an option, as in:

1. Download anonymous
2. Download public
3. Download public, switch to anonymous for seeding

Ideally there would be some feedback provided about the health of the torrent within the darknet, so if you were unlikely to have darknet success with option 1), you could easily select option 3).

[vvs-]

This paper has interesting relations to your work: Kadupul: Livin' on the Edge with Virtual Currencies and Time-Locked Puzzles

[synctext]

copied the text from our old ISSUE 1 ticket for archiving purposes, dated 5 March 2013

• Tribler anonymous downloads are fast
  Only 330KByte/sec is unacceptable for our video streaming use-case. Currently our GCM cypto or other bottleneck is slowing things down. slow anonymous downloads: Crypto CPU bottleneck #1882 end-to-end anonymous seeding and download performance test #2548
• User experience similar to Youtube
  Toward a Youtube-like experience within Tribler. Use the thumbnails pre-view of videos as the key navigation and content selection tool. Integrate our recommendation engine to the GUI, like Youtube. My updates: recommended based on your downloads and searches #1846. @devos50
• Anonymous Video streaming, similar experience to Youtube on-demand service
  Fast and robust downloads from hidden seeds. Users may need to wait a minute, but it simply works. Anon swarming: Swarming effect in anonymous downloads: unit tests, performance analysis, and improvements #1885 @lfdversluis
• Tribler users never seed naked in Bittorrent swarms.
  Bittorrent swarms offer no protection, they leave people exposed and naked. Hidden seeding is the default in Tribler for sharing content and can only be disabled deep in the settings screen. This ensures sufficient content becomes available with strong privacy in our darknet. Hidden seeding requires connectability of rendezvous and introduction points.
• Tribler can download from both hidden seeders and existing Bittorrent swarms.
  Tribler offers the best of both worlds. It downloads from hidden seeders using end-to-end encryption and through exit nodes from normal Bittorrent seeders. Tribler offers these downloads in parallel and tries to get the best download speed from both of them. The fallback option is outdated, anonymous seeding and public-swarm fallback policies #885.
• Tribler users never become an exit node, unless they explicitly volunteer.
  Our smooth backwards compatibility with Bittorrent comes with the cost of exposure in existing Bittorrent swarms. We need volunteers to run "exit nodes". These are the peers that receive encrypted messages from the darknet and unencrypted messages from Bittorrent peers. Running an exit node has proven to be a risky non-trivial task for the main Tor community. Lawyer-based attacks are very real for exit node volunteers. Ideally, only a single copy of each piece of content needs to be relayed by our exit nodes. If content is "pulled into the darknet" we can switch to end-to-end encryption and rely on hidden seeding. Ticket: No longer serve by default as an "Exit node" flag #1174
• Sharing ratio enforcement using Multichain credits
  Build in mechanism to determine who is helping others and who is freeriding. Improve our Bitcoin-like accounting system, called multichain. Similar to private Bittorrent communities we use the sharing ratio to identify freeriders. Double signed signature record is created after proxy helping or hidden seeding. These proof-of-work records are shared in the community (like Bitcoin public ledger). Each peer builds a database with the reliability of their neighbors, visualize in a graph (locally; no central accountant, controlling server). Rewarding good behavior #5 WIP: Multichain #1843, Sybil attack: sybil attack cost model #1844 pretty pictures: MultiChain part of standard Tribler unit test #1781 multichain brainstorm: strongest possible reputation system #31 @pimotte @pimveldhuisen @Captain-Coder
• credit mining for anonymous seeding
  Donate 25-100GByte to Tribler. Possibly even 1TByte. Automatically boost poorly seeded anonymous swarms. Maximize the yield of your bandwidth by automatically detecting and anonymous seeding of swarms. Youtube-like streaming focus and auto-seeding #573 Anonymous seeding and rewards experiments #655 1 TByte of seeding #21, running code: Credit investments test: donate 1 TByte anonymously #23 Operational credit mining branch, Gumby scenario and multichain #1842 @ardhipoetra 1TByte: @Pathemeous
• Android support for video recording and upload into Tribler/Bittorrent
  An Android app with the capability to record videos and upload the straight into Tribler as a Bittorrent swarm. Your mobile phone becomes a TV station, broadcasting videos in its own Tribler Channel. Tribler users can subscribe to your videos and see what is new. Support thumbnails. Android Devel on Jenkins #1782 Add libtribler recipe kivy/python-for-android#405 @brussee

[Destroyinator69420]

Spam resistance could be implemented by using hashcash. It would work because if the average computer took about 1 minute to crack a sha3-512 hash, then it would be unfeasible to send mass amounts of spam.